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Chapter 1:  Introduction and Overview    
 
This thesis is about innovation and power. Human nature has always been 
expressed by our capacity to innovate and adapt to almost any environment 
(Bowlby, 1962; Giddens, 1991). In the 20th century, the primary function of 
business organisations was to invent, produce and commercialise their products 
and services in different markets. As a matter of fact, business organisations in 
the last century proved to be the best way of disseminating innovation (Schön, 
1971). Currently in the 21st century, there is a call to better understand how new 
ideas, technology and sources of knowledge are managed, based on the premise 
that novelty can unfold anywhere and that innovation cannot be considered a 
linear process consisting of a chain of activities. 
Innovation is an abstraction embracing many different activities to ensure the 
long-term survival of firms: from design processes for new products or services 
to solving problems, increasing efficiency, reducing waste, developing the market 
and creating new business models (Day & Schoemaker, 2000; Van de Ven et al., 
2008; Chesbrough, 2006;2003). On the other hand, innovation is paradoxical in 
nature in that it can conflict with the existing status quo, that is, incumbent 
structures which are referred to as the “rules of the game.” This term stresses 
their political nature which, in business, essentially represents the rules and 
norms of markets and business organizations (or hierarchies) as well as their 
interaction.  
Early innovation studies stressed that novelty (new entrants, new laws, new 
technologies, and other “invaders”) can “annoy” markets by introducing 
differences that eventually change the “rules of the game” and alter the existing 
equilibrium. This process can create new conditions which are “destructive” for 
incumbent firms and existing offerings (Schumpeter, 1942). In contrast, and 
changing the perspective to the firm level, Alfred D. Chandler’s (1962) classic 
text, Strategy and Structure, hones in on innovation to discuss how enterprises 
develop new strategies to cope with new demands and how, as a consequence, 
they design appropriate structures to control and communicate activities through 
the different units that make up the business firm.  
Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation |  10 
 
Innovation at the firm level, in contrast to the processes of organic life and 
death, emphasizes managerial action to drive changes to fill the gap between 
strategies and the needed structures. It can be assumed, then, that innovation is 
a purposive managerial action requiring choices, investments and the 
mobilization of resources to avoid inefficiencies along the way. Innovation thus 
drives a complex organisational metamorphosis to unfold novelty, which, in turn, 
requires time to provide results and is expressed through a process. As such, 
innovation can be seen, metaphorically, as a path or a journey (Van de Ven et 
al., 2008), underscoring the inherent activity of “organising” as the creation of 
paths towards efficiency which are not pre-defined but dependent on managerial 
decision-making and action (Van de Ven, 1992). 
 
This path or journey consists of steps into the unknown, managing important 
risks that may vary along the way. The question is how to set the path. Options 
include markets and hierarchies, and their interaction. Today’s business context 
reveals increasing discontent with inefficient market fluctuations and cycles and, 
at the other extreme, mechanistic hierarchies. This researcher stresses here that 
innovation is dependent on having the appropriate structures, and that these 
structures, at the same time, can be seen as the result of innovation processes 
since novelties lead to structural change. Even though there are many business 
configurations (Mintzberg, 2002), organisations have shown a strong tendency to 
conform to “the machine” paradigm due to their need to develop scale and 
production efficiency. These kinds of structures show a strong propensity to 
engage in repetitive behaviour, being prone to highly stable organisational 
processes which can generate deterministic paths due to their dependency on 
the inheritance of past efficiencies. 
 
In contrast, Networks lie between markets and hierarchies, and are becoming a 
preferred context for a strategy based on innovation (Penrose, 2008; Powell et 
al., 2005). What distinguishes a network from other organisational structures is 
that it embraces the autonomy to choose to establish relationships driven by 
creative and differentiated actors. Networks reveal relationships and 
dependencies among actors (Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976), stressing that innovation 
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does not unfold in isolation, along with the need for governance and 
coordination. Here we can use the term ‘orchestration' as managerial action to 
define how a new path for innovation is created and how this path crystallizes 
into viable economic outcomes. Understanding this process is the main 
motivation behind this research.    
 
Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation 
 
The main question in this thesis is: “How does orchestration steer network 
behaviour for innovation?” To respond to this query, this phenomenon is 
presented as a managerial function to create new structures. Although this 
discourse is nascent, it has already received some attention in academic 
literature, combined with the strategic importance of networks, system 
integration and digital platforms (Chesbrough, 2008; Adner, 2006), the latter 
emphasising the role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). 
 
Orchestrating can thus be viewed as a managerial function that supersedes how 
economic factors can be managed to produce efficiently in mass markets. In 
other words, Orchestrating Innovation can be seen as an activity intended to 
manage investments in order to build paths of efficiency to better compete in 
existing markets but also as an activity for factor or market creation (Ghemawat, 
1997; Miller & Olleros, 2007). Paths are no more than expressions of dynamic 
and structural change, and networks have been used to examine these 
phenomena (Powell et al., 2005). These activities also require a better 
understanding of the duality of dynamic capacities to adapt and transform the 
environment (Teece, 2009; Augier & Teece, 2008; Pedersen, 1996). This is why I 
ground this function on a critical review of the existing literature, stressing the 
longitudinal empirical work carried out from 2004 to 2008 on two different cases 
of orchestration, spanning a period of approximately 25 years each. The aim of 
this thesis, then, is to contribute to existing theory and to managerial reflection, 
as well as to propose ideas for further research.   
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Innovation, Networks and Power   
 
With this function, the three main subthemes of this work are synthesised as 
follows: (1) innovation as a source of future value; (2) networks as different from 
organisations; and (3) power as management’s main activity and a means to 
understanding organisational structures. The intention is to make this research 
operational by focusing on the dual nature of innovation, that is, to create new 
factors and markets, and by examining the role of digital technologies in this 
process. Networks are indeed a good context to examine both the sources of 
innovation and how users learn to cooperate and use innovations.  
 
We have alluded to innovation as a journey. This notion has an antecedent in the 
metaphor of Ulysses and his journey from Ithaca to Troy and back. Ithaca here is 
a metaphor for Ideas, while Troy represents the world (In Latin, Terra). One 
case for the completion of the myth of Ulysses is the invention of the concept of 
Science: Ulysses returns to Ithaca from the contingent and temporal world to the 
eternal place where ideas reside. In this metaphor we can see the need for 
efficiency, on the one hand, because the time for the journey is limited just as 
human and organisational life is. On the other hand, there is a need to manage 
innovation, since realistic commitments are required under different conditions 
and sets of constraints, given that the journey is long and sea and metrological 
conditions changeable.  Perhaps the most celebrated episode of the Odyssey is 
when Ulysses binds himself to the mast to protect himself from the sirens' songs 
attempting to lure him off-course (see Elster, 2000). Here, Ulysses reveals his 
commitment to himself, to his men and the ship. Elster grounds his theory of 
binding rationality on this episode. By binding, we refer to the definition of an 
objective and remaining true to this goal throughout the journey, until the end - 
a fact which gives the trip meaning and represents effective actions, as occurs 
with a path towards innovation.  
 
The second aspect examined in this thesis is networks. The intellectual appeal of 
Innovation Networks resides in the variety of issues raised at the organisational 
level. Furthermore, these networks call upon individual attributes such as 
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creativity, knowledge and talent which contribute new combinations of existing 
resources (Pedersen & Larsen, 2006) with an intensive use of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs). Indeed, innovation is increasingly dependent 
on digital platforms (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008). Moreover, in the current digital 
era, it is somewhat difficult to define formal structures or ascertain where 
boundaries lie. Creativity and talent can be found beyond the walls of incumbent 
organisations which, in turn, are evolving and becoming more porous. In 
addition, the establishment of relationships with actors and partners from other 
organisations leads to the emergence of business networks.  
 
What distinguishes a network from other organisational structures, however, is 
that the former embraces creative and autonomous workers as part of its very 
foundation. This is not merely aesthetic intent since it has evident economic 
benefits: in knowledge-intensive environments, the average EBITDA 1
 
 per 
employee is 6 times greater than in productive industrial environments (see 
Beardsley et al., 2006). Indeed, networks are increasingly seen as emergent, 
alternative ways to organise, based on autonomy and voluntary relationships.  
Autonomy deals with empowerment and allows the actors to do more, conceiving 
networks as relationships among active members in contrast to hierarchical 
organisations where agents receive orders. Autonomy is about freedom. It 
highlights that group collaboration does not occur by accident or through 
coercion but by choice. There may be forces other than autonomy that link 
people together to co-create and co-produce. In this thesis we shall explore new 
phenomena that represent emergent organisational patterns which conflict with 
the traditional idea of hierarchical organisations and “central planners” (Hayek, 
1949) as well as with “chaotic markets”, which are also subject to non efficient 
cycles (see Penrose, 2008).  
 
For example, the Linux and Open Source movements encompass more than 
200,000 programmers outside formal organisations. If then, we accept that 
group collaboration is achieved based on human relations outside the “scientific”, 
                                                 
1 Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization 
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Taylor-based work plant model, what cohesive force is behind this organisational 
phenomenon? The concept of knowledge workers emphasises the idea of 
enhancing effectiveness through talent, interactions, diversity and heterogeneity 
(Powell et al, 2005). In a network context, creativity and inspiration do matter, 
but so do perceptiveness, communication and trust. Innovation occurs at the 
boundaries between mindsets, between subjectivity and objectivity, exploring the 
provisional territories of the unknown through communication and interactions 
(see Leonard-Barton, 1995) to create novelty.  
 
Finally, this is why power is the main theme of this thesis. It is worth noting that 
innovation, as a systematic activity, needs to understand power rules both at the 
structural level and at the level of managerial action in order to cope with its 
paradoxical nature, i.e., being critical to ensure long-term survival but, at the 
same time, serving as a source of conflict and tension in both markets and 
organisations by challenging the forces of equilibrium (Gersik, 1991). Innovation 
is not necessarily “good” or beneficial to all. Existing organisations and structures 
may not accept changes which are dependent on deviations from a previous 
path. Power is a resource to cope with resistance and with complexity because 
innovation is not an activity that unfolds in isolation. In a general sense, power is 
expressed by exerting ones influence to set boundaries or limits of action, 
reducing uncertainty and holding potential conflict at bay.  
 
Power and innovation, though, have compelling antecedents in both markets and 
hierarchies. Although hierarchies seemingly have a problem with the markets 
(and indeed with innovation); due to markets being unpredictable and 
hierarchies being bent on repetitive behaviour, leading to the production of 
outdated products and services for non-existing markets, jeopardising the firm’s 
performance and its future existence. On the individual level, there are classic 
and compelling antecedents which argue that both no control, or too much 
control may create spaces in which people cannot perform (see Freud, 
1921/2001; Morgan, 1997). In addition, there are also “anomic contexts,” to use 
Durkheim’s (1937; 1933) and Parson’s (1937) terminology, which can repress 
and eventually destroy the individual’s capacity for creativity and learning.   
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Network Leaders   
In this thesis there is an explicit interest in understanding Orchestration as a 
network capacity, but also the way in which individual leaders are related to this 
concept in terms of how they exert power and organise for innovation. Thus, this 
thesis not only examines innovation but also “the innovators” and “the leaders of 
innovation,” since this activity is dependent on strong psychological 
commitments. Managing innovation is a critical activity (Burns & Stalker, 1961); it 
is not easy but, rather, decidedly risky and subject to uncertainty. In fact, in 
contrast with mainstream myths which see the manager of innovation as “the 
heroic entrepreneur,” evidence shows that few managers survive the process of 
steering tottering organisations down new paths in their quest for structural 
change (see Kets de Vries, 2009). 
 
As argued, an increasing number of voices are questioning not only existing 
power structures in organisations and managerial practices (Benkler, 2006) but 
also the role of management (Hamel, 2007), thus superseding the administrative 
canon in which human beings are conceived as agents who are passive, reactive, 
opportunistic and “bound” in terms of rationality. So if group collaboration is 
achieved based on human relations outside the “work plant” model, what 
cohesive force is behind this organisational phenomenon? What source of power 
is behind it? Similarly, power and organisational structures can shape 
contributions from new voices, along with the contribution of novel ideas and 
interactions from this new type of worker. 
 
With respect to the question posed at the beginning of this introduction: it is 
quite obvious that managing innovation is difficult and risky and thus implies 
facing important challenges. This thesis also examines individual capacities in a 
more normative way, by considering situations in which the organisations studied 
face the risk or the reality of discontinuing some business units or production 
lines. It is precisely in this context that Orchestration has been observed. The 
question here is, returning to the myth of Ulysses, how managers are able to 
make realistic commitments under different conditions or sets of constraints, and 
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how this affects innovation, since the journey is long, and the sea and 
metrological conditions , may change. 
 
Organisation of this Thesis 
 
This thesis presents Orchestrating Business Networks for Innovation as a 
managerial function to create and capture the value of innovation. It is only one 
of many ways to innovate. The core of this function is to intermediate between 
the past, the present and the future, mobilising relationships and networks to 
unfold novel results and create a path for efficiency whose objective is to set a 
path for innovation. This function presupposes that networks are a natural 
context for creativity and autonomy, opening up new possibilities, because 
managing network behaviour can change the rules of the game. Managerial 
capacities focus on how to dynamically manage the equilibrium and boundaries 
of action. How is the function of Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation 
better able to adapt as a process-like approach? 
 
This thesis is grounded on the strategic management and dynamic capacities 
perspective, that is, based on understanding how potentialities unfold towards 
future capacities (Teece, 2007; Augier & Teece, 2008) and underscoring the 
notions of co-creation and collaborative organisation (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1996). Relationships are thus considered to be the principal resource of any 
network, and, by engaging in relationships, we must understand that they are 
investments. Since innovation is a journey, the different factors, dependencies 
and context will change along the way, as will the managerial actions affecting 
creativity. It also implies openness, new voices, perspectives and the ability to 
develop learning capacities within the network. By the same token, most 
products require services from several resources, and firms may need several 
products and services as well as a combination of knowledge to develop a new 
resource. 
 
Based on the above arguments, this thesis consists of eight chapters. Following 
this introduction, Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on networks of 
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innovation, providing definitions for the terms innovation, networks and power, 
and reviewing the literature according to three power dimensions: centrality, 
control over resources and dynamic capacities. A classification of Networks of 
Innovation based on these dimensions is also given. Finally, the existing gap that 
has been pointed out in recent literature between power and orchestration is 
highlighted.   
 
Chapter 3 presents Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation as a 
managerial function. This role is presented as a path that starts from the current 
situation and drives network behaviour to a possible future, seeing innovation as 
a process or a journey affecting: (1) network dynamics and digital platform 
management and (2) individual management regarding organisational, economic 
and conflict management capacities. Networks evolve over time; they are not 
static structures. A process-level approach and the managerial function in 
innovation are highlighted. How do processes cope better with the need to 
innovate in networks? What does network memory mean? How does it affect 
current and future actions in helping to redefine behaviour and developing 
guidelines for new actions? 
 
Chapter 4 describes my paradigmatic position and research design, explaining 
the theoretical foundations for the methodological approach and the exploratory 
method used. The point of departure for this work in terms of this researcher’s 
scientific position is explained, and the set of analytical techniques and 
perspectives which serve as the basis to perform the research presented in this 
thesis are elaborated upon.   
 
Both Chapters 5 and 6 contain an analysis and description of the cases on which 
the empirical part of Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation is 
grounded. Chapter 5 presents orchestration’s capacity to dynamically manage 
network boundaries and explores the concepts of roles, relationships, autonomy 
and robustness; it also proposes a way in which to analyse the cases presented 
at different stages of network evolution: their formation, growth, change and 
stabilisation to dynamically co-create digital platforms. Chapter 6 explores the 
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role of digital platforms in Generative Networks and their relationship with the 
creation of new markets and dominant designs, co-creative activities and 
programmed changes based on digital platforms.  
 
Chapter 7 specifically analyses the role of the Network Leader, focusing more on 
a normative view and exploring subjective perspectives regarding managerial 
practice according to my observations and reflections in this research. Here, the 
capacity to manage conflict, organisational capacity and performance is 
examined. Moreover, the role of leadership and its implications for Orchestrating 
Networks are analysed.  
 
Chapter 8 concludes with the theoretical contributions of the function presented 
in this thesis and poses questions and challenges for further research.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation |  19 
 
Chapter 2: Networks of Innovation, a Literature 
Review  
 
 
2.1.- Introduction  
This chapter presents the literature review of this thesis: Networks of Innovation 
and defines Innovation, Networks and Power, organised as the three main 
themes of this thesis. Next, the main themes that relate networks and innovation 
are given, as well as the concept of Network Structure and Equilibrium that 
prepares for the next chapter where the main notion of this thesis, Orchestrating 
Network Behaviour for Innovation, grounded in structural change and dynamics, 
is presented.  
Finally, the literature of Networks of Innovation is reviewed around the notion of 
focal firms and orchestrators to describe three power dimensions: centrality, 
control over resources and dynamic capabilities presenting different structures 
and configurations. This has two intentions: first, a classification of Networks of 
Innovation is presented with emphasis on these power dimensions, and second, 
the gaps between Orchestration and Power are presented and explored.  
 
2.2. – Main Definitions 
 
2.2.1. – Innovation 
 
This thesis defines Innovation as the relationship between current business 
affairs and possible future ones. To that end, it is recognised that innovation is a 
process that can be represented metaphorically as a journey or a path (Van de 
Ven et al., 2008). As a process, innovation is required to guarantee long-term 
organisational survival and to overcome sub-optimal regimes (Elster, 2000:1). 
However, it is also a source of conflict and tension, since any innovation 
introduces a difference that can upset the forces of equilibrium in organisations, 
industry structures and markets (Gresov & Drazin, 1997).  
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Innovation is linked to revolutionary behaviour, according to Elster (1989; 2000), 
and starts by holding some resources for short-term consumption, and investing 
them to build and co-create something new. This recognises that the potential 
results and benefits of these shared investments require time.  As such, a process 
view is needed to examine and understand the set of activities involved.  
Indeed, innovation dynamics may be synthesised into two major processes: (1) 
product/market competition, and (2) factor/market creation (Miller & Olleros, 
2007; Ghemawat, 1997). The first process linking innovation with business 
activities is to find or create superior positions in good industry structures 
(Porter, 1980; 1996) and/or to identify, select and deploy resources to generate 
superior performance and competitive advantage (Barney, 1994; Wernerfelt, 
1984; see Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Overdorf, 2000).  
The second major process, factor/market creation strategies, considers 
innovation related to changes in structures, behaviour and styles, requiring the 
definition of a path to manage transitions. This approach is normally analyzed 
from the dynamic capacities school (Teece et al., 1997; Peteraf et al., 2008), 
which essentially focuses on organizational change by using capacities and the 
re-combination of existing resources (Augier & Teece, 2008). Processes of 
change are normally associated with networks, systemic innovations and digital 
platforms for extending the resource base at the structural level (Miller & Olleros, 
2007; Dyer & Kale, 2007). The strategy to engage in network exchanges is 
coherent with the aim of sharing the costs and risks associated with “leap frogs” 
or radical innovations (Penrose, 2008). 
 
2.2.2.- Networks   
Network is defined as a set of actors who are interconnected by a series of 
relationships (Emerson, 1962). Among the many types and existing definitions of 
Networks and Business Networks (see Alstyne, 1997), Networks of Innovation 
highlight the fact that firms cannot innovate alone, requiring searching for and 
engaging in productive relationships (Penrose, 2008; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 
2001; Jarrillo, 1993).  
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According to the literature reviewed, studies on Networks of Innovation focus on 
one of several areas: (1) the types of innovation involved, (2) network functions, 
(3) clusters, and (4) structural attributes such as “innovativeness” and structural 
change.  
 
First, Networks of Innovation allow scholars to examine the type of innovation 
that takes place, that is, whether these networks give rise to: (1) radical or 
continuous innovations (Christiansen, 1997) or (2) unique or systemic changes 
(Teece, 1987). Here, innovation studies emphasize the level of connectivity 
between complementary components (Chesbrough, 2008; Teece, 1989). Second, 
studies on network functions encompass: (1) diffusion (Rogers, 1995) or – in 
very few analyses - on innovation generation (Van de Ven et al., 2008; Van de 
Ven & Rogers, 1988), (2) temporary entrepreneurial structures (Elfring & Hulsink, 
2007), or (3) even transitional organisations placed at the meso-level of analysis, 
between industry structures, markets and business organisations (Miller & 
Olleros, 2007).  Third, other studies focus on networks as “innovation clusters” or 
“hot spots”, revealing the dependencies of contemporary firmsupon their network 
relationships. Clusters enable and support business by raising productivity, the 
speed of innovation, and the faster formation of new companies (Porter, 1998; 
Cowan, 2007).  
 
Finally, structural studies examine focal firms, relational dynamics, network 
density, positions and the network capacity of “innovativeness” (Powell et al., 
2005; Powell, 1990; Damanpour, 1991). They focus on processes of innovation 
and dynamics (Murray, 2002; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1996) that are normally 
expressed as the generation of paths or trajectories (Pavitt & Steinmuller, 2002; 
Pavitt, 1984).  
In all cases, the emphasis of networks is on actors’ autonomy, creativity and 
motives for engaging in exchanges and communication, aspects that are briefly 
reviewed in the next sections.  
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2.2.2.1.- Creativity  
 
Innovation, as the propensity for problem solving and invention, is a natural 
(innate) human capacity (Huizinga, 1927/2002; Winnicott, 1971). Current notions 
of innovation embrace sophisticated processes and the management of many 
sources, making it an organizational activity, that although grounded in natural 
(innate) capacities, requires learning processes as well. One can define creativity 
as a function, an autonomous activity that gives us “the capacity to create the 
world” as a result of the experience of being alive and connecting what was 
unconnected (Kets de Vries, 1980; 2009). It is a part of instinctual human 
capacities and not necessarily a response or reaction to any external stimuli 
(Winnicott, 1971; 1964). Above all, however, it is related to the need to have fun 
and feel pleasure (Freud, 1966). Creativity is linked to fun, since it mixes reality 
and imagination, implying “as if” situations for problem-solving, theories, 
symbols, projects, riddles and playing (Huizinga, 1927/2002; Winnicott, 1988). 
This natural capacity allows for the exploration of boundaries between 
subjectivity and objectivity to recreate the world around us, to understand it 
better and to engage in productive social interactions. 
 
2.2.2.2.- Autonomy     
The key notion here is autonomy, the capacity to choose and engage in 
voluntary associations (Hayek, 1949/2009; Rand, 1967; Child, 1972). The notion 
of autonomy is a relative concept since it implies degrees. Further, in order to 
make sense of the concept, it needs to be differentiated within the framework of 
the different contexts in which we carry out our activities. Autonomy in terms of 
citizenship implies freedom of choice with a certain set of constraints normally 
based on constitutions, laws, as well as on social norms. In business activities, 
the degree of choice may refer to “job description” or “accountability”.  
Networks of innovation refer to the degree in which one can establish 
relationships with other firms beyond the existing legal and cultural 
organizational norms. Indeed, it is supposed that autonomy allows the actors to 
do more, conceiving networks as relationships among active members, with an 
emphasis on the links that are set beyond formalized relationships, thus 
emphasizing commitments and trust dynamics (Thorelli, 1986; Ring & Van de 
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Ven, 1994; Barney, 2007). Yet, the autonomy is not absolute but rather in 
degrees and is dependent on the autonomy of others, as it takes two to 
collaborate. Therefore, by stressing autonomy, the need for constraints is 
emphasized, since it is not the case that any choice goes.  
This contrasts with the passive recipients of orders given by agents in 
bureaucracies, and also highlights the fact that teams or “group collaboration” 
are dependent on willingness to collaborate, individual capacities (see Bowlby, 
1985), which constitute constraints that make this cooperation possible, 
emphasising that relationships among autonomous actors do not occur by 
accident or through coercion. There may be some other forces that link people 
together to co-create and co-produce. Actors that forge a Network for Innovation 
tend to create enduring social relationships based on rational choice and the 
calculation of future benefits and costs (Cook & Emerson, 1984; Child, 1972). 
 
2.2.2.3.- Motives     
 
According to the literature reviewed, actors join networks in order to: (1) share 
the costs and risks of innovation (Penrose, 2008); (2) take advantage of the 
superiority of networks in terms of transaction costs (Kogut, 1988; Coase, 1988; 
Williamson, 1991; 1975), thus reducing risks of opportunism and economic 
friction between partners along with misunderstandings and conflicts that may 
lead to delays, breakdowns, and other malfunctions (Williamson, 1994; 
Eisenhardt, 1989:2); (3) take advantage of strategic and resource-based fit 
(Kogut, 2000); (4) benefit from social and cultural fit among actors (Eisenhardt & 
Shoonhoven, 1996); and (5) benefit from trust in network dynamics (Ring & Van 
de Ven, 1994).  
 
On the other hand, Sociology is based on exchange theories (Emerson, 1962; 
1987; see also Molm, 2003) in which the main assumptions are that network 
formation is the result of: (1) an actor’s behaviour motivated by the desire to 
increase gain and avoid loss; (2) exchange relations developing into structures of 
mutual dependency and power dynamics; (3) actors engaging in recurrent, 
mutually contingent exchanges with specific resources and partners over time; or 
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(4) valued outcomes obeying the economic law of diminishing marginal utility 
(Molm et al., 2000; Molm, 2003) which leads to the principle of equilibrium that 
is presented later.   
 
On this basis, Exchange theories predict that the behaviour of individual and 
autonomous actors depends on exchange dynamics and its effects as outcomes 
in the structure itself (Emerson, 1962; 1987; see also Molm, 2003). This requires 
a closer look at structural dynamics and the notion of power and governance.  
 
2.2.3.- Power  
Power is the capacity to generate dependencies in others in order to steer their 
behaviour. It is considered to be a resource in organisational literature. In a 
general sense, it is expressed through the causation of the following effects: (1) 
the influence over others’ behaviour (Scott, 2001); (2) the ability to determine 
boundaries or limits of action (Bettelheim, 1988; Bowlby, 1962; Emerson, 1987; 
Mintzberg, 1973); (3) reduced uncertainty (Thompson, 1967/2003; Child, 1972) 
and (4) holding conflict (Pfeffer, 1994; Milgram, 2005).  
As such, power can be seen as linked to strategy and the contingent nature of 
human action (Clegg, 1989), which is subject to constraints (Barnard, 
1938/1968), both in economic and social life (Elster, 1989). Thus, power is 
connected to strategy, since it is about making a choice to set chosen constraints 
on organisational behaviour, that is, about shaping a style. Second, power relates 
directly to structures (Giddens, 1987). Structures are defined by their boundaries 
(limits of behaviour), roles and relationships, variables that, on the one hand, are 
interrelated, and do not vary independently, and, on the other, which shape and 
are shaped by behaviour (Schön, 1971; Giddens, 1987). 
Power is related to conflict theories (Gersick, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
This is in contrast to “politics” or the resistance to managerial action (Pfeffer, 
1994; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Indeed, networks are political organizations, the 
arena of tensions and conflict, that Thorelli (1986) metaphorically calls “network 
entropy.” This consists of: (1) conflicting relationships in order to control 
resources (Gresov & Drazin, 1997); (2) relational tensions between autonomy 
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and cohesion (Nhoria & Ghoshal, 1997); (3) loose goal-setting and direction; 
and/or (4) other variables that may conflict with managerial purposive action 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Benkler, 2006). The control of entropy is thus, in a 
continuous flux of balance with mutual adaptation between actors and the 
governance and coordination mechanisms (Thorelli, 1986).  
Power studies generally start at the relational level (Clegg, 1989; Emerson, 1962) 
and expand into the aggregated level, addressing the critical notion of “co-
ordination” (Galbraith, 1977; 1973) and its influence on relational dynamics, roles 
and network boundaries, variables that are interrelated with the notion of 
structure (Schön, 1971; Abbott, 1995). Power in management studies is normally 
associated with strategy, choices and action towards equilibrium and cohesion, 
that is, how to set and transform structures, the key notions that are explored in 
the next sections.  
 
2.3.- Network Structures  
A network structure is the combination of roles, relationships and boundaries 
(Abbott, 1995; Schön, 1971). Obviously, structures also embrace network 
resources such as technology, trust and core competences (Kash & Rycoft, 
2000). Boundaries can be defined as limits of behaviour (which has resource-
based, strategy, technological and social dimensions), being the result of 
cooperative decision making as well as investment, which clearly limits and 
shapes the roles and relationship dynamics, and therefore the structures.  
Since networks emphasize autonomy, there may be a variety of actors and roles. 
In this regard, networks cannot be considered “unitary” or “monolithic” 
organisations, what should be emphasized is the role of their actors, the 
reciprocal interactions linked with this, the fit between the actors (at strategic, 
resource and social levels) and how decisions are made in order to build the 
structure (Einsenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). As such, networks have to be 
seen as complex systems (Garnsey & McGlade, 2006) which, by definition, need 
boundaries to survive and set equilibrium. 
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2.3.1.- Equilibrium  
Power therefore, has the function to shape Network structures and influence the 
effectiveness of innovation by maintaining equilibrium within the creative 
tensions between actors and their conflicting interests, objectives and demands 
in the network (Quinn, 1988; Shenkar & Zeira, 1992).  
Equilibrium is defined as the situation in which the network actors expect to 
receive more value back, than the risks and costs they incur by being a part of 
the network (Barnard 1938/1968). 
As such, networks have to be seen as complex systems (Garnsey & McGlade, 
2006) where power has the function to shape network structures and explain and 
locate the limits. Complex structures, by definition, need “rules of the game” to 
set an equilibrium that leads to a pattern of behaviour which is conducive to 
survival (Stacey, 2003). 
In fact, studies on innovation related to 
equilibrium and change have commanded the attention of theorists for a long 
time (Gersick, 1991; Weik & Quinn, 1999; Demers, 2007; Lam, 2007).  
Sociology focuses on how these limits are set: they can be the result of coercion, 
force and manipulation or of legitimacy, influence, wisdom and signification 
(Clegg, 1989) which may lead to social consensus to build structures (Parsons, 
1937). Consensus is a more democratic (bottom-up) approach which can be 
understood as the set of constraints or “binding obligation” a society chooses as 
the rules of the game; this includes sanctions which serve solely as a deterrent 
(Parsons, 1937).   
 
2.4.- A Classification of Networks of Innovation        
 
After these main definitions, we present a classification of different “Networks of 
Innovators” based on power This is essentially focused on purposive action and 
the presence of a focal firm. This classification is based on reviewed literature 
(Powell & Grodal, 2007; Conway & Steward, 1998) where the criteria is focused 
on two variables: (1) the existence of a focal firm in their configurations vs. 
socially emergent relations of all kinds (Scott, 1991; Tuomi, 2002; Bijker & Law, 
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1992), with little or no managerial action or design, emphasising “political” ties, 
friendship or work relations (see also White, 2008; Krackhardt, 1992); and (2) 
the general capacity to innovate (or innovativeness) vs. the purposive capacity to 
generate one specific innovation, stressing that the locus of innovation, which 
can be defined as the spot where innovation is “concentrated,” can vary from the 
focal firm to the network (Powell et al., 1996). 
 
The network map presented in Figure 2.2 is derived from traditional static socio-
gram analysis (or visual structural analysis). It has a quantitative dimension 
(inclusion, number of ties and density) and a qualitative dimension regarding 
network components (diversity, sources of innovation, and formal and informal 
structures). In the figure, and according to literature, the following structural 
aspects are emphasized: (1) the tendency towards actor isomorphism or 
differentiation; (2) formal or informal relationships; (3) the type of innovation: 
continuous, radical, and unique vs. systemic; (4) the variation from top-down 
managerial processes, associated with task definition, which leads to the creation 
of relationships and networks.  
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The Primoridal Network 
Nodes: Similar 
Common Social Identity; Conformity; Isomorphism
The Network creates the task (Multi-task)  
Social Innovation (e.g., language) 
Main assumptions: bottom-up; ties before tasks; multi-
function
Social Organization of Specialists
Communities of Practice
Networks for Discrete Innovations 
Nodes: dissimilar (complementary). May be similar if there 
is competition or geographic assignments
Incremental and radical innovation
Organizations based on time-dependent teams 
Main assumptions: bottom-up and top down; ties and 
tasks interaction; one function
Project-based Organizations 
Strategic Alliance /Differentiated Network 
Nodes: Differentiated and Autonomous
Relationships: Symmetric (peer-to-peer) 
Specialization, complementarities and division of labour
Main assumptions: bottom-up and top down; ties and 
tasks interaction; multi-function
Radical Innovation
Open Innovation
Clusters and Regional Networks
The Transactional Network 
Nodes: dissimilar (complementary). May be similar if there 
is competition or geographic assignments
The work creates the Network 
Incremental innovation – on the existing process 
Main assumptions: top down; tasks before ties; one 
function
Keiretsu / Networks of Providers
Networks of Diffusion  
Dominated Networks 
Focal Firm
Centric
Social-Centric
Focus on General Innovative 
Activity (Innovativeness) 
Focus on Specific Innovative 
Activity  
 
                                                          Figure 2.2: Networks of Innovation 
                                                          Source: adapted from (1) Conway & Steward (1998) and (2) Powell & Grodal  (2007)  
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2.4.1.- The Primordial Network  
 
The Primordial Network is the expression of the emergent and natural social 
order (White, 2008; Giddens, 1987; Emerson, 1962; Merton, 1959; Freud, 1966). 
The literature normally assumes bottom-up or emergent processes of social 
formation, with the term “social,” referring to little or no managerial action (see 
also White, 2008; Krackhardt, 1992). These include the structure itself as a 
result, normally through an unconscious processes of identification.  
Identification does not necessarily presuppose common identity or trust among 
members, since this social process is a primordial enactment that “fills the gaps” 
with one’s internal assumptions projected onto others (Wilson et al., 2008). 
Primordial Networks can evolve into shared identities, trust and learning (Lave, 
1988; Lave & March, 1975) that can be found in communities of practice, 
although they may be based on tacit knowledge and experience when producing 
innovations (Wenger et al., 200; Wenger, 1998).  
 
           Structural Hole Theory Social Capital Theory  
      
           Figure 2.3: Structural Hole and Social Capital Theories                                      
 
Focal firms, as depicted in figure 2.3, are created by a collective, but they can 
also find good opportunities for innovation by linking to distant groups, the focal 
firms serving as bridges (Burt, 1992). Moreover, focal firms can create a context 
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in which actors exchange more contacts and social capital in order to enhance 
the appearance of novelty (Coleman, 1990). In these networks, social structures 
can last for generations, presenting what is called familiarity or embeddedness 
(Granovetter, 1985) as a process in which identification can be grounded on 
familiar roles and structures (White, 2008). High levels of embeddedness may 
lead to resistance to innovation (Sambamurthy, 2000). 
 
2.4.2.- The Networks of Discrete Innovations  
The Networks for discrete innovation are formed or designed to develop a 
specific innovation and can vary from project-based organisations (Söderlung & 
Bredin, 2006; Schön, 1971) to long-term relationships with strategic purposes 
(Gulati et al., 2000), depending on the nature of the innovation.  
Network duration and dynamics can be the result of purposive action and/or 
socially emergent processes, combining design and purpose (Doz, 1996). Their 
classification can range from informal to contractual, representing the degree of 
purposiveness or calculation and relating decision-making processes to network 
formation and evolution (Child & Rodrigues, 2003; Kogut, 2000; Merton, 1959). 
The social centric approach recognizes that these networks are characterised by 
initial “informality” (Gummesson, 1999; Mintzberg & Van der Heyden, 1999). In 
this kind of network there is no clear role for the focal firm. At times, strong 
leadership may emerge, while on other occasions, leadership is a role that can 
“rotate” throughout the project.  In the literature, references to business 
networks date back to the late 19th century in the form of “industrial districts” or 
“clusters” consisting of geographically concentrated groups of small or medium-
sized organisations (Breschi & Malerba, 2007) which depended on one another 
for a variety of services, sometimes related to technology (Porter, 1998; Cowan, 
2007). 
The main risk, however, is precisely the presence of different leaders with 
different perspectives and interests who may wish to establish different rules of 
the game at the structural level, in terms of roles, relationships and functions. In 
this case, political mastery is an essential skill, as is the capacity to generate trust 
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in order to exchange knowledge and resources for a given project or a task 
(Thorelli, 1986).  
 
2.4.3.- The Transactional Network  
 
Focal firms steer Transactional Networks that have a clear and conscious 
principle of operation that is driven by the task design, the project and a strong 
focus on efficiency and operational robustness (Vervest et al., 2005). These 
relationships are normally considered “formal” and “purposive” in most of the 
reviewed literature, recognising the power relations between the focal firm and 
the network (Wasserman & Galaskiewicz, 1994; Powell & Grodal, 2007).  
 
Some examples are Keiretsus or Networks of Suppliers. Normally in these 
networks, deep structures remain, and focal firms co-ordinate activities to create 
sustainable incremental innovations to resolve problems (Lasserre, 1992), as well 
as to create mechanisms to spread innovation (Rogers, 1995). They do this by 
downsizing-driven activities that are de-layered, core-competence-based and 
“lean and mean” (Lasserre, 1992). The reasons for their formation include: (1) a 
firm’s focus on its core competencies (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990); (2) the 
reduction of internal control in favour of externalising certain activities due to 
their specialisation; and (3) the reduction of the transaction costs associated with 
dealing with network partners (Hagel III & Singer, 1999; Gurbaxari & Whang, 
1991; Williamson, 1994; 1991). Specialisation and differentiation are brought 
about by the selection of the firm that controls the network and the various 
components it comprises.  
 
 
2.4.4.- The Strategic Alliance  
 
Focal Firms steer Strategic Alliances when the actors’ roles and governance are 
clearly set out and when relationships tend to be long-term (Gulati et al., 2000). 
Relationships are normally considered “formal” and “purposive,” recognising the 
power relations between the focal firm and the network (Wasserman & 
Galaskiewicz, 1994; Powell & Grodal, 2007). Strategic alliances for innovation 
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emphasise one focal firm that exhibits clear managerial intentions and rules of 
the game to drive core capabilities, while recognizing emergent processes. These 
can include system integration and open innovation (Chesbrough, 2008) or R&D 
activities in a particular field (Powell et al., 2005).  For this, managerial action 
focuses on partner selection and fit, affecting the alignment of objectives 
(Jarrillo, 1993), performance levels, cycles of slack (free resources) and 
investments (Nhoria & Ghoshal, 1997; Huber, 1991; 2006).  
It can be argued that differentiated networks can be a natural extension of 
Strategic Alliances, since they emphasise the resource view on competitiveness. 
However, in this case, the focal firm can be associated with the role of 
Headquarters, and putting an emphasis on autonomy may lead to more than one 
differentiated focal firm (one for each node in the network), thus emphasising 
power dynamics as a key variable to understanding network evolution.   
These Networks of Innovation emphasize resource-based views that argue that 
each actor may succeed by owning specific, rare, inimitable and unique 
resources, including tangible and intangible ones (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 
1994; 2007). The resource view in networks emphasizes “resource bases” such 
as relationships, governance and trust (Barney, 2007); product and service 
specificity (Powell, 1990); knowledge exchange (Tsoukas, 1996; Kogut, 2000); 
network core capacities (such as software production) and complementarities on 
their resource base (Teece, 1987; Kash & Rycoft, 2000); and social values and 
culture (Salk & Simonin, 2003; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). 
 
 
2.4.5.- The Differentiated Network   
 
The Differentiated Network can be seen as an evolution of strategic alliances 
adding legal boundaries or as an epistemic project to better understand the 
innovation dynamics of global firms. This approach emphasises a critical 
dimension for managing innovation: slack, introduced by Cyert and March (1963) 
in the Behavioural Theory of the Firm.  
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                                    Figure 2.4: Slack and Optimum   
 
Slack is essentially a notion used to define “free resources” such as innovation 
funds or discretionary payments (see Van de Ven & Hargrave, 2004; Nhoria & 
Ghoshal, 1997). Slack management is about balance and equilibrium, since, 
according to Nohria and Ghoshal (1997), innovation and slack have both positive 
and negative effects: positive, since slack encourages exploration and 
experimentation (March, 1991) and negative, because (too much) slack may 
encourage complacency and discourage discipline (see figure 2.4). A connection 
can be seen between slack and “loosely-coupled” structures. In both cases, their 
dependence with innovation is an inverse U-Shaped curve, therefore suggesting 
the idea of optimality. Here, an optimal amount of slack fosters innovation and 
serves as a point of equilibrium between experimentation and discipline. This 
optimal amount of slack is a question that every organisation needs to solve - 
case by case (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997, pp. 64). Structural dynamics is governed 
by boundaries and deep structures, and slack is normally associated with 
discretionary managerial decisions (Cyert & March, 1963).  However, they both 
share the idea of optimality and innovation, 
SlackTight Control                                Complacency
Innovation
understood as a response to cope 
with the administrative paradox formulated by Thompson (1967) in which 
organizations need to be efficient at exploiting their resources and flexible 
enough to dedicate free resources, investing them and build something new.  
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Networks emphasize a dialectical approach, recognising that they are complex 
structures of command, expertise, commitments and influence where 
orchestrators exert power to ensure innovation effectiveness, by maintaining the 
creative tension between the conflicting demands (Quinn, 1988), and ensuring 
purposive action that combines design and socially emergent processes (Doz, 
1996). 
The focal firm can be associated with the Headquarters (HQ), as mentioned, 
serving as the guardian of the doctrine, selecting territories for expansion, 
choosing the methods of diffusion, training people, socialising and incubating 
new agents, monitoring performance and keeping the network informed                  
(Barltlett & Ghoshal, 2002). However, every node within the network has 
autonomy, though we can consider that the firm sets the appropriate, nominal 
boundaries as a focal firm.   
Autonomy raises the issue of strategies and structural fit and its linkage to 
mutual adaptation between actors in the network. Here, two types of adaptations 
can be distinguished: (1) technical adaptations in product features or the 
production process and (2) mutual adaptations that bind companies together, 
often in a direct physical sense, reflecting a mutual commitment which, at the 
same time, is limited in time and empowers the companies (Hakansson & 
Snehota, 1989; 1995) 
Orchestration here relates to the management of a complex and plural political 
system. Business units, depending on their autonomy may have the capacity to 
adapt to every market and social reality, thus leading to differences and local 
innovations. Indeed, innovation is related to domestic units and their capacity to 
distribute innovations between actors, as well as how other Headquarter-level 
innovations can be spread throughout the network, that is, how they engage in 
an inter-organisational exchange process.  
 
 
2.5.- Orchestration and Power  
 
We now present the results of the literature review regarding a specific set of 
Networks of Innovation, that is, those that have a focal firm in their structures. 
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In the next sections, we review power and orchestrating theories, normally 
crystallised in the dimensions of (1) Centrality and Roles, (2) the control over 
resources, and (3) dynamic capacities.  
 
2.5.1.- Focal Firms and Centrality and Roles  
 
A role, in abstract, is defined by a position, a function and the relationships with 
other members of the structure (Alvarez & Svejenova, 2005). In other words, a 
role belongs to the structure, not to the individual, since roles are ways of 
enacting a position in the existing game. This is why roles can include status and 
symbolic components. Power Theory considers “roles” or functions as sources of 
power (Mintzberg, 1973). 
The literature on Orchestration identifies the classic notion of power as centrality 
with the existence of focal firms in networks (Ahuja, 2000; Krackhardt, 
1990). The assumption is that the more central the node, the greater the 
influence that node has on overall network behaviour and the more dependent 
other actors become on the focal firm’s influence (Thorelli, 1986; Ferriani et al., 
2009). Centrality is based on position or pre-eminence (Wasserman & 
Galaskiewicz, 1994), 
For example, the literature recognises a focal firm’s influence on creating and 
managing a network of suppliers (Jarillo, 1992); it is also seen as a strategic 
apex or co-ordinator of inter-firm exchanges (Lorenzi & Baden-Fuller, 1995) or, 
more recently, as an Orchestrator for innovation (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006).  
legitimacy and signals of status (Molm, 2003), as well as on 
access to critical resources or knowledge sources (Kogut, 2000; 1988). Centrality 
is also explored for how it affects network-based teams and performance 
(Ferriani et al., 2009) or how it is correlated to absorptive capacity (Tsai, 2001) 
and knowledge recombination (Pedersen & Larsen, 2006).  
Focal firms can shape the possibility of creating alliances with such non-
redundant partners (Powell et al., 2005). This is based on the notion of ”multi-
connectedness,” that is, the degree to which actors are aligned with multiple 
role-relationships (Conway & Steward, 1998), becoming more and better 
informed, and thus increasing their bargaining power and gaining efficiency 
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compared to less central firms (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Burt, 2004). 
Moreover, centrality is also related to the need to invest resources and costs for 
intense co-ordination and administrative activities. It therefore requires a balance 
between centrality, innovation and performance (Tsai, 2001), as well as the 
capacity to manage free resources for innovation. 
 
2.5.2.- Roles of the Focal Firm  
The literature on Orchestration has metaphorically associated focal firms with 
managerial roles such as leaders, architects, builders, and nurturers 
(Hinterhuber, 2002) in line with Thorelli (1986), who argues that position and 
roles are intertwined. However, the most effective innovation leaders do not 
exhibit a single role; rather, they are characterised by demonstrating a variety of 
styles and playing other roles in the network, such as those proposed by Kelley 
(2005): anthropologists, experimenters, cross fertilisers, herders, collaborators, 
architects, set designers, care givers and storytellers.  
An interesting gap in the literature exists between Orchestration roles and 
leading innovation roles. Van de Ven et al. (2008) propose different innovation 
roles, in general: (1) the sponsor or entrepreneur who breaks the rules of the 
game and proposes new ones; (2) the critic, in opposition to the first role, 
tending to assume a conservative position, challenging innovation; (3) the 
institutional role which settles disputes and structures; (4) the mentor role, 
supporting the process of innovation; and (5) the sponsor who procures, 
advocates and champions the initiative (see Figure 2.1). 
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Critic or
Reactive
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Institutional
Leader
Settles structures
Settles conflicts and
disputes
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Mentor
Coaches , counsels ,
advises
 
                       Figure 2.1 Different Innovation Roles  
 
2.5.3.- Control over resources  
 
According to reviewed literature, Orchestrators can exert control over these 
resources by: (1) centralising decision-making and becoming a strategic apex in 
the network (Lorenzi & Baden-Fuller, 1995); (2) controlling some strategic assets 
that may provide a competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984); (3) bridging 
structural holes (Burt, 1992); (4) applying sanctions where needed (Jarillo, 1993; 
Powell et al., 1995); and (5) managing network processes such as resource 
selection and mobilisation, thereby facilitating co-operative strategies (Häcki & 
Lighton, 2001; Brown et al., 2002) and managing global operations (Fung et al., 
2007).  
Orchestrating therefore, can be explored by the effective management of control 
of network resources such as (1) position, centrality and managerial roles 
(already described); (2) the relational dynamics between actors in the network 
structure; (3) trust management and (4) digital platforms, since innovation is 
(increasingly) dependent on digital assets, communication and interactions (Von 
Hippel, 2005), aspects that are covered in the next sections.  
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2.5.3.1.- Relationship dynamics 
In Managerial Science, Teece et al. (1997) define relationships as a dynamic 
resource based on interactions, communication and exchanges. Relationships 
start at the individual level and can be defined by their purpose, that is, they are 
the result of choices made and the intentions to engage in exchanges, as well as 
the latter’s level of formalisation, intensity and frequency (White, 2008; 
Granovetter, 1985; Aldrich, 1979). Much of the literature focuses on exploring 
the relationship between formality and innovation (see Powell & Grodal, 2007; 
Mintzberg & Van der Heyden, 1999; Gummesson, 1999). While formalization 
depends on a set of norms and criteria to define what is formal and what is not, 
the notions of intensity, strength, and frequency can only be explained observing 
time evolution and dynamics.  
Although relationships are normally represented as “lines” due to the profusion of 
graph theory (see DeBresson & Amesse, 1991; see also, Conway & Steward, 
1998), the real meaning of relationships is expressed through their dynamics 
which shape actors’ behaviour and the relationships between them. Here, the 
preferred unit of analysis is power (Emerson, 1962; 1987; Abbott, 1995), 
focusing on how actors exchange resources and develop dynamics of 
dependency, in other words, symmetries and asymmetries. A relationship 
between actors A and B who exchange the respective resources x and y can be 
represented by a dyad such as Ax-By. The availability and value of the resources 
determine the power and dependency between A and B. The more dependent B 
is on x, the more power A has over B and vice versa (Emerson, 1962). Social 
exchanges not only include tangible assets, but also capacities such as affection, 
approval and status (Molm, 2003). Because power is dependent on its value to 
others, it is an attribute of the relationship, not only a question of the actors or 
the resources since what is valuable for one actor may not be so for another.   
Power and innovation are thus related to: (1) the nature and context of the 
relationship and its function, taking into account information and exchange of 
goods; (2) its formalisation, that is, the relationships that are managerially 
designed or emergent; (3) being competitive or cooperative (Child et al., 2006); 
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and (4) the intensity, strength and frequency of interactions which are normally 
shaped by emotional attributes. Emotions are taken into account when scholars 
differentiate between “strong” and “weak” ties (Granovetter, 1973; 1985) which 
are the translation of Bowlby’s Theory of Relational Dynamics to Sociology.  
This is based on: (1) attachment or the need to be close to someone on whose 
life we are dependent, a need which has developed through nurturing; (2) care-
giving, that is, the pleasure of taking care of others; and (3) sex as attraction or 
desire, which leads to the need for fusion and completion (Bowlby, 1962; 1980; 
1985; see Aron & Westbay, 1996).  
 
Theory of Attachment  Theory of Strong/Weak Ties  
Attachment  Trust  
Care-giving  Commitment  
Sex  Intimacy  
  Table 2.1: Comparison between Attachment and Strong/Weak Ties  
 
Moral approaches include “positive” vs. “negative” dynamics normally associated 
with trust and/or friendship (Krackhardt, 1990). Negative relationships are based 
on lack of trust, opportunism and visceral human passions such as envy and fear 
(Elster, 1989). A negative relational dynamic reduces the frequency of 
interactions, while a positive one increases the exchange frequency (Cook & 
Emerson, 1984).  
Maybe one of the most critical indicators of relational dynamics (and power) is 
reciprocity, focusing on the underlying structure of the relationship, which can be 
termed asymmetric or unilateral when the flow is one-way, and symmetric or 
bilateral when the flow is two-way. Asymmetric relationships imply inequality in 
power relationships, and symmetry implies peer to peer relationships (Pedersen 
& Larsen, 2006; Krackhardt, 1992).  
Symmetric and asymmetric dynamics shape knowledge exchanges, routines and 
relationship-specific assets requiring a dynamic approach to purposefully 
understand relational dynamics with innovation (Dyer & Kale, 2007). Therefore, 
dynamic capacities stress how competitive advantages can be obtained when 
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firms move away from “arms-length relationships” to create “purposeful 
idiosyncratic relationships” that can facilitate new combinations of resources and 
capabilities (Teece, 2009; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Almeida & Kogut, 1999).  
The above discussion emphasises that a central problem in developing a scientific 
theory about relationships is the intertwined and underlying economic, social, 
cognitive and emotional processes involved. Similarly, social dynamics and 
innovation dynamics differ, and people can use an almost infinite variety of units 
of analysis, causes and reasons to explain relational behaviour.  
 
2.5.3.2.- Trust   
 
The Neo-Classical perspective does not consider fairness or equity in decision-
making processes, therefore omitting the critical role that trust plays in network 
dynamics (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Teece, 2009). This is simply because it 
considers innovation to be dependent on investments, learning capabilities and 
knowledge transfers between firms (Gilsing et al., 2008), which require some 
degree of exposure (Zollo & Winter, 2002; Contu & Willmott, 2003). Resource-
based views recognise that trust can be a source of competitive advantage 
depending on how actors invest in governance schemes and how they set 
relational dynamics and interactions (Barney, 2007). 
Any innovation requires long, strategic relationships in order to create new 
knowledge. The latter, in turn, requires interactions and exchanges whose nature 
is essentially tacit (DeBresson & Amesse, 1991). Transaction Cost Economics – 
although important – fails to grasp the whole phenomenon, as it is biased 
towards controlling opportunism better. For example, Pedersen and Larsen 
(2006) suggest that the exchange of “innocuous knowledge” is one process to 
engender trust, and which allows actors to exchange non-competitive or 
Intellectual-Property-based knowledge and to later share, combine and co-create 
new knowledge to change perspectives and innovation structures.  
Clemmensen et al. (2008) provide a set of constructs or definitions from different 
perspectives. These are reproduced in Table 2.2 with some comments (see 
Clemmensen et al., 2008 for the complete set of references). 
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Basis of Trust  Construct  
Rational Choice  A rational actor only bestows trust if his/her calculations suggest that 
the benefits of reciprocated trust are higher than the losses implied by 
a betrayal.  
Cognition-based and 
Diversity 
 
Cognition-based trust is grounded on the factual knowledge that the 
party doing the trusting has about the trustee.  
Acceptance of diversity – the good and bad side of any relationship. 
Value/Norm-based Trust cannot exist unless individuals share the same values. 
Affect-based trust 
  
Expectation-based 
Emotional trust consists of the emotional bonds between people such 
as those provided by the relational dynamics in care, attachment and 
passion.  
Identification of the other’s expectations. 
Impersonal trust  Impersonal or passive trust is given to a social institution.   
     Table 2.2: Trust Constructs. Source: Clemmensen et al. (2008)  
 
Networks are inter-organisational forms, which, dependent on trust, are superior 
to exchange transactions and the internalisation policies predicted by classic 
Transaction Cost Economics. In consequence, networks can serve as a search 
and evaluation procedure to evaluate the other parties’ technologies while 
ensuring non-cash agreements on technological know-how (DeBresson & 
Amesse, 1991).  
One actor’s exposure may entail the risk of exploitation by another actor or the 
non-alignment between competitive and collaborative behaviour. Child et al. 
(2006) refer to competitive learning processes as opposed to co-operative ones 
in which actors can take advantage of other actors’ knowledge and not give back 
anything in return. Elster (1989), by contrast, sees opportunism as a major force 
for cohesion in social behaviour regarding access to scarce resources. 
Organisation Theory has devoted a lot of attention to controlling opportunism 
through formalised arrangements or contracts inside and between firms 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). The classical approaches of Agency Theory 
and Transaction Cost Economics are aimed at formalising methods to control 
self-serving behaviour or opportunism in more formalised organisations and 
networks, respectively (Eisenhardt, 1989: 2). In contrast, with the risk of 
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opportunism found in markets, the actors engaged in a network, in any type of 
relationship, expect goodwill from the others, since relationships require 
investments whose returns or benefits are postponed in time (Thorelli, 1986).  
 
2.5.3.3.- Digital Platforms   
 
A digital platform is a set of modular components that, on the one hand, offers a 
standard framework and, on the other, facilitates plug-and-play options (Van 
Heck & Vervest, 2007). The contribution of any actor to the digital platform 
makes the network dependent on: (1) the platform functioning; (2) how the 
network builds and develops it (Von Hippel, 2005; Delporte-Vernieren et al., 
2004); and (3) the way inter-organisational processes are digitalised and the 
correct definition of interfaces among firms (Vervest et al., 2008). In addition, a 
digital platform offers shared processes, interoperability and compatibility 
(Alstyne, 1997). The first obvious effect is noise reduction and lower transaction 
costs among firms (Gubaxari & Whang, 1991).  
The author suggests considering digital platforms as a proxy in a Network’s 
shared investments for innovation. Indeed, a digital platform may consist of a 
platform based on digital assets (such as web services) which can be co-created 
and co-produced, thus underscoring the role of technology as a space for 
creativity and co-creation. This idea highlights the digital platform’s role as a 
resource to contextualize and make sense of the ongoing network activity 
(Orlikowski, 1996; Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001), but it is also a means to propose 
new functionalities and compose them with the existing set of digital assets 
(Gawer & Cusumano, 2008).  
 
Since innovation is a process of stepping into the unknown, dependencies arise 
in terms of information exchanges and knowledge generation, thus highlighting 
the importance of digital platforms in network dynamics for innovation. Digital 
platforms can be seen as infrastructures for innovation (Lyytinen & Newman, 
2008; Van de Ven et al., 2008), particularly in networks, since they relate to 
power, structural resource and working systems (Mason et al., 1997; Day & 
Shoemaker, 2000). Moreover, digital platforms are the arena in which to carry on 
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with research on alternative ways for software development. This is evident in 
Open Source communities (Von Hippel, 2005; Raymond, 2001) or agile 
developments which can be found between too much and too little structure, 
focusing on collaboration and quick (or agile) adaptive responses to requirements 
(Kautz & Zumpe, 2008). Indeed, structures and working systems shape and are 
shaped by information systems, since communications are based on information-
related work (Orlikowski, 1996).  
 
In this context, actors’ choices to co-create and deploy digital systems are not 
the result of agency, teleology or blind adaptation (Lyytinen & Newman, 2008). 
We thus consider digital platform as a network structural communications system 
(Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001) that can foster togetherness and trust, allowing 
information to become knowledge (Kogut, 2000; Kogut et al., 1992) enabling 
actors to absorb and recombine this knowledge base (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Teece, 1987) and, thus, permitting the re-combination of the network’s digital 
resource base, and becoming the means through which the actors’ interactions 
can create new paths.  
 
On the other hand, the social constructivist views stress the capacity to develop 
innovation throughout social interactions (Elkjaer, 2003; 1999; Tuomi, 2002; 
Bijker & Law, 1992). In any case, digital platforms in this thesis are considered to 
be an outcome of the interaction process among actors in a network and a 
matter of strategic importance, since network and digital platform interactions 
shape the opportunities to develop options and strategic change and structural 
design (Easterby-Smith, 1997; Orlikowski, 1991).  
In this specific view, strategy links with innovation for: (1) the creation of new 
platforms and attracting others to develop new add-ons, and (2) expanding 
markets towards the existing company platform (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008).  
Creation, co-creation, and the management of add-ons (complementors) are the 
essence of dynamic capabilities and networks for market / factor creation, where 
Orchestrating Networks for innovation is an important governance mechanism.  
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2.5.4.- Orchestration and Dynamic Capacities 
Strategic management and dynamic managerial capacities highlight the 
importance of managerial action and power to purposefully create, extend and 
modify the firm’s resource base as processes of becoming (Teece, 2009; 
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). For that matter, Orchestration is presented in the 
existing literature as a network capacity to dynamically organize innovation 
(Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006). Ritala et al. (2009) propose an Innovation 
Orchestration Capability for “future-oriented value creation” (p. 572) since value 
creation is dependent on the ability to connect different experts and specialists 
and enable them to work together (Dyer & Singh, 1998). All these authors 
analyse Orchestration at the organisational and individual levels, emphasising the 
fact that individual skills are to individuals what organisational capabilities are to 
firms.  
This means that individuals and organisations can be separated at the analytical 
level although they are interrelated, since individuals can shape organizational 
dynamics and relational capabilities which are increasingly important in an inter-
connected business world, and are seen as sources of differentiation (Dyer & 
Kale, 2007).  
In particular, the literature of dynamic capabilities emphasizes as network 
capacities (1) asset orchestration; and (2) value generation and appropriation 
which are highly interrelated. There are additional related notions according to 
this view, which are described briefly in the next paragraphs.   
 
2.5.4.1.- “Asset Orchestration” 
The concept of “Asset Orchestration” proposed by Teece (2007; 2009) 
emphasises: (1) the co-ordination of disparate actors without “central planners” 
(Hayek, 1949); and (2) the combination of emergent collective processes and 
managerial design (Doz et al., 2000). This notion of governance highlights 
autonomy (see also Benkler, 2006), and is intended to combine complementary 
and co-specialised assets among firms (Teece et al., 1997). Pedersen and Larsen 
(2006) extend this framework to network models of innovation, precisely 
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underscoring the actors’ autonomy and self-control, and the network’s capacity 
to re-combine its resource base, grounded on knowledge dynamics between 
actors (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).   
 
2.5.4.2.- Value generation and appropriation  
Dhanaraj & Parkhe (2006) hone in on the focal firm and specifically define 
Orchestration for Innovation as the capability to build and purposefully manage 
inter-firm innovation networks, suggesting a function of value creation and 
absorption. Orchestration is about generating network externalities and 
increasing returns; this is how network dynamics “expand the pie”, by focusing 
on the orchestrator’s capacity to extract more value from the network.  
Implicitly this approach is related with above discussion on power and the 
notions of centrality, roles and the capacity to control resources. Dhanaraj and 
Parkhe discuss how the Orchestrator may have the reputation of attracting 
members to the network and thus obtain a bigger piece of the pie by managing 
knowledge mobility, trust, socialisation and shared identity to ensure the stability 
of network dynamics.  
Trust is needed to allow an actor to be exposed to sharing knowledge for a 
common goal, and to cope with different “enactments,” understandings, 
perceptions and interests in order to be able to propose and combine them with 
others. The role of the Orchestrator is thus to create an open atmosphere of 
communication by helping to discuss and establish the basic rules of the game. 
Trust diminishes the threats of the actors’ opportunism, and fosters an equitable 
distribution of value (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006).  
2.5.4.3.- Boundaries and “Complementors”   
Chesbrough (2008) argues that the sources of differentiation and even the firm’s 
boundaries are dependent on the ownership of knowledge, the management of 
complementary assets and Intellectual Property (IP). Protection. Value 
appropriation is dependent on: (1) the nature of knowledge and how replicable it 
is, with an emphasis on Intellectual Property (IP) protection, and (2) the degree 
of complementarities needed for a particular innovation, its nature and the 
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capacity to manage them internally or/and externally through open innovation 
processes (Chesbrough, 2003; 2006). To this end, complementary assets can be 
generic - and easy to replicate and specialised and/or co-specialised (see also 
Williamson, 1995). The economic value of these complementary assets is the 
sum of their generic use, that is, their specific use plus their residual value in 
their next best alternative use.  
As a consequence, when firms own relevant complementary assets, the 
outsourcing or licensing of some technologies may be “virtuous” because the 
firms may exert power over the others and influence how the pie expands, 
through licensing, the creation of secondary markets and by being able to 
commercialise an externally accessed innovation (Chesbrough & Teece, 1996).  
 
2.6.- Conclusion: Combining Power and Orchestration 
 
In this chapter, I have reviewed and presented literature about Networks of 
Innovation and Orchestration as one way to govern networks. Networks are 
structures grounded on exchanges where power and trust shape the roles, 
relationship dynamics and boundaries that lead to specific structures. In this 
chapter, I have also presented existing network structures with focal firms and 
orchestrators, observing how literature shows that networks with focal firms are 
associated with diffusion for specific innovations, stressing centrality, control over 
resources and “node-anchoring” dynamics. In contrast, literature that presents 
the network as the locus of innovation assumes no specific focal firm and an 
implicit correlation with “innovativeness” as the network capacity to generate 
innovations. It is also suggested that networks designed for general 
“innovativeness” assume the capacity to generate core competences as some 
degree of stability, trust and embeddedness.  
 
The reviewed literature on Networks of Innovation has a bias towards static 
structural approaches. In contrast, the literature on strategic management and 
dynamic capabilities emphasises the importance of Orchestration in developing 
future paths for profitable innovation but it is almost silent about (1) how Focal 
Firms and Orchestrating affect structural changes, that is, boundaries, roles and 
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relationships and (2) although in innovation studies there is a tradition of setting 
trajectories and paths  (Pavitt & Steinmuller, 2002; Pavitt, 1984; Dosi, 1982), this 
line of thought has a bias towards path dependencies, determinism and teleology 
where research focuses on how Orchestrating, as a network capacity, can set a 
new path.  
 
In order to fill these gaps, this thesis relies on the proposal of the managerial 
function of Orchestrating that focuses on strategic management to examine 
network structural dynamics and a process view to better explore how 
managerial action can change the “rules of the game” governing how actors 
interact and change their relational dynamics, roles and boundaries. To do so, 
this thesis is grounded on managerial power as the resource to drive change and 
manoeuvre between flexibility and loose alignment and, at the same time, 
provide efficiency, certainty and stability (Thompson, 1967/2003; Chandler, 
1962). With this approach, Orchestrating focuses on the managerial capacity and 
power to set strategies and, as a consequence, consider innovation as the 
capacity to set paths for efficiency between the proposed strategies, while 
stressing decision making for the appropriate actions and resource mobilisation in 
the design of new structures for future organisations. The managerial function of 
Orchestrating also considers the importance of digital platforms as structural 
resources that play a strategic role in innovation since they emphasise the 
importance of having reliable information and knowledge with which to make 
choices when designing organisations (Galbraith, 2005; 1977).  
 
In accordance with previous streams of innovation, structural dynamics and 
dynamic capabilities, the next chapter of this thesis proposes the function of 
Orchestrating that is discussed and researched in Chapters 5 and 6 (Chapter 4 
contains the research design). It will present empirical work and adopt a 
propositional style by comparing existing literature with empirical findings to fill 
the gap presented.   
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Chapter 3: Orchestrating Network Behaviour for 
Innovation     
 
3.1.- Introduction 
 
In this chapter the managerial function of Orchestrating Network Behaviour for 
Innovation is defined as establishing a path towards innovation. The role of the 
focal firm or Orchestrator and its capacity to manage structural dynamics and 
digital platforms is specifically proposed. This researcher takes a dynamic 
capacities perspective to analyze structural change and examine the change to 
boundaries, relationships and roles, as well the role of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) in structural changes (Lyytinen & Newman, 
2008; Kautz & Zumpe, 2008).  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. First, the concept of Orchestrating Network 
behaviour for innovation is defined. Second, we incorporate the concepts 
introduced in chapter 2 and developing them in a dynamic context to extract the 
meaning of optimality for “loose coupled structures,” defining what a path of 
innovation is in this context. Thereafter, the main components of the function are 
described. The themes of structural dynamics and innovation with digital 
platforms are highlighted and developed in further chapters of this thesis. Finally, 
Orchestrating, at an individual level of analysis introduces managerial capabilities 
such as organization, conflict management and economics. 
 
3.2.- Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation   
Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation is defined as a function to build 
a path towards innovation (figure 3.1).  It is assumed that for innovation it is up 
to the managerial function to dynamically manage equilibrium, requiring choices 
and purpose. These paths are considered to be expressions of network dynamics, 
thus implying that technological and social dimensions evolve by influencing one 
or the other. The success of changes is dependent on how this path is set and 
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through which decisions and actions aimed at managing degrees of freedom in 
the network, that is, which boundaries or constraints.  
In this context, strategic management is considered to be a critical network 
managerial capacity to fix a purposive set of actions to build a path for all the 
actors in the network.  Innovation is enabled by shared investments and shaped 
by a set of external constraints which need to be managed or orchestrated in 
order to set a course of action based on choices and activities in a context of 
radical uncertainty (Cheng & Van de Ven, 1996). It is in this context where 
orchestrating is placed as a managerial capacity to exert power to deal with 
structural dialectics. Orchestrating Innovation considers that paths are not pre-
defined trajectories that need to be set by fixing and regulating constraints, since 
continuity may be challenged by tensions among autonomous actors with 
different interests. More specifically, the role of the focal firm and its capacity to 
control relational dynamics and other resources such as technology and dynamic 
capacities at the structural level are explored, suggesting that different conditions 
can result in different patterns of network evolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    
 
Figure 3.1: Network Behaviour for Innovation 
Macro - level: Current  
Domains of Action 
Sub-  units and  
teams 
Individual level  
Past environments Possible Future  
environments 
Time  
Experience 
Memory   Strategy 
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To that end, orchestrating is a function of (1) changing the rules of the game to 
keep the game alive and (2) avoiding disruptions, thus ensuring continuity 
through the connection between the old and the new, or between past behaviour 
patterns and the present and future ones. The hypothesis is that this function 
has a positive influence on the network’s structural innovative capacity or 
innovativeness, and takes advantage of digitally-enabled processes (see Figure 
3.2).  
Orchestration shows power through its influence on relational dynamics, roles 
and network boundaries. With this argument, it is stressed that decision-making 
and action-setting are always processes of balancing different forces, as all the 
actors in the network may exert a certain degree of power and influence since 
innovation does not necessarily end with performance improvements.  
 
Power in this function underscores the role of strategic leadership through “how” 
things are made through choices and managerial actions of design and 
adaptation (Augier & Teece, 2008), recognizing the flexibility of setting direction 
and incorporating other views, other perspectives, and/or other emergent 
actions. It represents setting a path by managing optimality and equilibrium 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), thus the 
governance of different optimal situations can be achieved along the way, 
followed by sub-optimal ones and the transitions in between (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1997), giving shape to cycles and fluctuations in an ongoing 
equilibrium. 
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                                Figure 3.2: Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation as a Managerial Function  
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3.3.- Networks as Optimum configurations for innovation  
 
To ground the managerial function presented in this thesis, it is assumed that 
Networks are optimal configurations or structures for innovation (Ferriani et al., 
2009; DeBresson & Amese, 1991; Conway & Steward, 1998). The notion of 
optimality comes from the common consideration that too little structure makes 
it difficult to manage change, while too much makes it hard to move (Burns & 
Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Losch, 1967). To explain this, it is necessary to 
present the concept of loosely-coupled structures (Orton & Weik, 1990; Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1996) as lying in between unstructured chaotic markets, and too 
much power leading to highly controlled bureaucracies (Thorelli, 1986; Powell, 
1990).   
 
The author here suggests that too much and too little structure leads to chaos, 
or negate the capacity to organize. Chaos is normally associated with little or no 
structure. However, according to mathematics, chaos has another meaning, 
implying a state of “bounded order.” Order and chaos cannot be explained as 
graphs of dots and lines, but according to structural dynamics, too many or too 
few constraints reduce the levels of freedom and thus lead to deterministic 
patterns of behaviour (Van de Ven et al., 2008), which become chaotic.  
 
Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) emphasise the dialectic of power between cohesion 
and autonomy when they describe networks as “semi-structural, lying midway 
between highly structured or mechanistic organisations and unstructured organic 
organisations with few responsibilities and processes” (p. 28). I interpret that the 
extremes, no structure or tight structures, tend to be chaotic (non-predictable 
and deterministic respectively), where loose coupled structures incorporate the 
capacity to change and set paths, thus being the optimal structure to fix order as 
a continuous process of organising (Bohm & Peat, 2002), as depicted in Figure 
3.3                        
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                                   Figure 3.3: Order and Chaos  
 
The latter has an interesting connection to administrative theory and psychology.  
Although there are many configurations and structures, business organizations 
reveal an important bias towards mechanistic processes (Hamel, 2007), often 
associated with greater operational efficiency than is normally evident in large-
scale operations. This way of organising human endeavours drew the attention of 
early sociologists who studied how labour conditions affected employees’ 
emotional moods. Their conclusions – drawn on studies from the 19th century – 
were that creativity is dependent on power intensity: too much control and too 
few rules produce “anomic forms of division of labour” (Durkheim, 1937) or, 
according to psychodynamics, the repression of creativity (Winnicott, 1965; 
1971; 1988), and the consequent destruction of innovation. Anomie can be 
defined as a subjective sense of despair and uselessness due to the interaction 
with social context, also having clinical implications for mental health (Kets de 
Vries, 2006; Winnicott, 1988), which are out of the range of this thesis. While 
early on, Durkheim focused on “too much structure” to explore anomie, Parsons 
(1957) used this term to study “too little structure” and innovation in society, 
which, according to him, could be considered as deviant behaviour since it broke 
the rules of the game, making society unstable (Parsons, 1937).   
Chaos Loose-Coupled Tight Coupled (Chaos) 
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With the power perspective chosen in this thesis, it is recognized that networks 
change through a dialectical process, reflecting the natural tensions among 
actors to control resources and to set direction. These dialectical dynamics also 
recognise that networks are complex structures of command, expertise, 
commitments and influence, and this author posits that power studies show their 
influence on relational dynamics, roles and network boundaries. These aspects 
are reviewed in the following sections in which the components of the presented 
function are elaborated upon: (1) strategic management and power through 
commitments (section 3.3); (2) network structural change and equilibrium 
(section 3.4); (3) digital platforms as infrastructures for innovation (section 3.5) 
and the (4) Network Leader describing organizational capabilities, conflict 
management and economic capabilities (section 3.6).     
 
3.4.- Power and Commitments      
 
This author proposes that the orchestrator specifically exerts power through 
commitments, that is, a combination of power and trust (Elster, 2000; 
Ghemawat, 1997; Bowlby, 1962), the latter serving as the raison d’être to look 
into the future: to try to project this future before leaping into it. Commitments 
emphasize their relevance in uncertain environments (Cook & Emerson, 1984) 
and the need to establish “psychological contracts,” stressing mutual 
understanding among actors in network activity (Child et al., 2006). In turn, 
network activity requires setting prerogatives and obligations, thus stressing the 
intense psychological effort and patience needed to achieve the required trust to 
set commitments. It is also assumed that trust is dynamic or time-dependent, as 
are the essential relationships. It consists of different phases: (1) deterrent and 
calculative at first, (2) based on knowledge exchange and representations, and 
(3) identity-based in more evolved relationships (Shapiro, 1987; Clemmensen et 
al., 2008). We turn now to explore some pre-conditions to commitment.   
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3.4.1.- Autonomy and Creativity        
 
The main pre-condition for commitment in this function is autonomy (or 
freedom) and creativity as presented and discussed in chapter 2.  It is a classic 
argument that individuals and even societies have constrained their freedom with 
explicit rules of the game (Huizinga, 1927/2007) to protect the very freedom and 
the individuals that constitute the society itself (Popper, 1957; Merton, 1949; 
Freud, 1966/2007:1; 1966/2007:2). This is particularly to protect humankind 
from visceral passions through shared consensus and limits on behaviour. On the 
individual level, we have argued that creativity needs constraints in order to be 
productive.   
 
3.4.2.- Path Dependencies and Deep Structures       
 
The second pre-condition is memory. As in any other organization, in a company, 
the past is stored in organisational memory which expresses itself in many ways, 
but this thesis is interested in the dynamic: in existing behaviours, processes and 
patterns. Some scholars explain change with the notion of “deep structures” or 
the set of fundamental choices a structure has made (Gersik, 1991) that provides 
a certain behaviour. Past choices affect roles, relationships and boundaries, as 
well as other structural resources. In contrast with popular wisdom, memory not 
only resides in “images,” “myths” or “culture.” Memory resides in deep 
structures, in behaviour, which is highly stable due to: (1) the tenacity of initial 
choices related to the beginning of the existence of structure and self-survival 
mechanisms (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990); (2) the fact that structural 
behaviour is reinforced through feedback loops (sometimes called organizational 
learning) to keep the structure intact or subject to short-term adaptations (March 
& Simon, 1958; Argyris & Schön, 1978; 1996); and (3) symmetries and 
asymmetries in relational dynamics affecting deep structures (an aspect I 
develop in following paragraphs).   
We argue that deep structures can be thought of as the design for the rules of 
the game where equilibrium periods can be compared to a game in play (Gersik, 
1991; Huizinga, 1927/2007; Winnicott, 1971) in which actors play some roles and 
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establish some relationship dynamics within certain boundaries of behaviour, and 
where the benefits of playing are greater than the costs and risks associated with 
doing so. As argued, roles are linked with relational dynamics where power is 
analyzed through reciprocity, termed as asymmetric or unilateral when the flow is 
one-way and symmetric or bilateral when the flow is two-way. As argued, 
asymmetric relationships imply inequality among actors and, as a consequence, a 
latent conflict.  
Based on this approach, the notion of “organizing at the edge of chaos” obtains 
full meaning as an optimum proposition. Too many constraints reduce the degree 
of freedom, and the dependency with the past is so strong that structures can 
only take pre-determined steps towards teleology. With no constraints, network 
behavior is unforeseeable. In both cases, deep structures are chaotic, and the 
required value equality cannot be fulfilled in the long run.  
In social systems the issue is “how” power set boundaries, from consensus to 
repression. The resulting behaviour generates what is called path dependencies, 
or in other words, the future of a structure is dependent on the existing one 
(Pavitt, 1984; Pavitt & Steinmuller, 2002). 
 
3.5.- Network Structural Change  
 
Orchestrating through commitments is about: (1) having few choices; (2) 
maintaining consistency with respect to these choices to direct the course of 
action; (3)  holding conflict inherent to any change; and (4) a dynamic capacity 
to set constraints to broad patterns of network behaviour (Ghemawat, 1991).  
 
3.5.1.- Dynamic Optimums   
 
The objective is to search for an ongoing equilibrium. Optimums are not a 
teleological “final objective” as critics of rational choice argue (Elster, 2000; 
1994). Rather, orchestrating is a process in order to set the path, along which 
different optimal situations can be achieved, followed by sub-optimal situations 
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and the transitions in between (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). This process thus 
shapes the different cycles and fluctuations as depicted in Figure 
3.4.  
 
Commitments require interacting with others and exploring the unknown to 
manage investments and create new meanings. This can be achieved by creating 
experiments and designing new steps to be taken.  
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    Figure 3.4:  Network Dynamics as Local Optimums and Transitions 
Innovation is a process of experimentation: outcomes are never the best (of all) 
options. They are more a modest set of local maximums such as “A” and “C” (in 
Figure 3.4) along a continuous path of improvement. Innovation may also go 
through troughs “B” and “D,” recognising that change can include a reduction in 
performance due to these transitions.   
 
In fact, studies on innovation related to equilibrium and change have 
commanded the attention of theorists for a long time (Gersick, 1991; Weik & 
Quinn, 1999; Demers, 2007; Lam, 2007). According to these studies, 
organisational changes can be explained through teleology, life cycles, dialectics 
(power dynamics) and evolution (Poole & Van de Ven, 2004) and how 
equilibrium and change occurs: (1) gradual change, where there is a process of 
on-going adaptation, and (2) punctuated equilibrium where new “species” arise 
abruptly, through sudden “punctuations” or revolutions (Gersick, 1991; Weik & 
Quinn, 1999).  As Gersik notes, human structures may look turbulent though the 
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underlying structures are stable, while hypothesising that others may look stable 
for a period of time, but they can mask deep structural changes that suddenly 
burst in punctuations. The assertion is that a change from one game to another 
is through transitions - at times through upheavals - leaving the structure 
temporarily disorganised and necessitating the making of choices around which a 
new deep structure forms. 
 
Dooley and Van de Ven (1997) suggest that innovation dynamics can be 
expressed as a set of combined phases of divergent and convergent behaviour, 
which explains the dynamics described above, of the peaks and troughs, 
respectively. Convergence means a synthesis towards equilibrium, narrowing the 
possibilities or constraints for purposive action. In contrast, divergence is about 
searching, “branching behaviour,” experimentation and the exploration of new 
possibilities (Dooley & Van de Ven, 1997; see also March, 1991).  
 
3.5.2.-Centripetal and Centrifugal forces  
 
In this thesis network boundaries is defined as a set of fundamental 
commitments between network actors, commitments which shape the network’s 
structural traits: roles, relationship dynamics, complementarities, the technology 
deployed (e.g., a BNOS), and co-ordination mechanisms (Thompson, 1967/2003; 
Malone et al., 1987; Montgomery & Oliver, 2007). This research takes into 
account the fact that boundaries, relationship dynamics and roles are interrelated 
variables, not independent ones (Abbot, 1995).  
We argue that orchestrating is intended to create competitive advantage through 
the careful selection of commitments with specific partners, choosing the type of 
relationship and the deliberate investment in these features. Indeed, the notion 
of relation-specific assets in networks refers to the assets of a partner who 
customises them in order to adapt to another partner and facilitate a systematic 
frame of innovation (Dyer & Kale, 2007).  In order to study this phenomenon, we 
use the tensions between centrifugal and centripetal forces as the units of 
analysis since they shape the network structure (Montgomery & Oliver, 2007). 
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Centripetal forces dominate the network when actors feel motivated to be a part 
of it. Relationship dynamics will tend to be cohesive, but they are the result of a 
combination of factors, including economic aspects and social opportunities 
(
Relationships are not necessarily intended for investment, as argued in this 
thesis. Thus, we take into account the fact that cohesive forces in social action 
may hide a conflictive nature, such as many forms of opportunism, which can be 
defined as the asymmetry between intentions, and what is given and what is 
received (see Elster, 1994; Child et al., 2006). As argued, innovation is a 
different game, one where relationships require commitments in order to invest 
and engage in co-creative activities. Powell et al. (2005) focus on power to 
explore network creation processes in innovative ventures. They propose several 
attachment dynamics: (1) accumulative advantage; (2) homophily or 
isomorphism; and (3) “follow the trend.”  First, accumulative advantage occurs 
when a node receives a disproportionate number of new connections. Second, 
with isomorphism, new partners are chosen on the basis of their similarity. Third, 
network expansion follows a herd-like process in which choices are made, 
depending on others’ choices, either as a response to external pressures or as an 
imitative behaviour.  
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996).  
Centrifugal forces, by contrast, can encourage actors to weaken the relationship 
and their commitments, or leave the network altogether if any of the strategic or 
resource complementarities offer a poor fit and lead to competitive relations 
more than do co-operative ones.   
Centripetal and centrifugal forces may vary along the way, depending on the 
capacity to reach commitments. This can affect: (1) the actors’ strategic position; 
(2) their access to new or complementary resources or new markets; (3) new 
sources of knowledge (Kogut, 2000; Jarrillo, 1993); (4) co-ordination costs and 
risks (Williamson, 1991; (5) their capacity to search for complementarities 
(Teece, 2009); and (6) their social values and trust. From a dynamic view, we 
can also see that centripetal forces lead to cohesion when there are positive 
economic returns (Teece et al., 1997), stability, network externalities and lock-in 
(Shapiro & Varian, 1999), while sources of change can unbalance the equilibrium 
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as a centripetal force. Moreover, where a network can go (its future structure) is 
a function of its current structure (Teece et al., 1997). This, in turn, is a function 
of its capacity to change or establish new paths, and overcome the forces of 
resistance to change due to structural rigidity or over-embeddedness 
(Sambamurthy, 2000; Granovetter, 1985).  
 
3.6.- Digital Platforms as Innovation Infrastructures  
 
The cases analysed as part of this thesis are based on information-related work, 
stressing that actors’ choices are not the result of agency, teleology or blind 
adaptation. We refer here to the fact that digital platforms are a means through 
which the actors’ interactions can create new paths. It is understood that digital 
platforms are the result of many accretions which influence each other over 
extended periods, thus permitting the re-combination of the network’s digital 
resource base with a focus on agile developments (Kautz & Zumpe, 2008) and 
becoming the means through which the actors’ interactions can create new 
paths.  
It is important to note that we have been differentiating between “systems” and 
“structures”. Up to now, information systems have emphasized clearly set 
interfaces to establish limit and integrability mechanisms and tools between the 
network system and the different actors (Delporte-Vernieren, 2004); and 
providing information transparency and tangibility for network automated 
operations, as well for generating more information to innovate (Zuboff, 1985).   
Very recently, Miller and Olleros (2009) have proposed that the degree of 
tightness among software components may lead to different strategies around 
digital platforms from (1) high system integration (e.g., software commercial 
platforms) to (2) modular system design. The second emphasises the co-creation 
of digital platforms that should: (1) solve a critical business problem, developing 
a function or a set of functions that can be described as the “system of use”; (2)  
be easy to connect and disconnect or easily present plug-and-play options (Van 
Heck & Vervest, 2007); (3) include an embedded network logic supporting inter- 
and intra-organisational processes and control variables; (4) come with a 
Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation |  61 
 
standard and modular architecture, a “Lego-like” structure such as web services 
that can be combined in specific ways. 
 
3.7.- The Network Leader        
 
Leadership is a critical activity in innovation (Mintzberg, 1973; Kets de Vries, 
1980; Van de Ven et al., 2008; Álvarez & Svejenova, 2005). The (few) choices 
available to develop a consistent continuity in terms of strategy (or pattern of 
behaviour) lead to steps or experiments that can be consistently small or 
punctuated by a few large ones (Ghemawat, 1991). Triggers may come from 
exogenous forces, such as changes in technology, regulations, institutions or 
endogenous forces, such as a customer demanding better performance or new 
solutions (Miller & Olleros, 2007; Doe & Schoemaker, 2000).  
 
Commitments stemming from choices are the basic argument of binding 
rationality, that is, the freely chosen decision to bind oneself to proceed. This 
idea is proposed by Elster (2000:1; 2000:2). The latter uses the metaphor of 
Ulysses “binding himself to the ship’s mast” in the famous episode with the 
Sirens, recognising his own weakness upon hearing the sound of the sirens’ 
songs but also showing his courage by carrying on with his journey to Ithaca.  
 
Taking this perspective, we consider strategic leadership from an individual level 
of analysis (Ritala et al., 2009) and define three dimensions of Orchestration 
grounded on the managerial functions proposed by Pedersen (1996):  
 
(1) Organisational Capacity: managing choices and actions regarding how to 
select partners; how to manage relationships; how to achieve structural 
and strategic fit, and managing co-operation for co-creation while keeping 
the network united; 
(2) Economic Capacity: how to make investments together (Gilsing et al., 
2008; Murray, 2002) and generate a value regime for value creation and 
absorption; and 
(3) Conflict management. 
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3.7.1.- Organisational Capacity       
 
Orchestrating is a function that builds a path of efficiency since it provides value 
by not representing a traumatic break with past activities, something which 
always implies a waste of resources. It is a way of re-combining them in different 
ways and adding new components to existing ones. It is assumed that 
orchestrating smoothly paves the way. We consider that successful innovations 
depend on how Orchestrators manage teams and relationships, thus inviting 
individuals to consider divergent behaviour, along with a wider range of 
alternatives in diverse and multi-connected networks (Powell et al., 2005) that 
drive convergent behaviour, focusing on specific innovations. Leaders listen, scan 
and monitor the network, and use their status to obtain relevant information, as 
well as organize people to achieve goals. But they also decide to establish 
relationships with talented individuals and specialists who may be connected 
(Dyer & Kale, 2007). We therefore focus on the capacity to manage boundaries: 
how to select partners, how to achieve structural and strategic fit, how to 
manage relational dynamics and manage co-operation for co-creation activities 
while keeping the network united. 
 
This capacity is directly related to commitment by regulating network boundaries 
through centripetal and centrifugal forces that may lead to lock-ins and lock-outs, 
respectively (Ghemawat, 1991). Lock-in refers to organisational persistence and 
core-capabilities. Commitment is not over-embeddedness, resistance to change, 
and other rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1995) since commitment always 
presupposes autonomy. By contrast, lock-out, is the motive behind commitment, 
when firms decide to disinvest - since, once this decision is made, it may be 
uneconomical to restart without jeopardising the levels of efficiency (Ghemawat, 
1991). This discussion is synthesized in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5: Commitments as dynamic capacity to set 
constraints and boundaries of action   
 
With choices and actions we mean acting while thinking or thinking in action 
(Schön, 1983). Thinking is based on experience and risk management strategy, 
highlighting the need to make sense of “turning points” and then mobilising 
resources to overcome inconsistencies which arise between means and 
objectives (Thompson, 1967/2003). Thinking underscores these risks in terms of 
the ability to cope with the complexity inherent in conceptualising 
“discontinuities” or “transitions” that occur when the gap between the 
requirements associated with contextual conditions and the range of existing 
knowledge and technology grows (Gilsing et al., 2008; Miller & Floricel, 2007). 
 
Thinking, at individual level, is very much related to resilience, the latter defined 
as the magnitude of disturbance or sub-optimality that the network can absorb 
before the network reaches a new equilibrium and structure (Holling, 1973).   
 
By action, we mean experiments and projects that can be defined as how one 
establishes a new relationship with the future. Experiments take less time than 
other projects, and allow for some rehearsal and the repetition of some activities 
that are needed to ensure that all the actors involved in the innovation can feel 
powerful, and thus avoid the risk of failure (Pisano, 1990; 1991). This is why 
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experience is of great importance in this approach due to the combination of 
novelty with some pre-rehearsed components. Experiments combine decision-
making and action, exploring the real gap between the existing repertoire of 
strategies, technologies and knowledge and the needed one, but also to how 
organisations make sense of it through multiple enactments and perspectives 
(Weik, 1979). 
Orchestrating set steps, “big” or “small,” reversible or irreversible, may be 
different for every organisation. It is also very difficult to establish common 
ground since the steps to build a path depend on: (1) how the different actors 
engage in projects; (2) how actors adapt to each other by maintaining coherence 
in terms of objectives, functions, processes, resources and expectations; and (3) 
how actors engage and in what type of relationships for co-creation. 
 
3.7.2.- Conflict Management  
 
Innovation is a source of conflict since it unfolds despite current structures (Weik 
& Quinn, 1999), challenging the status quo and the forces of equilibrium (Gresov 
& Drazin, 1997). Gaps and contradictions normally feed conflicts. Conflict can be 
defined as a situation in which the different parties are faced with perceived 
incompatible goals and seek to undermine each other's goal-seeking capability 
(Thomas, 1976). The main sources of conflict in innovation are related to early 
triggers of change, such as market shifts, changes in technology, the dissolution 
of some activities or products (due to lifecycles), new waves or perhaps better 
ideas that start by creating a difference (Day & Shoemaker, 2000).    
 
As already argued, power is the resource to cope with conflicts in organisations. 
We consider that conflict is a living thing; in other words, living organizations 
present conflicts. This is, of course, the opposite view to Taylor’s approach to 
organisational theory which strives for “peace and harmony” while repressing 
conflict and hiding anomic psychic prisons (Kets de Vries & Miller, 1984; Morgan, 
1997).  
 
Conflict starts when minorities detect early signals of change. In networks, 
executives do not necessarily have a unified view of the firm and express (1) 
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opposite views, (2) that role ambiguity arises when network management is 
unclear about partners’ expectations and (3) that role conflict appears when 
priorities among actors clash with one another, thus, leading to a confrontation 
between conflicting demands (Shenkar & Zeira, 1992). Another important source 
of conflict is that innovation activities unleash different human emotions and 
passions - from euphoria (at the beginning), to anger and despair (when 
confronted with reality and complexity in the middle periods), and sadness (at 
“the end of the tunnel” phase).  
Another way of expressing this is with the idea of how to link the new (what has 
resulted from the innovation) with the old. Integrative mechanisms are important 
in an entwined process of adopting the new and letting go of the old. Special 
managerial ability is required to help people to address the end and “let go” 
(Bowlby, 1985) due to the heavy psychological investments people normally 
make in innovations (Sutton, 1987). For example, Sutton proposes organisational 
funerals and even mourning periods. If people feel that everything represents a 
loss, with no gain at all, resistance may develop and jeopardise a change 
program, feeding resentment and anger (Bridges, 2003). 
These conflicts add a critical source of divergence for leaders of innovation at the 
subjective level: this is isolation (Burns & Stalker, 1961). An nnovation leaders 
will tend to compensate for this isolation by overplaying or underplaying his or 
her role (Burns & Stalker, 1961), that is, following the herd of network behaviour 
(ups and downs) and trying to establish unilateral control while repressing 
conflicting situations, stopping any attempt to resolve conflicts through the use of 
dialogue, and preferring instead to keep potential conflicts hidden (Argyris 1986; 
1990; 1994; 2004; Argyris & Schön, 1996).  
The opposite of isolation is communication, of course. According to Bohm (1965), 
dialogue is a critical capacity to hold conflict, “Dialogue is a special kind of 
collaborative conversation, quite distinct from discussion, which is primarily 
competitive.” Dialogue is a free flowing conversation among people, allowing 
them to discover insights that they could not attain individually. This 
communicative capacity is very much aligned with a position of power since it 
refers to the collection, or absorption and dissemination of information 
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(Mintzberg, 1998; 2002) by the manager or the appointed people or 
spokespersons picking the right message, the appropriate channel and the right 
moment to communicate in a formalised context. This role can also be played by 
self-elected disseminators willing to reveal their special relationship with 
management to others, that is, using formal and informal channels.   
In line with these arguments, we explore how conflict management is related to 
boundary management and commitments among leaders in order to examine 
this variable in the success or failure of innovation networks. Orchestrators can 
be pluralist leaders and promote co-creative and co-operative resolution. For this, 
they need to be assertive and authentic, as shown in Figure 3.6.  Communication 
mechanisms can be characterized as: (1) assertive - facing and managing the 
conflict; (2) buffering - assuming an “as if” attitude towards the organization 
while maintaining their autonomy and continuing with the project; and (3) 
adapting to – accommodating – conflict (Thomas, 1976).  
I  believe that power starts with authenticity, a term which means having “full 
power over” in Greek etymology. This attitude towards collaborative resolution 
contrasts with some non-transparent styles and hidden agendas which project an 
image of manipulation, and another source of power: coercion and arbitrariness, 
away from the needed commitment to innovation.  
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Figure 3.6: Assertiveness and Co-operation (Adapted from: Thomas, 
1976) 
Commitments may be faced with several paradoxes, since any change process 
can require a search for new partners or for some relationships to be dropped 
along the way as a result of disinvestments (Kash & Rycoft, 2000).  As Child et 
al. (2006) argue, “This may of course offend current partners and threaten 
current trust, if it is not pursued wisely” (p. 410). Relationships may have their 
own cycles: they may simply end because partners have reached their objectives 
or because the project has ended. 
 
3.7.3.- Economic capacity     
 
By “Economic Capacity” we refer to (1) the creation of value regimes to generate 
and absorb value and levels of performance (see figure 3.4), as well as (2) 
innovation outcomes. The main assumption here is that governance and co-
ordination generate super additive sum games in which Orchestration is about 
expanding the pie (generating lock-in) and taking a bigger piece than the rest by 
controlling critical resources (Danaraj & Pharke, 2006).  
 
By the same token, Orchestration is also about profitable innovation and 
commercialising innovations effectively (Chesbrough, 2008). While we pay 
attention to transaction costs since they are a pre-requisite for network formation 
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and evolution, they do not explain, for example, how new investment policies 
should be managed since the term “cost” is largely problematic when analysing 
risks and future events (Augier & Teece, 2008). It thus requires a better 
examination through the use of empirical cases.   
 
Innovation outcome is the extension of Network behaviour as a dynamic 
capacity. During the change process choices can be made regarding which 
resources to develop, what should be recombined and which competences 
should be discarded (Doz, 1996). We propose to examine resilience (not breaking 
the rules of the game) as an outcome of a process of change. Resilience requires 
examining how much change the network has absorbed to reach a new 
equilibrium. In addition, resilience may require (1) re-evaluating the initial 
conditions; and (2) how much the network members (among whom the network 
started) have adapted to the new situation. Since research is limited in time, one 
can set nominal boundaries in the process and analyse resilience as the different 
balance of centripetal and centrifugal forces, and the new sets of symmetries and 
asymmetries in deep structures such as (1) members of the network co-creating 
with complementary equals; (2) a network of weak members trying to gain 
power in order to confront a stronger competitor; (3) bootstrap alliances in which 
one or more weak partners tries to reach agreements with a powerful partner; 
(4) the end of a specific network with the aim of exploring other areas in the 
future; (5) amicable (or otherwise) separations (or lock-outs) (see Bleeke & 
Ernst, 1995).   
 
3.8.- Conclusion     
 
In this chapter, I have presented Orchestrating Network Behavior for Innovation 
as a managerial function. This function is intended to set new paths, through a 
process-based approach that dynamically manages equilibrium, and is presented 
as a proposition based on commitments which we assume shape boundaries, 
roles and relational dynamics. The “outcomes” of innovation are precise changes 
at the structural level, which lead to new behaviours, and which also feed new 
structures, and so on. I have also discussed the opportunity to consider resilience 
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as an outcome in order to assess the degree of change a structure can absorb as 
its capacity for opening new paths. 
 
Orchestration may then be increasingly important in innovation when uncertainty 
and complexity increase, making trust, equity and conflict-resolution procedures 
of capital importance in terms of being able to understand how governance 
structures emerge, evolve and dissolve over time. In the next chapter, I present 
the research design to test this function in real settings and continue presenting 
empirical evidence.  
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Chapter 4: Research Perspective and Design  
 
4.1.- Introduction   
 
This chapter describes how this thesis is organised, its objectives and design, 
including the paradigmatic approach, scientific methodology, and operative 
method. I, as the author, choose dynamic capabilities and strategic management 
that incorporate ideas from Strategic Management, Economics, Sociology, 
Psychology and Power (Peteraf & Barney, 2003), including explaining, describing 
and predicting organisational behaviour. The latter requires continuously 
updating and refining theoretical frames and expanding knowledge (Peteraf et 
al., 2008) and the multidisciplinary approach (Pettigrew, 1990).  
 
Orchestrating Network Dynamics for Innovation stresses the importance of 
understanding organisational processes better, and focusing on the “how” (see 
Peteraf et al., 2008). In order to address these issues, I first discuss the 
methodological foundations of this research design. I describe Abduction, which 
was proposed and developed by Peirce in greater detail. This idea is coherent 
with several nuances within Positivism and Realism (Habermas, 2002) and with 
the pragmatic approach found in Dynamic Capabilities (Teece et al., 1997; 
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). I then describe the operative method that I have 
applied in order to obtain the data, as well as the data sources. Lastly, I present 
the narratives resulting from the empirical research, leading to the presentation 
of the theoretical construct, an object of this thesis. 
 
4.2.- Paradigmatic Approach:  Critical Rationality and Positivism       
  
A paradigmatic approach represents the basic assumptions of the researcher’s 
purpose of activity (research interest), the nature of the examined object 
(ontology), the relationships with the object (epistemology) and the suitable 
methodology to examine the object of research. Kuhn (1978) defined two paths 
for paradigmatic formulation: (1) the stable or normalised path and (2) the 
exceptional path for upheavals of knowledge. The current status quo – or 
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normalised view – of Organisational Theory recognises the following paradigms: 
Positivism, chosen in this thesis, as well as other models based on interpretative 
approaches such as Critical Theory and Constructivism (Tsoukas & Knudsen, 
2003; Guba & Lincoln, 1994).   
 
I choose Positivism as the paradigm since it is based on the principle of 
demarcation, focusing on what is real and what is not (Donaldson, 2003; Popper, 
1969). Positivism assumes a realistic approach to the exploration of network 
structures and boundaries (Conway & Steward, 1990). This approach inherently 
incorporates nominalist qualities such as the reality presented by the researcher 
in the empirical work, which is held and framed by the intentions and objectives 
of the research question, without which the data would become meaningless.  
 
Second, the researcher’s relationship with reality (epistemology) can obtain 
knowledge about said reality. One of the major flaws in organisational research is 
the profusion of a-historical and a-contextual studies, with the risk of 
incorporating collective trends and researchers’ sociological biases (Pettigrew, 
1990). I assume that the researcher is a contextualised individual inside reality 
(Hayek, 1949/2009; Rand, 1967), capable of gaining the right perspective and 
seeing research as a learning process and as an expression of autonomy 
(Vygotsky, 1987; Winch, 1958). This idea emphasises the individual’s active 
differentiation from social co-operative systems (Rand, 1967) and 
This approach stresses the importance of dedicating sufficient time to building a 
perspective, carrying out research and examining long periods of organisational 
history and its context (Pettigrew, 1990). Context is critical since it may offer 
different explanations regarding triggers for innovation and change (Mason et al., 
1997). This requires: 1) vertical levels of analysis (from macro to micro levels), 
and 2) horizontal levels of analysis, referring to sequential inter-connectedness, 
locating change in the past, present and future times (Pettigrew, 1990; Mason et 
al., 1997). Change is not predefined or expressed by a set of pre-established 
real facts, 
providing an interpretation in order to construct theory. This can be obtained by 
a set of empirical and systemic observations, and it is the subject of further 
empirical tests to justify theory building.  
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trajectories. It requires the careful examination of context, triggers, 
organisational structural changes, decisions, and the development of 
technological solutions (Mason et al., 1997; Weik, 1989), the main objectives of 
this empirical research.  
 
4.3.- Methodology 
 
In terms of methodology, research on strategy is divided between the “what” 
and the “how” (Poole & Van de Ven, 2000; Peteraf & Barney, 2003). Processes 
are intrinsically connected with the creation, extension and modification of the 
network resource base (Pedersen & Larsen, 2006). In the process domain, 
research is normally based on the question of “how” and leads to qualitative data 
and the use of longitudinal cross-case analyses (Vidich & Lyman, 1994; 
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1996). Power is very much 
related to capacities as the ability to perform a particular action in terms of the 
power needed to carry it out. However, until the action is executed, this power 
remains latent. As a matter of fact, managerial power, structural attributes and 
dynamic capacities are sources of power to drive change (Teece, 2009). Here, 
technology and digital platforms can be seen as a reservoir of potential power, a 
metaphorical fountainhead from which change springs (see Mason et al., 1997) 
since these technologies have been proven to be instruments of structural 
change from within, affecting roles, relationships and organisational (and 
network) boundaries (Lyytinen & Newman, 2008; Pedersen & Larsen, 2006).  
 
In this thesis, I focus on process-like theories at the organisational level, 
including variables such as dynamism, time, development and outcomes 
(Petigrew, 1990), thus analysing innovation throughout its entire lifecycle, 
starting with the antecedents of major changes and examining innovation 
processes throughout their development (Huber & Van de Ven, 1995; Van de 
Ven & Hargrave, 2004). This is done to better understand the relationships 
between power and innovation where digital platforms, as discussed, are 
conceptualised as instruments or means for change, taking into account their 
different roles (see Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001).  
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Taking a process view provides a deeper exploration of innovation processes 
since: (1) it allows us to examine how processes and outcomes shape each other 
(Pettigrew, 1990), and (2) it focuses on the “how” and dynamic interrelationships 
between decisions, the actions taken, and how these influence structural 
dynamics that address complexities and unsolved previous questions (Eisenhardt 
& Martin, 2000). This approach is summarised in Table 4.1 below.  
 
Research Design   
Ontological approach  Realism  
Epistemology  The relationship with reality is based on autonomy 
and distance with the object of study, implying 
systematic observation, contextual analysis and time. 
Methodology  Methodological Individualism (avoiding fashionable 
“social constructions of reality” which may bias 
reality)  
Pragmatism. Abduction. A learning process, creative, 
contextualised and reflexive. 
Method  Case Method; objective approaches such as 
interviews and ethnographic studies   
Theories and 
representations  
Process-oriented theory 
Narratives  
Managerial Function 
     
Table 4.1: Paradigmatic and Methodological Approach 
 
In the following sections, the theoretical approach developed by Peirce is 
described in greater detail.  
 
 
4.3.1.- Abduction    
 
Methodology refers to the method theory applied to research, which, in this case, 
intends to construct a valid hypothesis regarding the innovation function. I use 
the methodology defined by Peirce as Abduction, “a process of argument with 
whose aid is to obtain [a] true statement of reality” (Peirce, 1992; Habermas, 
2002, page 113). Abduction has been used before in research on Orchestration 
(see Ritala et al., 2009), since this methodology is used when the existing 
theoretical development is inconsistent and even contradictory (Ritala et al., 
2009). Second, according to the literature reviewed, there is no theoretical work 
specifically dedicated to Orchestration and network structural change. Finally, 
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this thesis contains a historical empirical focus, recognising that time is needed to 
interpret organisational change and requires a careful examination of causes and 
effects (Zollo & Winter, 2002). In this context, the methodology needs to adapt 
to reality to better cope with organisational dynamics in order to provide a richer 
theoretical development (Orton & Weik, 1990; Peteraf et al., 2008).  
 
Abduction combines rational deduction from some hypotheses and tests them 
with empirical data. At the same time, however, observation leads to an 
inductive process of theory-building. This, in turn, is based on the critical review 
of existing knowledge (or theories), the observation of reality and on expanding 
knowledge boundaries grounded in an interactive learning process (Peirce, 
1992). Reality exists independently of our observation. However, we make sense 
of it and we can provide meaning by building new knowledge. Therefore, 
learning processes should be based on controlled feedback between the 
accumulation of knowledge, theory-building (a synthesis in the managerial 
function object of this thesis) and empirical research (Eden & Spender, 1998).  
 
4.3.2.- Method    
 
As already mentioned, the key issue regarding structural change and innovation 
is the question of “how” they occur. Answering this question in terms of dynamic 
capacities and innovation may provide a richer representation of organisational 
life due to its process-based approach (Peteraf & Barney, 2003; Huber & Van de 
Ven, 1995). Given the exploratory nature of this research, I have opted for a 
research method that combines ethnography and case study research as a tool 
for demarcation between the context and the phenomenon (Yin, 2003; Have, 
2004). I give special emphasis to qualitative data and empirical analysis, a 
coherent approach with dynamic capacities and innovation process studies 
(Huber & Van de Ven, 1995; Dyer & Singh, 1995). Case studies are based on 
systemic observations and grounded on a positivist approach since they 
constitute empirical evidence which serves for theory construction (Eisenhardt, 
1989). The empirical research of this thesis focuses on two case studies that are 
described from the protagonists’ perspectives, with their own visions of reality 
which I have endeavoured to respect (Garfinkel, 1967).  Likewise, the case study 
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method is appropriate for this research since I wished to study a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, where the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and the context were not so clearly evident. I also used multiple 
sources of evidence (e.g., interviews, documents, and observations) in order to 
eliminate biases (Yin, 2003).  
 
4.3.3.- Units and Levels of Analysis      
 
In order to examine innovation, it is important to define the nominal limits of this 
research or clarify the researcher’s perspective. Assuming autonomy, we carefully 
need to set “nominal” boundaries to analyse this reality as a complex one 
(Garnsey & McGlade, 2006). For example, Neo-Classic Economics considers 
reactive players with zero commitment to economic activities that only build 
capital, derive its marginal product for an arbitrarily short time period and then 
resell it. Under such conditions, the choice requires predicting only one thing: 
price (Garnsey & McGlade, 2006; Augier & Teece, 2009), but not commitments 
and innovation (figure 4.1). Assuming autonomy in order to better cope with 
processes and structural dynamics, power dynamics in the preferred choice, 
more research is needed (Powell & Grodal, 2007; Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; 
Poole & Van de Ven, 2004). In this regard, I analyse commitments as the main 
theme and their expressions as centripetal and centrifugal forces to examine 
structural dynamics, that is, boundaries, roles and relational dynamics.  
I also consider other levels of analysis: inter-organisational and inter-personal 
relationships (the latter among leaders), examining organisational and individual 
levels of Orchestration (Ritala et al., 2009).  
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                          Figure 4.1: Autonomy, “Coupled Levels” and Units of Analysis (Adapted from: Garnsey & McGlade, 2007)
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4.3.4.- Paths and Narratives     
 
I explain and analyse innovation and change through narratives. Innovation and 
technology-based business stories show how entrepreneurs and executives seek 
to use technology to improve organisational fit and economic gains and how they 
bring about something new (Mason et al., 1997). Information and 
Communication Technology-based narratives provide an account of how major 
decisions and ICT investments are made, revealing how the operations, 
structures, functions and power distribution of organisations have changed as a 
result (Mason et al., 1997). This recognises that narratives also help us to 
understand meta-phenomena, in other words, that organisational change may be 
a process and an outcome of the innovation process at the same time (Huber & 
Van de Ven, 1995).  
 
4.4.- Case Selection and Presentation    
 
I have selected cases that cover extreme situations to highlight differences and 
key variables (Yin, 2003; Pettigrew, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989:1). I wanted to 
compare a successful entrepreneurial and innovative focal firm, Multiasistencia, 
and its evolution from 1983 to 2007 with the same orchestrating phenomenon in 
a multinational. In the first of these cases, the IBM Barcelona Lab successfully 
developed innovative software solutions from 1984 to 2004. The cases present 
important similarities. Their innovations focused on the development of 
technological solutions such as digital platforms along with network change. The 
two cases are critical and unusual, and they both include disruptive innovations 
and major changes in contextual demands and market shifts. In addition, the 
management of efficiencies such as results, boundaries and domains of action 
are critical aspects to examine in order to understand their evolution.  
In the IBM case, the Lab successfully orchestrated its network from 1994 to 
2004. In the cases I focus on digital platforms (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008) as 
outcomes of innovative efforts, although the main unit of analysis of this work is 
structural change.  
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4.4.1. Multiasistencia 
 
During the study period, Grupo Multiasistencia was a leading company dedicated 
to providing complex services to banks and insurers through its original home 
insurance claims and repairs services. During the study, the company maintained 
operations in Spain, France, the UK and Portugal, serving approximately 
9,000,000 end customers. It offered its services by outsourcing contracts to 100 
banks and it managed a network of approximately 11,000 trade professionals. 
The firm’s evolution spans from its foundation in 1983, to 2009. This 
Orchestrated Network is European-wide presenting end customers and corporate 
clients through its Control Centre located on the outskirts of Madrid. From this 
Control Centre it managed the main process it called its “Comprehensive Claim 
Management Service” (CCMS). The Centre employed 375 Customer Service 
Representatives (CSR) who received requests for home repairs by phone, e-mail, 
and the Internet.  
 
They deployed and supervised jobs to a network of trade professionals who 
carried out the repairs. Since 2004 on, Multiasistenica has managed a ubiquitous 
Business Network Operating System (BNOS) based on different technologies such 
as the Call Centre, the Internet, Web Services, and Mobile Systems. The BNOS 
incorporates corporate customer demands as turnkey services. All services are 
audited through Service Level Agreements (SLA) with all the agents in the 
network. Multiasistencia has boosted its value and innovation by collaborating 
with its corporate clients in developing new services. Figure 4.2 represents the 
relationship model and the business network actors with respect to the firm at 
the end of the 90s when Multiasistencia appeared as the focal firm within this 
business network. In the 90s, Multiasistencia was very successful in managing 
groups and attracting corporate clients such as banks and insurers.  
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Figure 4.2: Grupo Multiasistencia 
            
4.4.2. IBM Barcelona Lab   
 
The IBM Barcelona Lab was created in 1984 when a group of engineers 
developed a turn-key application to integrate the PC for one of the most 
important savings banks in Europe. This project was the basis for the LAN-DP 
(LAN-Distributed Platform) software product. In 2005, there were more than 
1,500,000 licenses for this product used by 1,500 banks around the world. The 
second phase spans from 1994 to 2004. In 1994, IBM faced one the worst crises 
in its history. Given this situation, the company needed the LAN-DP application to 
be transferred to another of its labs in order to develop economies of scale. The 
Barcelona Lab had to re-invent itself, lowering its centre of gravity and defining 
itself as open to the customer, thus Orchestrating a Network of banks, other 
Labs and Independent software vendors (ISV) worldwide pioneering hybrid 
programming, which allowed it to design a new software product in collaboration 
with its customers: the Websphere Business Component Composer (WBCC). In 
Figure 4.3 below, I outline the project-based relationship model, the business 
network actors, and the Lab’s central position as the focal Firm.  
 
Multiasistencia
Trade
Professionals
Corporate
Customers
End
Customers
                     Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation |  80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        
 
                  
 
 
 
 
            Figure 4.3: The IBM Barcelona Lab as a Network Organisation  
              
4.5.- Data Collection   
 
The main objective of this thesis’ empirical work is centred around: (1) 
structuring action over time; (2) a contextual examination of the diverse relations 
and dependencies in each context and at different levels of analysis; (3) a 
comparison between the case studies, with data collection taking place from 
2004 to 2007; and (4) a pluralist approach, emphasising the fact that the main 
sources consisted of interviews, phone conversations, focus groups, observation 
and secondary sources (Pettigrew, 1990). The data were mainly gathered 
through interviews with executives and employees at workshops conducted in 
June 2004, February 2005, and March 2006. The average duration of each 
interview was 90 - 180 minutes. Managers related their stories of how the 
change process evolved in their respective firms.  
 
 
4.5.1.- Interviews   
 
I divided the interviews into three parts: (1) the first was about the company, the 
type of business, the context and the motivations for change (Pettigrew, 1990); 
(2) the second was about the interviewee’s subjective view regarding the change 
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process (their stories) and “how” they did it, emphasising the decision-making 
process with a focus on the activities, the value for the actors, the innovation 
process and how relationships were established, changed or brought to an end; 
and (3) the third part was related to strategic issues such as results, 
organisational changes and resource mobilisation. The interviews were semi-
constructed and concentrated on managerial decision-making. Interviews 
included opposing questions and listening to different perspectives at an 
individual level, as well as the capacity to lead focus groups to contrast 
conflicting information.  
 
In addition to the interviews, there were countless telephone calls, conversations, 
and comments throughout the process, which also allowed me to collect informal 
data. For example, I was invited to a customer event with two of the companies 
where I had the chance to share meals, receptions and coffee breaks and spend 
considerable time with the companies in order to gain their confidence and 
gather good ethnographic material. I took written notes during these meetings 
and recorded them by date and subject. 
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               Table 4.2: Description of Case Data (Number of Interviews)  
Strategic Profile Multiasistencia IBM Barcelona Lab 
Chairman  
CEO 
CIO  
Lab Manager 
Business Development Manager 
Country Managers  
Production Manager (COO) 
Network Suppliers  
Network Corporate Clients   
3 
3 
6 
N/A 
2 
3 
2 
2 
6 
 
N/A 
IBM Spain 1 
6 
6 
6 
2 
3 
2 
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As Table 4.2 shows, interviewees were selected because of their leading 
positions in the respective organisations and in the innovation process under 
analysis. They included initiators of change, those affected by changes, and 
others external to the focal firm. Another source was focus groups with the 
different managerial levels. Interviews were prepared and conducted over three 
years, from 2004 to 2006, allowing them to validate the findings from the case 
data. Interviews were recorded on paper notes, audio tapes, and 6 hours of 
videotapes (resulting in two edited DVDs), along with teaching cases for 
Multiasistencia and the IBM Barcelona Lab.  
 
4.5.2.- Other Sources   
 
The teaching cases also allowed me to invite executives to my classes. This 
method provided good additional insights from the interaction between these 
managers and participants. I asked for permission to record these classes 
(sometimes via an assistant taking notes and others by video recording) in order 
to be able to analyse and compare these sources of information, and triangulate 
them with others, both in time and with other perspectives.  
One of these cases, the “IBM Barcelona Lab: Orchestrating Banking Innovation” 
(www.ecch.com) was named the best case outside the USA and Canada by the 
North American Case Research Association (NACRA) in October 2006. The 
presentation of this case and “Multiasistencia on the Internet (A), (B) and (C)” in 
2005 to the same conference allowed me to discuss and check the structure of 
the cases and their validity with the academic community.  
 
The research process took four years for each case on average. Data collection 
and analysis occurred iteratively, thus guiding subsequent data gathering (see 
Table 4.3). In presenting data, I emphasise people’s voices. As already stated, 
other sources included direct observation and secondary sources such as 
company reports or press releases. With the understanding that every research 
project has its limitations, I am confident that I have an accurate enough 
impression of what happened in these firms to understand the process’ object of 
study. 
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                                                                    Table 4.3: Data Sources for Empirical Research
Multiasistencia IBM Barcelona Lab 
• Field notes taken during visits to the company 
• Press notes and clippings from 1998 to 2004   
• Multiasistencia Magazine for their network of professionals and 
network of clients (2004-2008) 
• Internal company documents: internal communications, 
reports, process descriptions, and documentation for software 
developed 
• Documentation regarding the company’s financial situation  
• Personal interviews: (1) with company executives: the 
President, Group CEO, General Managers in Spain, France, and 
UK, the International Expansion Director, the CIO, the Network 
Manager, and the COO; (2) With executives in two of 
Multiasistencia’s most important corporate clients: SegurCaixa, 
belonging to the “la Caixa” Group, and BBVA Seguros; (3) With 
managers of the franchised repair companies 
• Focus groups with the Board of Directors in 2005, 2006 and 
2007  
• Attending client meetings in 2006. 
 
• Field notes taken during various visits to the company 
• Documentation regarding innovations introduced by the Lab 
from 1984 to 2004   
• Internal company documents: internal communications, 
reports, process descriptions, and documentation for 
software developed 
• Documentation regarding the company’s financial situation 
(confidential and cannot be released)  
• Personal interviews: (1) with Lab executives: Lab General 
Manager, the Director of Business Development, the 
Director of Sales for Banking and (2) With an executive from 
the “la Caixa” Group 
• Focus groups: one per year from 2003 to 2007 
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4.6.- Conclusion     
 
In this chapter, I have described the boundaries of the empirical research. The 
chapter includes objectives and design, including the paradigmatic approach, 
scientific methodology and operative method. I chose dynamic capabilities and 
strategic management to focus on the “hows”. In order to address these 
issues, I have described Abduction, coherent with Dynamic Capabilities (Teece 
et al., 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) and have endeavored to expand 
knowledge boundaries to examine the autonomy dynamics or degrees of 
freedom needed to drive changes affecting network structures. I have also 
described the operative method that I have applied emphasizing narratives and 
longitudinal studies. In the next chapter, I analyze the cases presented to 
examine changes in boundaries, roles and relationships in order to contrast 
with the propositions described in Chapter 3, where I defined Orchestrating 
Network Behavior for Innovation as a managerial function.  
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Chapter 5: Orchestrating and Network 
Structural Change  
 
5.1. Introduction      
 
This chapter applies the research method to 
 
 Network Behaviour with two 
empirical cases, using power as a unit of analysis and centripetal and 
centrifugal forces to examine roles, relationship dynamics and network 
boundaries. In order to explore these questions at the empirical level, the 
strategy followed in this chapter is as follows: first, the present situation is 
defined and the Multiasistencia and IBM Barcelona Lab cases are analysed, with 
a focus on their evolving structures (roles, network co-ordination models, 
integration processes and type of relationships) and their stories as processes. 
However, to make this simpler, several stages are defined that act as 
references in the transformational processes which were used for over 20 years 
in Multiasistencia and the IBM Barcelona Lab. 
5.2. Case Presentation    
This section presents Multiasistencia’s and IBM Barcelona Lab’s evolution as a 
succession of local maximums in an ongoing process of experimentation 
regarding their respective business approaches, market development, network 
structures and digital platforms delivered. By comparing these two cases with 
their dynamic structural change as a path of efficiency for the proposed 
Orchestrating Network Behavior for Innovation function,  innovation process 
is empirically analyzed, observing Orchestration from the focal firm’s central 
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position. If we observe the empirical phenomena from another perspective and 
try to imagine the role of Multiasistencia when orchestrating, for example, 
versus that of IBM, we see how it develops its full potential.  
Thus, this chapter presents the analysis of two narratives: in the first, we see 
the generation and evolution of a network from its origins, the Multiasistencia 
case, representing a natural way to create firms; in the second, we see a 
process of network generation and evolution within a global firm that can be 
framed as a Differentiated Network.  
 
5.3. Multiasistencia      
 
This section describes and analyses Multiasistencia, a focal firm within a 
network that provides different services for banks and insurers. This case was 
selected to study different stages within the firm in which to examine the 
equilibrium, innovation and change throughout its 25-year history (from 1984 
to 2009). This period even encompasses the disruptive change from 2000-2003 
when Multiasistencia successfully implemented a digital platform. Its evolution 
reveals optimal and sub-optimal stages affecting the various network 
relationships and the roles of different. For analytical purposes, we propose a 
dynamic, five-stage process spanning: (1) the network’s initial situation (1984-
1995); (2) the boom and expansion of the network (1995-2000); (3) the 
change in the network (2000-2004); (4) network behaviour promoting 
innovation as an equilibrium to innovate with information through a digital 
platform (2004-2008); and (5) the focal firm’s introduction of some changes in 
network governance (from 2008 onwards).  
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5.3.1-Network Creation (1984-1995)      
 
This phase is defined by an entrepreneur who started Multiasistencia after 
identifying a structural gap between small customers (hotels and restaurants) 
and repair services. According to the founder, “What we proposed was to 
establish criteria for these repairs, guaranteeing a set price and response, 
consistent service and quality standards” This idea was expressed in the 
company’s slogan and promise in the 90s, “Yes, we can”. It was a promise of 
trust that filled the structural gap and generated a new type of business and a 
new “repairs market.”   
 
Multiasistencia provided its repair service through its International Control and 
Co-ordination Centre. The Customer Service Representatives (CSRs) working 
there received the initial call from end users looking for the final solution, in 
many cases home repairs. Once the claim was accepted, the CSR deployed jobs 
to a network of self-employed trade professionals, co-ordinated by the focal 
firm. 
 
5.3.2.- The Network Boom (1995-2000)      
 
Multiasistencia’s boom generated increasing returns that acted as a centripetal 
force, attracting new actors to the network and expanding boundaries. These 
included banks which wanted: (1) fast access to the new insurance market 
where time-to-market was crucial and working with Multiasistencia offered this 
possibility; (2)  lowered transaction costs to take advantage of increasing 
economies of scale; (3) access gained to a very specialized service; and (4) a 
focus on their core activities. This allowed banks to generate more value by 
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cross-selling insurance to their home mortgage clients or credit card holders. 
Trade professionals, by contrast, had access to larger markets, ensuring a 
constant flow of jobs. Meanwhile, end customers appreciated the 24/7 
availability, time guarantees (3 hours for emergencies and 48 hours for the 
rest) and warranties (3 months). By the end of 2000, Multiasistencia reached 9 
million end customers in Europe through 100 major corporations such as banks 
and insurers that outsourced this service. From 1995 to 2000 Multiasistencia 
grew from €40 m in turnover to €90 m. Its growth generated important 
economies of scale, increasing returns and network externalities that increased 
lock-in.  
 
However, there was a latent and increasingly important asymmetry with trade 
professionals. In 2000, the network encompassed approximately 11,000 trade 
professionals. This collective was only 20%-dependent upon delivering the 
service. There was a “culture of freedom” which hid latent opportunistic 
relationships during the first phase, serving as a centripetal force so long as the 
business grew. Nonetheless, as the case shows, relationships based on 
opportunism can be very cohesive. The attractiveness of the business and the 
focal firm assumed full responsibility for co-ordination (pushing the actors in 
the network). There were no clear rules of engagement or commitment and, 
therefore, no clear boundary setting.  
 
In 2000, the Control Centre needed to make 5.5 calls on average to find an 
available trade professional. As such, the firm’s economic boom also masked an 
important escalation of increasing co-ordination and transaction costs which 
drained productivity and finally led to a sub-optimal situation, making it more 
risky and costly to be a part of the network. For example, productivity dropped 
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from 1,900 claims/customer service representatives a year in 1995 to 1,200 in 
2000. While the Control Centre grew from 100 CSRs in 1995, to 450 in 2000, 
their activity focused increasingly on searching for available trade professionals 
and responding to complaints from end customers and banks, meaning that 
they dedicated less time to developing more business.  
 
In parallel, Multiasistencia focused on innovation and new service development. 
For example, it succeeded in: (1) reducing the average claim cycle completion 
from 30 to 5 days; (2) reducing the process for a bank customer to change 
accounts from 2 weeks to 2 hours, bridging banks with utilities and invoicing 
providers through an automatic branch office billing service; and (3) linking 
banks/insurers with trade professionals to carry out repairs through a 
comprehensive claim management service. One manager explained,  
 
“Multiasistencia was very creative, but faced what can be described 
as an invisible glass ceiling: we did not really understand how to 
control a whole lot of fragmented operations in a manner that was 
more professional, more automatic.”   
 
We can even see Multiasistencia as a focal firm in the centre of a network, but 
one which lacked power since the relational dynamics made Multiasistencia 
much more dependent on the surrounding relationships based on opportunism, 
thus leading to an increasingly costly structure which jeopardised the business. 
This was “the invisible glass ceiling.”   
 
 
Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation |  91 
 
5.3.3.- Network Change (2000-2004)       
 
New management joined the focal firm in 2000 and decided to change the 
rules of the game and define a new set of commitments and boundaries with 
the trade professionals and banks. The management team decided to commit 
to trade professionals by asking them to do more by themselves while coaching 
them in the process of: (1) changing their role from that of self-employed 
workers to managers of small firms of 10-15 professionals; (2) managing a 
much larger number of repairs; (3) co-investing in software modules (web 
services) to manage these new businesses (financials and job assignments) 
which were developed initially by the focal firm; and (4) accepting a new co-
ordination schema to a) pull jobs from the digital platforms, as well as digital 
billing and Service Level Agreements (SLA), and b) leaving the sales process 
exclusively to the focal firm.   
 
On the one hand, this new schema meant that these newly created repair firms 
had to implicitly accept sharing co-ordination costs; and, on the other, they had 
to accept greater dependency on Multiasistencia. However, this new power 
equilibrium was based on mutual commitment and trust. As one manager 
added, “The communication policy of sharing our objectives with them was, 
therefore, an absolutely key factor. There has been a relationship of sharing 
the objectives and of growing together.” However, not all trade professionals 
accepted these new rules of the game, and from 2000 to 2003, some of the 
trade professionals left the professional network, thus ending their relationship 
with the focal firm.  
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The focal firm’s management team also changed the relational dynamics with 
banks by balancing the centrifugal force of conflict due to dissatisfaction. 
Multiasistencia’s management wagered on “openness” to define a new set 
commitments. It established agreements with its client banks to co-create the 
internet solution, the Business Network Operating System (BNOS), among all 
the network actors. As one manager related,  
 
“We had a model of relations with these trade professionals which 
was not very well integrated with them. We offered work and they 
took it, if they wanted to, and if they didn’t want to, they didn’t 
take it. It was much better to reach a level of greater commitment, 
that is, we undertook to do a series of things, to give them a 
volume of work, and they undertook to accept it and to carry it out 
within certain dynamics.” 
 
The BNOS was designed to manage claims and process repairs in a fully 
automated manner, linking banks and trade professionals in real time, and it 
was governed by 100 variables. Multiasistencia’s management asked for a new 
commitment from banks through sharing the scalability problem, presenting the 
solution of leveraging digital platforms and asking them to co-create the new 
digital platform to run network processes. This led to a peer-to-peer type of 
relationship, creating autonomy on both sides and allowing the co-creation of 
software modules which combined existing co-specific software applications to 
build the BNOS. According to one manager, “80% of processes developed were 
through co-creative processes.”   
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However, in a few cases, Multiasistencia had to create lock-in policies by 
increasing greater dependency and raising exit costs to keep some corporate 
customers from leaving the network and consequently losing business 
revenues.  As one manager indicated, 
 
“We deployed the repair work to the trade professional; previously 
all these activities were by phone, but by replacing all the elements 
of the relations, except for the incoming call from the customer 
requesting the service, with information flows, allowed us to be 
much more agile, to reduce times, to be much more flexible and to 
devote the human time to managing the exceptions and the 
complicated processes,, instead of performing manual tasks which 
can be carried out more efficiently by a machine”.  
 
Their action can be interpreted as exerting autonomy by fostering a centrifugal 
force to change relationship dynamics: the focal firm asked for greater self-
control and commitment among network actors, fought against opportunism, 
and created peer-to-peer relationships. In addition, Multiasistencia enhanced 
the CSRs’ empowerment and autonomy by transforming their role from that of 
“information chasers” to “process owners.” They began by assessing the repair 
according to the firm’s schema programmed on the BNOS. The BNOS was 
intentionally designed as a boundary management system, establishing a 
framework or pattern of expected behaviour acting as a deterrent (boundary 
guardian). According to one executive, “We have substituted all human 
communicative elements in the repair service, except incoming calls, with 
machines. We have developed a sophisticated process supported by ICTs, 
allowing people to manage exceptions.” Productivity at the Control Centre 
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increased by 25% a year from 2000 to 2003, contrasting with the decline of 
previous years(see Figure 5.1).  
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                 Figure 5.1: Productivity Evolution at the Control Centre  
Source: Author based on estimations (1996 to 
1999) and data provided by Multiasistencia 
(2000-2004)  
 
Multiasistencia changed its role to that of reference in the Network. One 
manager commented, “The BNOS had been conceived as a framework of 
reference for network behaviour, freeing up resources to focus on developing 
new business and innovation.” According to another executive, “After the 
change process, the business was autonomous: we did not need to push it 
anymore.” The change process led to a new equilibrium, giving the network a 
totally different structure. 
 
Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation |  95 
 
5.3.4.- Network Behaviour for Innovation (2004-2008)      
 
At this stage the focal firm managed network boundaries by setting 
commitments which balanced the centrifugal force of autonomy with centripetal 
forces of increasing returns and lock-in. Multiasistencia’s role was to serve as 
the reference in a network of innovation, opening space for growth by 
leveraging the digital platform as a space for co-creation. It also developed 
trust as a deterrent, controlling network boundaries through SLAs and through 
the BNOS which automated and kept track of all the processes but also acted 
as a space for communication and co-creation.  
 
Multiasistencia changed its role from that of “the innovator” which saw the 
network as an instrument to diffuse innovation, to that of “the reference” (a 
trustee to identify and share knowledge). It began to look at  the network as 
“the locus of innovation” and became a facilitator to co-create innovation by 
orchestrating the interaction between the different sources and voices, 
understanding proposals, composing them and combining them as new 
services. One trade professional commented,  
 
“In this process, we learned to adapt to what they [Multiasistencia] 
asked of us and, in a way, well, we also learned to trust them, to 
be more transparent and share information to be more agile and do 
better business.”  
 
One bank executive added, “Multiasistencia is very innovative and always 
proposed new ways to develop new business”. 
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First, CSR interaction with all the network actors served as a new source for 
solutions. New ideas appeared regarding conflict resolution due to gaps in 
service provision and the problem-solving process. Moreover, the digital 
platform provided a history of contacts and data analysis which fed predictive 
models to mobilize the right resources at the right time. Examples of this were 
better workload distribution in the Control Centre, process improvements, and 
increased availability by managing a network of three other Contact Centres 
belonging to insurance companies in Spain. These insurance companies  acted 
as back-up centres to ensure access during peak periods in telephone traffic or 
during telecommunication network failures.  
Second, corporate customers (banks and insurers) and trade professionals 
were also important sources of innovation. New software components (web 
services) were developed by co-creating new services. The digital platform was 
a space for service innovation and shared investments and network resources, 
although Multiasistencia continued to be the formal owner of the technology. 
Examples of this co-creation were, first, digital signatures and electronic 
invoicing, “desk-top audits” over the internet, allowing loss adjusters to assess 
claims over the BNOS, and premium services to inform customers through SMS 
messaging. Finally, Multiasistencia also continued innovating by replicating this 
model in other markets such as healthcare and public services (see Table 5.1). 
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Source of Innovation  BNOS Role  Benefits 
 
Continuous service improvement 
 
Network Interactions 
 
Customer Service 
Representatives (CSRs) with 
end customers, corporate 
customers and trade 
professionals at the Control 
Center with the BNOS  
Deterrent Role 
Process automation  
Control variables and Service Level Agreements (SLAs)  
Automatic Boundary Management and Process Automation  
Increase the Efficiency of Existing Operations 
CSR managing exceptions: Proactive quality  
Increase in productivity by 25% a year (2000-2003) 
Digital invoices: 40% cost reductions through the reduction of 
paper work 
Predictive Models    
Data Analysis  
 
Predict New Paths for Efficiency 
Peak Management and Service availability  
Service Enhancements  
 
 
Co-Create New Services 
 
Peer Interaction  
Software Co-creation  
Space for Co-creation  
Generation of Economies of Scope   
 
New Sources of Income 
Including digital photos  
Inter-connectivity with insurance systems and trade 
professional systems   
Desk-top audit: New area of revenue and cost reduction (for 
network actors), representing 60% of the process  
Premium services and generating SMS messaging   SMS messaging, improving communications with end customers 
30% increase in customer satisfaction  
 
New Markets 
 
Focal Firm Management    
Fostering Positive Returns  
Generation of Economies of Scale    
Replication of the Model in Other Areas  
Increased business scale throughout (1) the front office; (2) 
inter-organisational processes and (3) network structuring 
                               Table 5.1: Service Innovation in Multiasistencia’s Network 
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Orchestrating the Network at this stage implied managing a new equilibrium. 
We can identify the following centripetal forces: trust, higher business value, 
and the generation of economies of scale and scope. Centrifugal forces at this 
point might have been misfits at the strategic or resource levels, representing a 
new cost base for firms which re-defined the logic of transactional costs. In 
some cases autonomy has also worked as a centrifugal force in terms of the 
search for new opportunities. 
  
The result was the increasing dependency on Multiasistencia due to growing 
specialisation and different roles: banks focused on their core business and 
trade professionals only on repairs, leaving business management to the focal 
firm. The digital platform was also an important instrument to generate system 
lock-in and served to generate trust as a deterrent, keeping track of SLAs. 
 
5.3.5.- 2008 to the Present: Towards a Dominated Network   
     
As of 2008, Multiasistencia started to face competition in the very market it had 
created. Some new entrants, including insurance companies, began to focus 
more on quality assurance rather than on innovation. Multiasistencia decided to 
incorporate some trade professional franchises and their staff as special units 
to ensure top quality for some key corporate customers, developing a 
hierarchical relationship with them. In fact, Transaction Cost Theory suggests 
that firms try to control specific scarce resources and that they tend to in-
source them (see Williamson, 1994). This approach seems insufficient, 
according to the data, to fully interpret managerial decisions in fields such as 
this where more research is needed.  
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5.4 Case Study: IBM Barcelona Lab  
 
This section describes and analyses the IBM Barcelona Lab as a focal firm 
leading software development for middleware integration between the front 
office and the mainframe. This case was selected to study different stages 
within the firm to examine the equilibrium, innovation and change throughout 
its 25-year history (from 1984 to 2009). This period even encompasses a 
disruptive change from 2000-2003 when IBM Barcelona Lab opened up 
software development to its customers as “an open lab.” Its evolution reveals 
optimal and sub-optimal stages affecting the various network relationships and 
the roles of different actors. For analytical purposes, a dynamic, four-stage 
process is proposed  that spans: (1) the network’s initial situation (1984-1994); 
(2) change in the network (1994-1996); (3) network behaviour promoting 
innovation for the development and deployment of a digital platform (1996-
2004); and (4) when the IBM Barcelona Lab became a Competence Centre 
(from 2004 onwards).  
 
 
5.4.1. Network Initial Conditions: The PC in the Bank Branch   
 
IBM Barcelona Lab started its days with one relationship with a bank for a 
specific project. In 1981, IBM launched its personal computer (PC). By 1984, 
the new product, named PC-AT, was the central computer used for application 
development in the special projects that the banking team was working on in 
Barcelona. However, the “la Caixa” savings bank in Barcelona, and other 
institutions in Spain, insisted on IBM in Spain leading the change, that is, 
introducing PCs in their branch offices to reduce IT costs.   
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IBM executives proposed partnering and developing an investment project 
between IBM in Barcelona and “la Caixa”, informally planting the seed for open 
innovation through this relationship which changed from a provider/customer 
relationship to one in which the actors co-created something new together. The 
project was a good example of autonomous action, since it was launched 
without following the formal procedures at IBM regarding software 
development. The plan involved a pilot project that would allow a prototype to 
be designed locally, based entirely on “la Caixa” and IBM resources in 
Barcelona. This project was very successful and later became a standard 
solution for many financial institutions. It was called Financial Branch System 
Services (FBSS).  
 
As a result, IBM decided to formalize this innovative venture, this change of 
role, by converting it into an R&D laboratory for banking applications in Spain, 
known to its staff as the Barcelona Lab or “the Lab.” In 1993, seven years after 
it had come into being, the Lab had consolidated its position and had more 
than seventy professionals on staff. In 1994, LAN-DP had 500,000 licenses 
world-wide. Thus, the product was entering its mature phase. 
 
5.4.2. Network Change (1994-1996)  
 
In 1993, IBM announced the most negative results in its entire history, 8 billion 
Dollars, and its market capitalization plummeted from a high of $105 billion to 
$32 billion. Given this situation, the company’s corporate management, 
presided by J. Akers, proposed that IBM be split into seven separate companies 
to save it from bankruptcy. However, in 1993 when Lou Gerstner came in as 
CEO, his primary objective was to keep the company together as a single unit. 
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Only twelve months later, in 1994, and in an unprecedented turnaround, the 
company announced profits of 3 billion Dollars.2
 
 The main decision was to shift 
its orientation from products to service. A result of this new orientation was 
IBM’s decision to create IBM Global Services (IGS) as the firm’s new 
Consultancy Division. After the turmoil in 1993, IBM began to offer its 
customers integral solutions.  
However, there was a latent and important asymmetry with the rest of IBM, as 
in any other hierarchy. The attractiveness of the business around LAN-DP 
determined that IBM Barcelona Lab assumed full responsibility for software 
production where there were no clear rules of commitment with the rest of 
Software application groups. However, due to market shifts and new 
technological waves, it was decided to re-structure the whole organization. In 
June 1994, IBM underwent heavy cost optimisation that also had repercussions 
for its laboratories policy, particularly the smaller European units in Vienna, 
Rome, and Barcelona. This new policy led to the decision to discontinue 
Barcelona Lab’s operations. As a consequence, the Leader who had run the Lab 
since its foundation resigned.  
 
In the uncertain times of 1993 and beyond, IGS in Spain offered many of the 
Barcelona Lab staff a natural outlet for their professional careers. There was a 
constant movement of people switching from the Lab to IGS. It was more 
appealing to work on particular projects integrating this new technology than to 
wait for the unknown. By the end of 1996, the Lab had less than twenty staff 
members, and many had opted to join the new IGS consultancy unit.  
                                                 
2 Gerstner, L. (2002). Who says elephants can’t dance?.  New York: Harper Collins. 
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5.4.3. Network Behaviour for Innovation (1996-2004) 
 
A key aspect was boosting collaboration with the Sales Banking Organisation in 
Spain. When the risk that this small team would be definitively incorporated 
into the Consultancy Organisation was at its height, the Commercial Banking 
Organisation and IGS identified several projects for them in various financial 
institutions where the disruptive technology which became known as the 
internet was appearing. The new management team proposed a centripetal 
force: (1) developing a Lab that was open to its customers to carry out 
innovations based on internet technologies and (2) exerting autonomy by re-
thinking software development through engaging in direct relationships with 
customers, that is, banks aligned with new lab strategy. According to one 
executive,  
 
“We focused on finding banks that worked globally and had to face 
global challenges in integrating their business processes and their 
technological assets. The Lab’s origin lay in being close to 
customers; therefore, I decided to take advantage of this capability 
by opening the Lab up to customers.” 
 
IBM Barcelona Lab also changed its role(as Multiasistencia did), from being the 
“the innovator” and perceiving the network (in this case IBM and their 
customers) as an instrument to diffuse innovation to understanding the 
network as the locus of innovation, and becoming “a facilitator” to co-create 
innovation by orchestrating the interaction of the different sources and voices. 
As one Lab member related, the Lab was no longer like an Ivory tower, since 
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they had moved its gravity centre towards the customer. On the other hand, as 
argued, a new trigger appeared in the context: Internet technologies were 
rapidly evolving, and thus it was easy to find key customers willing to innovate 
with this type of technology, that is, who wanted to take advantage of the 
Lab’s know-how. The merit was based on its early detection, and very rapidly a 
new set of commitments and a new method of organisation. According to one 
executive, it was a, 
 
“A matter of capturing the existing innovation needs of each of the 
clients, making them reality and co-creating a solution with the 
client. As a result, we had key people in key projects.”  
 
The IBM Barcelona Lab exerted autonomy, staffing “key people in key projects” 
from IBM and from banks, and dealing with the leaders like technical architects 
or sales people. In the Lab, it was quite the norm for a professional who was 
working in development to then move to the project group at the end of the 
development phase, later going to the client to implement or start up a project 
based on the product that he or she might have developed personally. The Lab 
not only exerted autonomy, it generated a new capacity to attract even IT 
banking staff. As one manager commented, 
 
“And at some point I took a gamble, because we needed project 
directors from the banks in the laboratory. And without a doubt, 
that has been one of the wagers that has given the best results.”  
 
The Lab also implemented a new way of developing software that shaped its 
very structure. In other words, the related tasks shaped ties and structures 
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while these relationships also forged trust and commitment which, in turn, 
shaped new tasks. The Lab was shaped like a daisy, where project teams 
rotated with software development teams in different projects, analysing, 
diagnosing and building software solutions. One of the Lab members stated,  
 
“This results in plans being changed. People have to be dynamic, 
flexible, and know how to adapt to these changes. I would say that 
this is a little difficult at first; basically, professionals prefer to know 
very clearly what is expected of them, exactly when and how. And 
as soon as they get used to that dynamism, to that flexibility, they 
take it as a routine part of their work.” 
 
The capacity to rotate from software development to project management even 
to business development was considered to be a part of the Lab’s tasks, thus 
“avoiding repetitive or routine activities,” according to one manager. Indeed, 
experimenting entered a flow of ongoing ideas and invention, a combination of 
accents, changing harmonic patterns that would inter-weave the structure of 
relationships and networks. As a manager indicated, 
 
“So, we put key people in key projects. In graphic terms, the 
organisation was like a flower. Its centre was formed by the core 
competences: Product functional development and innovation. The 
petals of the flower were formed by specific customer projects.”  
 
The purpose of the first line (the project teams) was to define solutions to meet 
customers’ needs. In this context, it was the intermediary's job to define which 
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part of the project could be recycled. The Lab developed new roles in the 
network.  
As discussed previously, in the IBM Barcelona Lab case, the Lab’s boundaries, 
roles and relationships also changed. Until 1993, the Lab’s knowledge base was 
focused on software development. By engaging in project management, it 
developed its business development capacities – as executives in the Lab called 
it. Therefore, the Lab became less dependent on the willingness of sales 
departments to sell their solutions. This is an important issue in multinationals 
such as IBM, where product and sales catalogues are vast and product 
divisions dedicate part of their resources to sell products to sales forces. In this 
case, the IBM Barcelona Lab’s Business Development team did not compete, 
but was much closer in order to control the sales process in IBM.  
The IBM Barcelona Lab deployed Internet applications to integrate new 
channels and, as a result, developed its Websphere Business Component 
Composer (WBCC), a modular software architecture to integrate multiple 
contact channels based on re-using existing components and creating new 
ones. In addition, these technologies became richer and increasingly complex, 
adding more features and easier access to transactional systems. This allowed 
for some of their other services to be increasingly available, including requests 
for accounts, transfers, and managing payments. 
 
According to one executive, “WBCC was a “component composer” that gave 
more autonomy to customers, letting them build new applications, re-use and 
integrate them with existing applications” affecting multi-channel strategies.  
As one manager declared, “In essence, software projects were thought of as 
the development of re-usable components”- Additionally, project teams 
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synthesised knowledge into interconnecting software modules which were the 
foundation for the modular architecture that became the WBCC launched in 
1998. 
   
IBM Barcelona Lab orchestrated different sources of innovation (Table 5.2). 
Banks were important sources of that innovation. New software components 
(web services) were developed, co-created and combined with existing IBM 
technology. WBCC was a space for innovation and shared investments and 
network resources although IBM continued to be the technology’s formal 
owner. Finally, IBM, as a corporation, took advantage of the WBCC technology 
to continue innovating by escalating this model to other industries, as well as 
re-framing its relationships with customers. 
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Source of Innovation  WBCC Role  Benefits 
 
Continuous service improvement 
 
Network Interactions 
 
IBM Lab staff interaction 
with Banks, other IBM Labs, 
sales force and Independent 
Software Vendors (ISV)  
Deterrent Role 
 
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) for software delivery 
Standards   
Increase the Efficiency  
 
Time to Market: from 2 years to 6 months 
Customer Satisfaction  
 
Co-Create New Services 
 
Peer Interaction  
Software Co-creation  
Space for Co-creation  
Generation of Economies of Scope   
 
New Sources of Income 
Inter-connectivity between multi-channel front office with 
Mainframe   
Multi-disciplinary teams (banks and IBM Lab staff)  
New integration projects  
Replication of cumulated knowledge in new customers   
Transferring knowledge to other IBM Labs  
 
New Markets 
 
Focal Firm Management 
of the differentiated 
network     
Fostering Positive Returns  
Generation of Economies of Scale    
Replication of the Model in Other Areas  
Value absorptive capacity by IBM as Corporation 
IBM as diffusion network (e.g., 1.500 Banks use LAN-DP) 
                                Table 5.2: Innovation in IBM Barcelona Lab’s Network 
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5.4.4. Becoming a Competence Centre          
 
At some point in 2004, IBM decided that, to increase productivity, the basic 
programming could be done from its laboratory in China. This would result in 
greater programming productivity and cost reduction due to off-shoring 
policies. The Vice-President of the Banking Industry in EMEA summed up the 
situation in 2004 as follows, 
 
“IBM Barcelona Lab was essential for our competitive strategy in 
the Retail Banking sector not only in Spain: It was a key 
competitive advantage in our European and global operations. The 
Barcelona Lab demonstrated high organisational flexibility, and its 
hybrid programming techniques were very useful for the 
incorporation of new applications, reducing time-to-market and 
making it easier to share knowledge and enhancing collaboration 
between the Lab, the sales organisation, and the clients.” 
 
IBM decided to capitalise on the extensive know-how of its workers, although 
not as much in terms of technology as in terms of solutions for the financial 
system, transforming the software laboratory into a skills or competence 
centre. As one manager argued,  
 
“The laboratory and skills centre motto has always been that we 
should “reinvent ourselves.” But I’m also convinced that within four 
or five years we’re going to have to dream up the next step. We are 
always going to be there next to our clients, because the other part 
of the motto is “this reinvention will only be possible if we are close 
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to our clients’ projects”, and not like the shut-away or isolated 
laboratory concept, which is very out-dated. That would never 
work, we will carry on reinventing ourselves”  
 
5.5.- Propositions          
 
This chapter has contributed to the discussion on dynamic capabilities and 
power by defining and testing Orchestrating Network Structural Dynamics 
empirically. Grounded on the foregoing analysis, this chapter presents the 
propositions which are described in the following sections.   
 
5.5.1.- Orchestrating Networks: The Dual Nature of Power          
 
 
Proposition 1:  Orchestrating Network dynamics for innovation balances 
autonomy and cohesion through dynamic commitments as a power 
expression of managerial action. 
 
With this proposition we argue that Orchestration, by nature, exerts power in 
two ways. First, it is about setting direction and opening new spaces. In the 
cases studied, this occurs by exerting autonomy to network actors. More 
autonomous actors may make new choices to search for complementarities 
which the orchestrator can then mobilize and make the network the “locus” of 
innovation. In the Multiasistencia case, it works as a change process. In the 
IBM Barcelona Lab case, it is the result of “open[ing] the Lab to customers”-  
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Both cases show networks as multi-connected and multi-disciplinary spaces of 
new relational dynamics which can combine and re-combine new sources for 
innovation such as: (1) autonomous staff focused on problem-solving, 
stemming from the interaction with other network actors and with information 
systems such as the digital platforms; (2) the co-creation and development of a 
digital platform based on peer-to-peer dynamics; and (3) the re-design of 
network structures through the capacity to engage in new communication 
schemas. 
 
The second source of power is setting commitments. Innovation requires trust 
since actors need to expose themselves and unfold  new sources, propose 
ideas and combine them into co-creative activities. In addition, this process 
emphasises that orchestrating is about holding conflict at bay, since autonomy 
stresses doing more by oneself, having self-control and less dependency on the 
power of others but also assuming the risk of having different objectives and 
perspectives. To that end, commitments among actors are about taking care of 
each other and maintaining an ongoing equilibrium to not break up network 
structures (even during deep structural changes), and, therefore, create an 
efficient path for innovation.  
 
Orchestrating through commitments is about changing the rules of the game 
and keeping the game alive. This approach presents networks as a more 
natural way of organizing, thus challenging the Neo-Classical perspective of 
relationships as transactions- which presents many limitations for innovation 
studies (Teece, 2009)- and dismissing other human attributes to deal with 
innovation and cope with radical uncertainty. Compelling antecedents can be 
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found in Psychology or even in classic narratives to support commitment as the 
force to link networks of innovation. First, among mature and autonomous 
individuals, commitment is the capacity to care for each other (Bowlby, 1962), 
assuming consciousness and self-control to choose and set relationships, thus 
recognising the dependencies that actors’ have on each other in a network. The 
second antecedent is found in Elster’s Theory of Binding Rationality (see Elster, 
2000) as argued above. In Multiasistencia, orchestrating through commitment 
contrasts with the opportunism which was previously the source of latent 
conflict and, paradoxically, served as a centripetal force. This confirms that 
some social dynamics can be very cohesive but, since they may hide 
asymmetries, they are incompatible with co-creative processes of innovation. 
Partnering, creativity and autonomy lay behind IBM Barcelona Lab’s idea of 
“key people in key projects” which sees areas of innovation in particular 
settings, developing the right staffing policies and generalising what is specific 
and a market trend.  
Orchestrating also implies taking actions in those cases which led to some 
relationships being dropped while new ones were built, recognising that not all 
actors in a network can be interested in or have the capacity to establish 
commitments. Moreover, in the cases presented, commitments were 
determined precisely in sub-optimal regimes, emphasising how trust is a 
necessary resource that orchestrators have to foster in order to manage 
investments in situations where, for some actors, the costs and risks may be 
greater than the short-term benefits. 
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5.5.2.- The Dynamics of Co-Creation          
 
Proposition 2: Orchestrating innovation in networks has a positive 
influence on maximising outcomes when commitments lead to peer-to-peer 
relationships among autonomous players.  
 
This proposition emphasises that orchestrating is a different way of exerting 
power, leading to different network structures based on peer-to-peer relations. 
Being peers seems to be the prerequisite for co-creative activities, according to 
empirical results. This requires the existence of complementary assets to 
exchange and create something new. This dynamic affects both actors’ roles 
and the network boundaries.  
Actors become more specialised, gaining greater differentiation and 
establishing a new division of labour. In Multiasistencia, the new network 
structure stressed complementarities but also relational co-dependencies, since 
trade professionals needed to focus on their repair work, being more 
dependent on the sales process and market development carried out by the 
focal firm. The result was that tradesmen and the focal company balanced their 
relationship. By the same token, banks needed Multiasistencia’s service quality 
to expand their customer business value. This is also consistent with the 
proposition that, in order to establish a new equilibrium, firms may create 
greater specialisation and differentiated resources (Wernerfelt, 1984). In the 
case of the IBM Barcelona Lab, this implied: (1) the capacity to co-create new 
software solutions; (2) the ability to leverage “external” and “internal” 
resources to do so (in other words, the “slack” was provided by the first 
Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation  |  113 
 
customers to carry on with the project); and (3) the capacity to integrate new 
technologies in the existing bases already installed.  
In the Multiasistencia case, power, as expressed by exerting autonomy and 
managing commitments, led to a new set of social values such as the policy of 
“growing together,” implicitly recognising economic value generation and 
absorption processes. The focal firm also asked its Customer Service 
Representatives (CSRs) to become “process owners” and to co-create, co-
produce and exploit new services based on the co-operative software 
developed with banks. Multiasistencia gained autonomy as the focal firm, 
inviting those who did not accept the new schema to leave the network. The 
new game was now a question of not only sharing benefits, but also costs.  
 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 below summarise the empirical study of both cases and 
their respective structural dynamics affecting the roles, relationships and 
boundaries by balancing centripetal and centrifugal forces. Also stressed is the 
role of ICTs due to their importance in the dynamics of both Networks.  
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 Initial Network Conditions 
(1984-1994) 
Network Boom (1995-2000) Network Change (2000-
2003) 
Network Behaviour for 
Innovation (2004-2008) 
Towards a Dominated 
Network (2009- 
Focal Firm Role Bridging a structural hole  Attempt to be the strategic apex  Management of new 
commitments  
Reference for innovation Strategic apex  
Relationships Asymmetric  
(1) Contracts with customers  
(2) Latent opportunism with 
providers  
Asymmetric  
(1) Explosion of opportunism 
among providers 
(2) Lack of trust and quality in 
service with banks  
Balancing relational dynamics 
through boundary definition 
and commitments.  
Some new relationships 
created, others are dropped 
Trust as a deterrent and 
calculative  
Commitments (peer-to-peer) 
towards co-creation and 
complementarities for co-
creation 
Trust builds knowledge and 
identification 
Hierarchical control over 
providers  
Boundaries as 
centripetal vs. 
centrifugal forces 
Promise to customers “Yes, We 
Can” 
Not defined with providers 
Centripetal forces prevail: 
Boundaries expanding due to 
business growth, externalities, 
increasing returns, “follow the 
others” and “latent” opportunism  
Management exerts autonomy 
as a centrifugal force vs. the 
centripetal force of opportunism 
(and its over-embeddedness)   
 
Commitments balance 
centripetal forces (increasing 
returns) and centrifugal forces 
(autonomy) 
New balance under study 
ICT role  Operational support  Source of new income and 
innovation   
Co-creation of a BNOS Automatic boundary control 
(deterrent) and space for co-
creation (knowledge based) 
To be analysed  
                                Table 5.3: Orchestrating Network Structural Dynamics in Multiasistencia                                                   
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 Initial Network Conditions 
(1984-1994) 
Network Change (1994-
1996) 
Network Behaviour for 
Innovation (1996-2004) 
Competence Centre (2004-) 
Focal Firm Role Bridging a structural hole  Management of new 
commitments  
Reference for innovation Reference for innovation 
Relationships Asymmetric  
(1) Commitments with 
Customers  (Banks) – some of 
them latent after project ending 
(2) Agency-based with IBM as a 
Corporation – latent asymmetry 
and opportunism?    
Balancing relational dynamics 
through boundary definition 
and commitments.  
Trust as a deterrent and 
calculative  
Commitments (peer-to-peer) 
towards co-creation and 
complementarities for co-
creation 
Trust adds knowledge and 
identification 
Commitments (peer-to-peer) 
towards co-creation and 
complementarities for co-creation 
Trust adds knowledge and 
identification 
Boundaries as 
centripetal vs. 
centrifugal forces 
Centripetal forces prevail: 
Boundaries expanding due to 
business growth, externalities, 
increasing returns and “latent” 
opportunism 
Management exerts autonomy 
as a centrifugal force (Key 
People in Key Projects) vs. the 
centripetal force of opportunism 
(and its over-embeddedness)   
 
Commitments balance 
centripetal forces (increasing 
returns) and centrifugal forces 
(autonomy) 
New balance under study 
ICT role  Source of new income, new 
types of relationships with 
customers and innovation   
Co-creation of LAN-DP  
Project-based, ad-hoc solutions   Co-creation of WBCC To be analysed  
   Table 5.4: Orchestrating Network Structural Dynamics in the IBM Barcelona Lab                                                    
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5.5.3.- The Orchestrator as the Network Reference          
 
Proposition 3: A focal firm can act as the network reference, influencing 
dynamic boundary control and trust in the network.  
 
In this proposition, it is important to point out the structural attributes of the 
focal firm which act as a yardstick for innovation, capable of exerting power and 
strategic control on a peer-to-peer basis while maintaining the rules of the game. 
Although the role of peer-to-peer interactions in innovation is underscored, in the 
Multiasistencia case, the focal firm strengthened its central role and maintained 
ownership of the digital platform, thus controlling a strategic resource to keep an 
asymmetrical power balance with respect to the other actors, although it also 
maintained its capacity to generate commitments. It is important to note that the 
focal firm changed its role as well as the network structure and its function in the 
different periods analysed. In the first phases (1984-2000) the focal firm’s power 
was based on concentrating innovation and trying to control the network as a 
tool to spread its innovations. During the sub-optimal regime (2000-2004) the 
focal firm’s way of exerting power was to exert  autonomy, opening new spaces 
and establishing new commitments. In this transition, the focal firm proposed a 
new game and changed the rules of that game, balancing relational dynamics. 
From 2004 to 2008 the emphasis was on co-creative activities to design and 
implement new services. Here the focal firm exerted power by increasing its 
centrality as the reference for innovation, controlling resources and opening new 
spaces, thus rolling out dynamic capacities.  
 
I also propose that the role of reference to manifest commitments and deal with 
changes can be assessed by resilience as proposed in Chapter 3. In both cases 
(1) members of the network adopted a co-creative activity with complementary 
equals (2) focal firms gained power in order to confront asymmetries (3) partners 
reached agreements with a focal firm (4) amicable (or otherwise) separations (or 
lock-outs) were reached and (5) a specific structure was ended with the aim of 
exploring other areas in the future.  
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5.6.- Conclusions   
 
This chapter has analysed Orchestrating as a managerial function to set a new 
path of efficiency, managing a process of ongoing equilibrium between the 
actor’s benefits and costs which can vary along the way, stressing that setting a 
path is “changing the rules” while keeping the game alive. Orchestrating Network 
Behaviour for Innovation is about power: on the one hand, opening new sources 
of innovation and, on the other, setting commitments which shape network 
boundaries. This issue has been stressed, particularly in sub-optimal regimes, 
therefore resilience is proposed. In this respect, management is about 
dynamically regulating boundaries through centripetal and centrifugal forces in 
accordance with objectives and circumstances which can also shape roles and 
relationships.  
 
Therefore, Orchestrating Innovation is an ongoing process to change network 
structures to manage the players’ autonomy and peer-to-peer relationships for 
co-creation, sharing investments and engendering trust. This leads to network 
behaviour for innovation and the development of new opportunities. In turn, the 
latter leads to a “multi-connected” network, emphasising value regimes based on 
equity, holding conflict, and organizing forward. This serves to highlight: (1) the 
autonomy and the predominant relational model among the actors in the 
network (whether hierarchical or peer-to-peer); (2) the locus of innovation, that 
is, if innovation is centralised and the network’s main function is diffusion or if 
the focal firm is the reference to generate novelty by orchestrating new sources 
that come about in the network; and (3) how the focal firm fosters 
communication within the network. Information systems and digital platforms 
have been highlighted, in particular, as a proxy for commitments and also as a 
communications system and a creative space. Creativity in social settings may be 
part inspirational, but it also requires perception and communication in order to 
become a structural process.  
 
In Chapter 6, I analyze the “optimum state” found in both cases in more detail, 
where the focal firm orchestrated innovation through peer-to-peer relationships, 
co-creation and the capacity for opening new spaces and sources of innovation, 
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which allowed it to have the capacity to set new paths due to multi-connectivity, 
find new experts, end and establish relationships, and develop new digital 
platforms; a critical infrastructure for innovation as I shall explore in the next 
chapter.   
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Chapter 6: Orchestrating Generative Networks of 
Innovation     
 
6.1. Introduction      
 
This chapter elaborates further on the optimum condition for innovation when 
Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation engaged in co-creative activities. 
There is evidence in the Multiasistencia case from 2003-2008 and in the IBM 
Barcelona Lab case from 1996 to 2004. This formula offered maximum results 
and outcomes by opening up a space for new voices and new sources of ideas 
(see Tables 5.1 and 5.2 in chapter 5) which complemented and re-combined with 
each other, to create novel results with an important economic impact on the co-
creation and exploitation of digital platforms as innovation infrastructures.  
This chapter presents a framework that describes commitments assumed by the 
focal firm in the network and compares them with exploitation and exploration 
factors by comparing the two case studies. In the following subsections, these 
issues are discussed and the cases are analysed with an emphasis on the 
network as an ecosystem for co-creation.  
 
6.2. Generative Networks: A Framework of Commitment        
 
Generative networks are expressions of optimality, and rely on Orchestrating 
through commitments, trust, and a symmetric (peer to peer) model of 
relationships for co-creation. Generative networks also represent an optimal 
configuration as network behaviour for innovation. The orchestrator exerts 
autonomy, opens space for new sources of innovation, and boosts 
communication between actors. Digital Platforms provide an infrastructure for 
innovation, giving more autonomy to actors, and letting them build new 
applications to re-use and integrate them with existing applications and 
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components in order to build more integrative solutions (in the IBM case) and 
new services (in Multiasistencia case). Autonomy is expressed with the proposal 
of new projects, to come up with software projects thought of as the 
development of re-usable components, or in other words, a re-combination of 
existing resources to expand the resource base, as dynamic capacities suggest. 
Additionally, we have shown that project teams synthesised existing and new 
knowledge into interconnecting software modules which were the foundation for 
the modular architecture of digital platforms.  
 
With this approach, it is pointed out that, on the one hand, the network is the 
locus of innovation, stressing that Orchestrating is a network capability 
(dependent on sources of innovation), not only a question of the focal firm. On 
the other hand, Orchestrating is about opening and managing new sources with, 
(1) network interactions among actors; (2) spaces for co-creation and generation 
of new modules/applications/services and generation of economies of scope; and 
(3) the replication of existing models in new markets, industries and areas (see 
chapter 5). In both cases studied, the focal firms detected 
significant inefficiencies within the banking sector’s business processes due to 
their profound knowledge of business and administrative processes in the 
industry. Given the common problems and broad applicability of these processes, 
both focal firms quickly found (1) economies of scale and externalities that 
helped apply their digital platforms to other sectors of the economy with some 
modifications as well as (2) economies of scope, becoming “innovation factories” 
for complex, process-intensive information services, balancing 
 
greater scope or 
breadth versus greater focus and specialisation. It is suggested that sources of 
innovation are dependent on the way commitments are set and their impact on 
innovations (from exploitation to exploration). To that end, we define the three 
key modes:  
(1) A new business dominant logic, that is, new business models and market 
creation, as a result of irreversible commitments led by the focal firm. 
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(2) Co-creative activities and mutual commitments and adaptation among 
actors at the technological and organisational levels to ensure resource 
and strategic fit. Mutual adaptations are basic constituents of loosely-
coupled structures.  
(3) Digitally enabled commitments, which include programmed information 
systems with the capacity to assimilate programmed limits of action and 
provide new functionalities based on data analyses and predictive 
modelling. With programmed changes, we consider that some automatic 
responses can be the result of dynamic models of data analysis such as 
new business intelligence technologies.  
These three modes are at the heart of the governing function and also imply 
mobilising resources, for which we present empirical findings. However, two 
additional processes are included: one related to high levels of commitment and 
exploitation, and the other to low levels of commitment and ICTs used for 
exploration. The fourth mode might be: Dominant (existing) business logic 
through which networks can show persistence or attachment to previous 
commitments. The reasons for “persistence” must be carefully analysed as they 
can be the result of previous commitments or be due to chaotic behaviour, that 
is, the absence of clear previous constraints or boundaries that can lead complex 
systems to assume deterministic paths.  
Finally, a fifth mode may be possible due to the exploitative role of information 
systems. Although theoretically possible through “artificial intelligence,” this 
mode would require much more research (and time!) since this question is on 
the boundary of science. Maybe one day computers and information systems will 
make commitments, choices and judgements. While this may become possible in 
the future, it is far from being a reality today. These two modes 4) and 5) are 
presented to argue that commitment and the level of exploration are 
independent variables. Exploitation and exploration refer to the scale of the 
innovation and also the resource mobilisation required, that is, the money and 
investment, the new relationships andgetting out of old ones, etc. Orchestrating 
recognises that the greater the organisational capacity, the greater the scale of 
change (Orlikowski, 1996). This approach to adaptability can be synthesised in 
the following figure.   
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                                                                Figure 6.1: Modes of Commitment for Innovation  
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6.3. Dominant Designs and Business Models       
 
The first mode is related to irreversible commitments, that is, situations where 
there are few choices and they are leapt into, providing for consistent behaviour 
which maintains organisational consistency with respect to these choices. This 
thesis has presented innovation dynamics towards dominant designs which can 
be defined as knowledge that crystallises from: (1) an innovation path, which 
implies (2) different choices and actions that set this path (3) marching in line 
with the articulation of preferences. Both the IBM Barcelona Lab and 
Multiasistencia epitomise these dominant designs with the co-creation of the two 
digital platforms. In turn, these led to the creation of new markets for 
“middleware integration” at IBM and “repairs” in the case of Multiasistencia.   
 
In both cases, findings show how digital platforms are associated with new 
dominant business logic, giving these firms a “referential power” and the capacity 
to control digital platform developments or their ownership. This is consistent 
with previous research, since new dominant designs are related to new 
hierarchies (Van de Ven & Garud, 1993; Utterback & Suarez, 1993; Suarez, 
2004) 
 
This discussion is also related to recent proposals in the literature such as linking 
Orchestration and dominant designs with market and factor creation. In the early 
stages of any industry or market development, product designs and organisations 
tended to be organic, with no clear definition of rules, roles and boundaries 
(Burns & Stalker, 1961), thus permitting networks to be seen as natural ways to 
describe the stages where investments and co-creation seem to be critical 
aspects as well as Orchestrating managerial capability.  
 
Centripetal forces lead to super-additive games that serve to: (1) attract new 
developers, new improvements, and new modular subsystems; (2) accelerate the 
diffusion among new adopters; and (3) thus create increasing returns, thereby 
confirming the existing theory which sustains that orchestrators generate a new 
type of asymmetry (expanding the pie but keeping a bigger piece for their own 
hierarchical position). Finally, we confirm that dominant designs accelerate the 
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diffusion across heterogeneous adopters, as cases show, since innovation leads 
to opening up the possibility of co-operative relationships and generating 
externalities which can reinforce cumulative returns.   
 
Multiasistencia, for example, created new businesses and new markets beyond 
the repair service industry, becoming a service factory and managing complex 
informational processes such as mortgages or transfers of customer information 
from one bank branch to another. As one manager described, “We have created 
a specific call centre for this with an application that handles more than 17,000 
companies offering direct debit services.”  
 
6.4.- Co-creation 
 
Commitments in these cases were initially established through strategic or 
idiosyncratic relationships searching for complementarities that could generate 
interest in co-investing in new software solutions. This situation then led to 
greater interaction and increased autonomy and the different networks 
developing new ways to carry out their business activities. Through co-creative 
activities, actors can perceive that they co-share ownership of the network as 
well as mutual adaptability, resulting in much better time to market.  
Co-creation networks can be seen as ecosystems which engage in systemic 
innovation, while still providing the developmental tools needed to continue 
improving their set of functionalities. They can however be co-created through a 
set of derivative developments with greater agility, to meet market demands and 
better time-to-market, quality and integration targets, while avoiding disruptions 
and reducing risks. 
The new business model developed by the IBM Barcelona Lab, for example, 
allowed for the creation of a new concept of software production known as 
“Hybrid Programming.” As one manager stated, “The key issue for the Lab was 
managing a fast time-to-market”. Unlike the strategic planning model in place up 
to then, this concept was based on the development teams who continuously co-
operated with customers on “product drops” every few months. When a 
customer or the sales force asked for a new requirement, it was incorporated 
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into the software development program. These new requests were placed on a 
list governed by a cost-based priorities structure (resources, time and 
complexity) and by profit criteria (applicability and extendibility). One of the 
managers explained,  
 
“The versions depend on customer needs. Software development 
runs in parallel, coming out of the work of several teams responsible 
for each module. The new versions are launched at set intervals – 
every six months. We have also defined a new delivery process to 
ensure the quality of every product drop.” 
 
During this period, and due to the extensive experience and knowledge 
accumulated in integration projects, in 1998 the Barcelona Lab launched a new 
product: the Websphere Business Component Composer (WBCC) which is a line 
of pre-configured software tools using internet software. This greater flexibility 
permitted a new modular architecture to be defined based on “components” or 
small, functionality modules which provided specific solutions to the client’s 
needs. 
 
“It allows software application designers to build quick and flexible 
banking solutions, re-use existing components and applications, and 
integrate them into their transactional systems. From the bank side, 
this is a way to protect their strategic investments in the mainframe.” 
 
This emphasises that: (1) autonomy, not coercion, is a critical variable to 
conducting innovation activities, and (2) adaptability at the organisational and 
technological levels serves to build core-competences at the network level such 
as the capacity to co-operate and learn.    
 
6.5.- Digitally enabled commitments   
 
Digital platforms set the rules of the game and network boundaries, as can be 
clearly seen in the Multiassistencia case. Multiasistencia built a Business Network 
Operating System (BNOS) to automate the process of managing its contacts with 
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corporate clients and the CCMS process. This system was deployed during the 
change process enacted from 2000 to 2003. The objectives of the platform were 
to:  (1) determine a pre-defined pattern of behaviour; (2) ensure process control 
and continuity; (3) ensure scalability and provide the tools needed to manage 
peaks in demand and exceptions; (4) ensure information and communication 
flows; and (5) act as a deterrent to monitor the defined pattern of behaviour and 
Service Level Agreements. 
 
According to one Multiasistencia manager,  
 
“We have substituted all human communication elements in the 
repair service, except for incoming calls, with machines. We have 
developed a Business Network Operating System that supports our 
sophisticated process, allowing people to manage exceptions to the 
main process” 
 
It follows from Proposition 1 above that the use of ICTs has allowed the network 
to automate many processes and thus release limited resources. As one 
executive indicated,  
 
“Our model is that of making the whole process transparent. The 
integration of processes on the internet has allowed us to define a 
“virtual machine of finite states” with very precise expiry dates 
between states. The application has about 100 controlled steps linked 
to our client and professional applications. When an exception occurs, 
we must offer all the information available to the person directly 
responsible for its management to make the decision-making more 
effective.” 
 
This exploitative use of ICTs implies the use of structured information and 
problem resolution that can lead business intelligence systems to develop 
predictive models. As one manager of Multiasistenica recalled, “data is essential” 
because it provides more experience to people running the business and 
facilitates a learning process of day-to-day activities, all of which result in 
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internalising and mobilising knowledge. Similarly, as a result of having more 
information, Multiasistencia has developed experimental uses for its ICTs, 
allowing the firm to develop new solutions and services (“Factory of Processes”) 
based on informational exploration.  
 
Digital platforms contain programmed behaviour, including, for example, IT 
standards at different levels of connectivity and integrability: from data to 
processes and integrative behaviour. This allows a network information processes 
to be supported throughout the network and permits easy plug-and-play. 
Informational and technological limits can create entry barriers, but they also 
have lock-in effects or imply exit costs (see Shapiro & Varian, 1999). In the 
Multiasistencia case, the BNOS supported the new model to co-ordinate the 
network of trade professionals as the framework for network behaviour and 
boundary management. The BNOS is the basis of the partnership since the 
Internet portal is the source of jobs: (1) trade professionals are responsible for 
“pulling” jobs from the system; (2) the BNOS acts as a deterrent as it keeps track 
of Service Level Agreements (SLA); and (3) it monitors and supports the new 
information system. As one manager added,  
 
“For us the Internet does not just contribute value; it has also been 
the facilitator of the entire new operating model that we have 
developed. Everything is automated and we, the people, manage the 
exceptions; we manage the proactive quality. Simplifying the 
operating idea for Multiasistencia, the new process came about when 
we said: ‘We’re going to put it on the internet’.” 
 
Moreover, the BNOS reduced transactional costs due to the reduction in 
administrative tasks and paperwork arising from the calculation, invoicing and 
collection of payments from corporate clients and end customers (Multiasistencia 
executives estimated that, for some trade professionals (TPs), paperwork 
accounted for 50% of their activity, even though Multiasistencia invoiced on their 
behalf). As one trade professional added, “Multiasistencia has a self-invoicing 
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system which means that once you finish the job, you don’t need to issue the 
invoice anymore.”  
The orchestrator exerts power through control of the digital platforms as a 
resource. In Table 6.1 a synthesis of findings at “focal firm” level and “individual 
level” (elaborated upon in chapter 7) is presented. It is important not 
underestimate the question of which actor owns the platform, and other issues 
such as intellectual property are also critical. In addition, the platform’s capacity 
to increase the lock-in effect among actors in the network is worth bearing in 
mind. But above all else, the platform distributes the power to co-create, that is, 
the platform can be used as a tool for creativity, increasing collegiality and a 
sense of ownership while, at the same time, continuously evolving to provide 
new offerings and service innovation.  
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                                          Table 6.1:  The Three Modes of Commitment and Innovation 
Governance Modes   Multiasistencia IBM Barcelona Lab   
 Functions Managerial Enablers Functions   Managerial Enablers  
Digitally enabled 
commitments    
• Assignment of jobs to the appropriate 
trade professional  
• Automatic invoices  
• Online quotations for repairs  
• Claim management  
• IT: (1) Digital Platform internet-
based pervasive system connecting 
100 corporate clients and 11,000 
trade professionals; (2) Web 
Services to easily connect to the 
network and (3) dynamic boundary 
management 
 
• Multi-channel Mid-Layer Software  
• Data conversion from mainframe to contact 
channels such as Contact Centre and the 
internet  
  
 
• IT: Websphere Business 
Component Composer (WBCC) as a 
component-based platform for 
multi-channel integration 
 
Co-Creation     • Proactive quality; lifecycle management  
• Ad hoc services and exception 
management (service improvements)  
• Customer-centric innovation for fast time-
to-market: Participation architecture to 
enrich the DIGITAL PLATFORM as a 
network resource  
• Active dialogue and conflict 
management  
• Key People in Key Projects  
• IT: Internet/Web Service 
Integration and Call Centre 
Integration with other partners  
 
• Customer-centric innovation: incorporating 
customer requirements  
• Key People in Key Projects: rotating people 
and changing roles  
• LAN-DP and WBCC as component-based 
solutions founded on knowledge 
capitalisation  
• Active dialogue to make sense of 
reality: “Application of technology 
to real problems” 
• Conflict management  
• Creativity – dialogue  
 
 
Dominant Design  
and Market Creation  
 
• Opening new geographical markets  
• Creation of SMEs for repairs “around the 
network” – spin-out-type program  
• Firm-driven innovation for new services  
• Defining new markets such as Healthcare 
and the Public Sector 
• Increasing scale and cost reduction for 
network externalities  
 
• IT Flexibility: Factory of processes 
and system renewal 
• Knowledge generation to create 
new ideas   
• Exert autonomy  
 
 
• Strategy: “Choose a series of key projects 
aligned with strategy”  
• Creation of the Lab in 1984 
• Creation of new markets since 1994 
• Creation of an SME to develop software 
solutions, spin-out-type program  
 
• Information search and innovation 
screening  
• Active information exchange 
through formal and informal means  
• Exert autonomy  
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6.6.- A dynamic view of commitment    
 
Figure 6.1 shows the three levels of commitment ranging from irreversible, co-
creative, to “automatic” and their relationship with exploration and exploitation. 
Figure 6.2 below illustrates the commitment framework graphically, depicting the 
dynamic effects of commitments. Irreversible commitments (from point “B” to 
“C”) lead to dominant designs and dominant business logic, as “node anchoring” 
and convergent behaviour, although the path is based on a set of experiments, a 
set of steps until the new business logic is right.  
 
 
 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
            
              
               Figure 6.2: A Dynamic View of the Commitment Framework   
 
This process is based on mutual commitments between network actors in order 
to develop co-creative activities. Similarly, this process may serve to attract 
actors who can incorporate new complementary factors into the network and into 
the digital platform due to increasing returns and externalities or super-positive 
sum games. Attraction can be due to opportunism, as discussed in Chapter 5, or 
even to natural euphoria at the beginning of any innovation process (Van de Ven 
et al., 2008). Here we argue for the importance of commitments as criteria for 
demarcation and boundary setting in orchestrated networks of innovation.  
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Running digital platforms can develop two roles. The first involves automatic 
boundary setting for network behaviour (as the Multiasistencia case shows).  
In digitally enabled networks, some structural patterns or behaviour are driven by 
an information system that sets a specific set of constraints to limit degrees of 
freedom, precisely to establish a style (from the many which are theoretically 
possible) or, in business terms, a Service Level Agreement. The second role that 
information systems can play is that of a standard and standardisation platform 
for the development of new software modules for the specific function of front-
office and back-office integration in banking systems. Although business 
functions are different, the social or structural function is similar, that is, setting 
boundaries for human activities and setting standards for behaviour. This is 
represented as a horizontal line that constrains the “levels of freedom” in our 
diagram of cycles, with the hypothesis that “ups” and “downs” can be held at this 
level, that is, setting boundaries of action.   
 
Multiasistencia was entering new markets. This had two implications: 
geographical with entry into the UK and France, leveraging the scale and 
flexibility of its digital platform, and sectorial, the company’s branching out into 
the healthcare and automotive repair industries. Furthermore, the firm also 
began orchestrating information from different local government agencies, 
providing a unique point of contact for citizens in different cities. Meanwhile, the 
IBM Barcelona Lab developed different innovative products to integrate a multi-
channel offering. At the moment of writing this thesis, approximately 1,500 
banks world-wide were using this company’s solutions. Therefore, these two 
innovation projects which were the result of taking a different look at reality, in 
turn, led to the creation of a new market and a new business dominant logic.  
 
After analysing upstream dynamics, we will now discuss downstream ones and 
sub-optimal regimes. Once a new dominant design emerges, the competition 
(both external and internal) that wants the dominant position will focus on price 
to take advantage of the new design’s weaknesses. Competition will tend to offer 
the same product or service at better prices, with an emphasis on large-scale 
production (see Suarez, 2004). The main risks are technical community 
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disintegration and an increase in competition. Orchestrators focus on the design 
and deployment of specialised assets, that is, the generation of new modules 
through co-creative activities, focusing on more specialised assets which are 
more difficult to copy. This is clearly seen in the more mature phases within the 
IBM Barcelona Lab and Multiasistencia cases.   
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                       Figure 6.3:  A Dynamic View of Orchestrating  
 
Figure 6.3 is a continuation of the previous figure (6.2) but in which the risks and 
conflict associated with structural evolution during peaks (dominant designs) and 
troughs (sub-optimal regimes) are added. These are explored more in-depth in 
the next chapter.  
In 2000, companies had the choice of subcontracting Multiasistencia or building 
their own infrastructures. From 2005, due to the appearance of four new firms 
providing similar services, banks could split their claim management and repair 
services between two or three firms. Perhaps this is why Multiasistencia’s 
management decided to include some key trade professionals as internal 
employees along the way evolving towards a bureaucracy-like firm.  
Multiasistencia’s pioneering effort exerted a centripetal force not only on trade 
professionals and banks, but on other firms that saw this as an attempt to 
structure repair services which were previously unstructured and thus 
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inadvertently create barriers for new entrants to the market, competing in terms 
of price and scale. In 2009 the repair market was worth €2,500 M in which 20% 
was “free”, that is, services were not controlled by major insurance companies. 
Multiasistencia controlled approximately 50% of this free market with a turnover 
of €250 M. The rest was distributed among 4 other major players. Since this 
service was driven by market rules and, due to the financial crisis that started in 
2008, many small banking institutions started to sell this business unit to 
insurance companies, thereby challenging the market, since major insurers 
tended to in-source the service. Transaction Economics could have predicted this 
situation which, according to this research, occurred due to the absence of 
commitments serving as boundary criteria. If the criteria to mobilise resources 
are driven by price, then Transaction Cost Economics can predict that valuable 
resources will tend to be in-sourced by firms. The process of in-sourcing literally 
dries up the market and makes it a hostile place for newcomers.  
 
In the case of the IBM Barcelona Lab, once the dominant design was released, 
the major risks it faced included the technological community’s dissolution due to 
internal competition (a hypothesis) and internal policies promoting off-shoring. 
When a company depends on only one product, this can be a question of time 
since any software application, such as the first LAN-DP product or WBCC, will 
quickly enter a mature phase (4-5 years) where: “80% of the value perceived by 
customers was based on customisations,” as one IBM executive related regarding 
their product.  
 
The Websphere platform controlled approximately 20% of the system integration 
market in 2009, according to Gartner. One can suppose it controlled a much 
higher figure in the banking sector. This same source (see Norton, 2009) claimed 
that IBM could offer quick time-to-market and increased customer satisfaction for 
IBM’s agile Websphere implementation methodology, based on 3-day workshops 
(see Figure 6.4). As this research shows, this is due to more than 25 years of 
proven experience, at least for the IBM Barcelona Lab, which is now a part of the 
multinational’s global service operations and is, therefore, considered a local 
element in global innovation (see Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997).  
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Figure 6.4: Agile Implementation of IBM’s Websphere (Source:  
Norton, 2009) 
 
This thesis has emphasised that centrifugal forces may have affected both cases: 
once the market is created, it follows its own rules, and firms tend to adapt to 
these rules following well-known principles. It is, of course, possible to start a 
new orchestrated path, as divergent behaviour, finding new opportunities, as is 
proposed in Figure 6.3 above, to avoid the tendency to create sub-optimal 
regimes and further cycles. This is, naturally, a hypothesis that will require 
further research.  
 
6.7.- Propositions    
 
From the theoretical framework presented in this chapter and the findings of the 
case studies, we formulate a set of propositions that emphasise the role of 
networks and information systems which link and qualify the different modes of 
commitment to guide future research in this area. This cross-case analysis serves 
to highlight two focal firms and their establishment of a strategic direction and 
determining paths to efficiency, revealing a capacity to co-ordinate actions and 
build digital platforms.  
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The IBM Barcelona Lab specifically co-ordinated a business network of software 
innovation for the banking and finance industries. Digital platform development 
was the main activity and task for the innovation network. Customisation was 
enabled through the interactive relationships established by the Lab and its 
customers to integrate new demands and enrich existing solutions and systems. 
This enabled the dynamic analysis of commodity-specialist input factors and the 
identification of optimal sourcing options. While for Multiasistencia, the main 
ethos underlying its business objectives was to satisfy customers’ needs and 
requirements within the limits governed by SLAs and information systems, for the 
IBM Barcelona Lab, in contrast, bi-directional adaptation was performed through 
negotiations on project scope, terms, conditions, and deliveries.  
6.7.1. Generative Networks       
 
Proposition 4: Generative Networks are optimum configuration for 
self-renewal and dependent on the predominant symmetric 
relationship dynamics for co-creation.  
 
By ‘generative’ we refer to new sources of innovation and communication to 
engage in a multi-disciplinary and multi-connected network. Orchestration can  
new commitments as driven by the focal firm. This leads to new business 
development and new market development, co-creative activities and digitally 
enabled changes. Hence, it follows that increased levels of strategic choices and 
commitment lead to more radical levels of innovation through co-creation 
activities and a new dominant business.  
Moreover, we can deduce that innovation is positively related to the firms’ self-
renewal abilities. In Multiasistencia, change took place by the company re-
defining its commitments from a previously chaotic set of opportunistic 
relationships; in the IBM Lab, the latter simply had to open up to create 
relationships with its customers in order to co-create and leverage power inside 
IBM with this important resource. Mutual agreements, trust, and a business-to-
business symmetric model were instituted. In some cases, the lasting existing 
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relationships were more prone to be dropped. At other times, they evolved to a 
new schema.  
 
 
 
6.7.2.- Digital Platforms and Generative Networks  
 
Proposition 5: Digital Platforms serve as proxies for commitments 
among network actors.  
 
Digital platforms are digital infrastructures to generate innovation. Trust may be 
impersonal, for example, with respect to the technology and the network itself 
(Shapiro, 1987). In the research presented in this paper, digital platforms played 
a critical role, serving as proxies for trust in the networks by providing 
transparency and being built as a result of shared investments and co-creative 
activities. Indeed, a digital platform is a space for information-sharing that allows 
for the transformation of the network’s knowledge base. The digital platform 
plays a key role in network domains by: (1) exerting boundary control and 
surveillance, allowing the creation of network externalities and increased returns, 
network scale and lock-in and (2) expanding network domains of knowledge as a 
result of co-creative activities, continuous improvements and the generation of 
new markets. This underscores the role played by technology in fostering the 
dynamic interplay of capabilities. This interplay leads to proposals for the creation 
of new services through the assimilation of new knowledge and reworking the 
existing knowledge base in order to expand value options and increase returns. 
Multiasistencia focused on creating a new digital platform, its Business Network 
Operating System, allowing the focal firm to manage adaptation among 
participants, structuring and integrating information between nodes and links, 
and allowing firms to connect and disconnect. Furthermore, the new BNOS 
spread out along the network and helped to establish structured patterns of 
behaviour, institutionalising them and allowing free resources such as information 
to flow with higher levels of adaptability.  
In addition, Multiasistencia wanted to increase the availability of information in 
real time, along with reliability, transparency, automatic tracking, control, 
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scheduling, and routing optimisation. The result of having more information was 
an increase in the level of control over the processes involved (not over 
employees through direct supervision). Another similarity is the establishment of 
more or less stable electronic links between network participants. The IBM 
Barcelona Lab, in contrast, managed a large network of personal contacts and 
relationships which gave rise to more of a process-like activity since they 
developed projects. Platform owners can benefit a great deal from innovation in 
complementary products and services added to the platform. They also benefit 
from the overall system: development costs drop as the scale of developers or 
contributors increases. Learning costs also decrease in co-productive innovation 
processes. Another issue is how to set criteria to provide the right incentives to 
the right participants. It is also important to understand which talented 
contributions are considered valuable and how they should be brought into the 
community, and how incentives change as the knowledge base changes 
(Pedersen & Larsen, 2006). This can be considered an important line of future 
research.   
 
6.7.3.- The Role of Orchestrating in Factor / Market creation  
 
Proposition 6a: Orchestrating Network Behaviour lead ICT-enabled 
networks to optimum states for innovation which engender the 
dynamics for market creation 
 
Proposition 6b: The Orchestration of (1) irreversible commitments, 
(2) co-creation and (3) digitally enabled changes has a positive 
impact on network business growth, self-renewal and market 
creation.   
 
Proposition 6c: Orchestrating enables explorative processes such as 
co-creative actions towards dominant designs. 
 
This thesis has proposed that Orchestrating can generate new markets, although 
this is a first step to which more research must be devoted. Markets can be seen 
as a new game, although not exactly driven by trust. In the first steps though, 
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when activities do not have enough scale, it seems that trust and commitments 
are essential to create communities. Once the super-additive games create a 
critical mass, the logic seems to be price driven and only competitive, thus 
drastically reducing the degrees of autonomy needed and dismissing the role in 
management in market/factor creation activities.  Market logic tends to dissolve 
existing communities and increase competition and opportunism, thus reducing 
autonomy or, in other words, adding more constraints that can diminish the 
ability to innovate. Perhaps this is why there is no innovations market.  
 
However, Orchestration can generate new commitments driven by the focal firm 
which can lead to new lines of business and new markets. Hence, it follows that 
increased levels of strategic choices and commitment lead to more radical levels 
of innovation through co-creative activities and the new dominant business. 
Moreover, it can be deduced that innovation is positively related to the ability to 
self-renew. This implies that there is choice regarding a new path. Management 
becomes an exercise in value generation by defining the limits of appropriate 
actions, commensurate with suitable expenditures of organisational resources. In 
other words, a criterion of successful management is knowing when to allocate 
limited resources to the more demanding long-term choices and commitments.  
In both cases studied, significant inefficiencies were detected in business 
processes within the banking sector due to their profound knowledge on the 
industry’s business and administrative processes. In this sense, they became 
specialised in complex, process-intensive information services, balancing 
 
greater 
scope and breadth versus greater focus and specialisation.  
6.8.- Conclusions   
 
Orchestrators exert power through commitments among autonomous parties, 
leading to the development and use of new digital platforms. In the two cases 
analysed, the focal firms managed co-creative activities and adaptation among 
participants, structured and integrated information among nodes and links, and 
allowed firms to establish compatible goals. The use of ICTs permitted the 
networks to: (1) automate many processes and/or (2) standardise activities, and 
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thus release free resources (or slack), as a result, balancing exploitative modes 
with increased interaction and information sharing.  
 
As such, the new information system, spread out among the network, helped to 
establish structured and institutionalised patterns of behaviour that led to market 
creation through a dominant business logic and dominant digital platform design 
which attracted other actors, thus creating a critical mass which, in turn, led to a 
new market. While this is very clear in the Multiasistencia case, it is not so 
obvious in the IBM Barcelona Lab case. In the latter case, Orchestration was a 
temporary activity beyond the realm of the firm’s traditional business activity, as 
was the creation of a banking system integration market and its agile 
implementation capacity (IBM has not disclosed corresponding figures on this 
matter). In addition, between the game played by the Lab and the market it 
created, there was another structure called IBM with its own policies, legal rules 
and boundaries, power structures and global strategies.  
 
Now I turn to the individual level of analysis, that is, managerial capabilities, a 
theme developed in Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 7: Network Leadership    
 
7.1.-Introduction        
 
This chapter uses the normative approach, constituting a final reflection based on 
the empirical findings and adding a more personal view on the individual 
dimension of Orchestration and possibly even a novel approach to Network 
Leadership. The chapter discusses the full potential of leadership in terms of its 
proposed organisational capacities: the ability to organise, to set economic and 
performance objectives, and to hold the inherent conflict which any innovation 
implies at bay.  
 
Thus far, we have discussed focal firms’ power capacities to steer network 
behaviour for innovation by exerting a role as reference for the network, 
controlling boundaries, managing dynamics and transitions and incorporating 
digital platforms as structural resources. We have also examined network 
behaviour, the establishment of programmed or digitally enabled commitments, 
and the use of digital platforms as spaces for co-creation and a means to 
generate increasing returns to then create dominant designs and new markets.  
 
Individual dimensions, however, are always complicated. Although this thesis is 
grounded on the notion of autonomy to understand networks as voluntary 
associations, we have also discussed the importance of commitments to set 
network boundaries for innovation. In terms of leadership, it is quite a challenge 
to contribute something, new due to the plethora of literature (academic, 
managerial and fictional) available on this topic.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. First, we explore conflict and then examine 
the way orchestrators manage relationships and power to set direction and 
performance, and to control this risk. Since the relationship between leaders and 
followers has already received attention in the literature (Kets de Vries, 1980; 
2003; 2009), this chapter focuses more on inter-managerial and inter-leadership 
relationships, a relatively unexplored area in innovation studies.  
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To do so, first, we discuss managerial capacities at the individual level. After a 
reflection on strategic leadership, we briefly examine the essential traits observed 
as the result of empirical research. Second, we discuss authenticity which is a 
central notion to fix commitments and trust in relationships, the critical activity of 
a Network Leader. We then explore the following dimensions: (1) conflict 
management, (2) organisational capacity and (3) performance. Next follows a 
discussion of managerial capacities, and the idea of innovation as a conflict, 
analysing power and politics.  
 
Lastly, we analyse how leaders engage in relationships with other leaders or 
managers. What the role of commitment between people is. What the relational 
dynamics between them are and how these influence the critical process of 
capturing value from innovation.   
 
7.2.- Network Leadership        
According to the empirical work carried out, the fundamental characteristic that 
defines leadership is the capacity to attract others through the ability to break 
the rules. This is a major force of attraction at the individual level, as confirmed 
by the literature (Kets de Vries, 2003; 2006; 2009). To that end, leaders have a 
very clear sense of the rhythm of the music of organising, since they can 
perceive early signals of change and choose the right moment in which to move. 
Although for many leaders, having followers is a factor of contingency and risk, 
this is why leaders may be alone and, on some occasions, isolated (Kets de Vries, 
2006; Burns & Stalker, 1961). The major risks of isolation in business ventures 
are losing track of reality and incorrectly mobilising organisational resources. 
Defining a path for innovation is all about setting actions in response to real 
commitments. 
This thesis stresses that Network Leadership comprises the ability to govern 
relationships, the complete opposite of isolation. Leading through commitments 
is emphasizing power and trust. This is achieved by Network Leaders defining 
boundaries (as sets of constraints), giving co-operative actions a sense of 
purpose and meaning. Leaders then exert autonomy by fomenting a process of 
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sense-making and experimentation in order to set a path towards innovation, 
facilitating peer-to-peer relationships for co-creation.   
Leaders (and their teams) detect new waves or new technologies early on. The 
IBM Barcelona Lab can be seen as a good example. Its leader (and her team) 
detected that PCs represented a revolution for the banking industry. By the same 
token, the founder of Multiasistencia and his team created the repairs market 
(when, previously, the market comprised a highly fragmented set of activities). 
In both cases, Network Leadership obtained the full potential to understand 
relationships with other leaders (in banks, for example), with their teams, with 
providers and with managerial colleagues (new management in the 
Multiasistencia case). The critical capacity is to build teams, peer-to-peer 
associations, where everyone takes care of everyone else.  
The difference between the two cases is that the leaders in Multiasistencia were 
able to create a new venture from scratch while the IBM Barcelona Lab is a story 
of how rules changed within an existing game through new commitments, 
fomenting innovation and structural change such as new roles, relationships and 
boundaries of action. The IBM case reveals how part of a commercial branch 
changed both its role and function by becoming a Lab, thus proposing a change 
in the rules, conflicting with the “existing game,” namely, IBM and its structure.  
 
7.2.1.- Innovation and Isolation         
Isolation and Innovation are close phenomena. When new management decided 
“to place Multiasistencia on the internet”, 80% of the Board of Directors was 
against the idea, seeing this new path as “temporary madness” and certain that 
the new management team wouldn’t last very long. Similar things happened in 
the IBM case. When the Lab’s staff communicated their plans to place PCs in 
bank branches, as one manager related: 
 
“People, even within the company, really thought we were crazy in 
the beginning.” 
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As novelty comes about, innovators are considered as “outsiders”, according to 
this researcher’s observations. It is important to note that in Multiasistencia, the 
leaders of change were newcomers, but in the case of IBM, they were perceived 
to be outsiders or “crazy.” Isolation is normally overlooked by the heroic 
interpretations found in recent approaches to innovation (see Teece, 2009). 
However, it is a classic argument that very thin boundaries are found between 
leaders: there may be heroes and scapegoats. Managers of innovation have to 
deal with tottering organizations affected by political conflicts (creating deep 
structures) and those associated with managing transitions and organisational 
loss (examined in more detail in section 7.4). 
Depending on the individual, these situations in organisational life produce 
different degrees of pain. While an innovation does not produce trust, since it 
often represents a political change that may question future promotions and 
careers. And potential losses confront people with death (Bowlby, 1985). None of 
these are allies of trustful environments. Paradoxically, in contrast to what 
common wisdom may suggest, these are the main reasons why leaders do not 
tend to be surrounded by trust, making it very difficult for them to obtain 
commitments and, therefore, increasing the risk of isolation. In general terms, 
leadership does not presuppose commitments or trust at all, and on many 
occasions it is just the contrary (Kets de Vries & Engellau, 2004).  
Isolation is a subjective concept since, for some, the degree of autonomy may fit 
into this category. Isolation means not having any trusting relationships within 
the social system or, in other words, with anyone else. Surprisingly, isolation is 
praised (possibly unconsciously) for innovative ventures in academic literature. 
These academic works tend to use the metaphor of a nursery that needs to 
isolate new-borns from viruses and bacteria. This ignores the basic notions of 
Psychology, such need for attachment and care, discussed above, as well as the 
need to be part of a social system (Bowlby, 1962). It also ignores classic 
managerial literature, such as Barnard’s (1938/1968) The Functions of the 
Executive, which claims that “Human organisms do not function except in 
conjunction with other human organisms” (p.11), or Burns & Stalker’s classic 
approach (1961) regarding managerial isolation which can be seen as an extreme 
of autonomy. In reality, this literature refers to the opposite meaning. Isolation 
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leads to extreme dependency on others. By contrast, the researcher has 
observed how network leaders strategically manage this contingent factor by 
carefully managing their own personal attributes (even a personal “brand”) and 
relationships, as is also examined in the next sections.  
 
Leaders may demonstrate emotional dependency or they may be “reactive” to 
the opinions of the group (and social trends), thus undermining productive 
leadership towards innovation. They may do this by compensating for the 
isolation of “ups” and “downs” by over- or underplaying their role (Burns & 
Stalker, 1961) and then taking too many risks, instead, developing, dramatic or 
“heroic” behaviour or bearing other’s burdens, costs and opportunisms. We can 
see an example of this phenomenon in the Multiasistencia case (although we 
recognise some degree of speculation), when the focal firm was in its period of 
economic boom when it attracted providers by establishing opportunistic 
relationships and assuming all co-ordination costs (see Chapter 5). In contrast, 
underplaying their role may have meant not assuming the hierarchy (and 
asymmetry) associated with command, and thus promoting friendship, mobs and 
“circles” instead of professional engagement and commitment. This is more likely 
to happen during “down” periods. The leader may show empathy, but not 
friendship. These two attitudes are futile on the individual level. Since they 
project an image of falseness (Kets de Vries, 2003; Winnicott, 1971), they can 
worsen isolation (Burns & Stalker, 1961, p. 143) and may separate the leader 
from his/her area of work: eventually, in reality, worsening the “ups” and 
“downs”. 
 
7.2.2.- Empathy   
 
This thesis has discussed the structural dynamics of “ups” and “downs.” In social 
settings, these cycles can be easily associated with euphoria and loss; as we 
have argued, people sometimes find innovation painful. In these situations, 
isolation can be a defence mechanism (Argyris, 1990; 2004) avoiding pain 
though the use of informational filters, only hearing favourable comments while 
dismissing others (Burns & Stalker, 1961). Innovation euphoria, during the first 
moments of any innovative venture, can also be painful (ex-post). There are 
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many examples in economic life of resource misuse. The argument here is that 
orchestrators drive teams towards understanding these feelings, these emotional 
moods. Empathy is placing oneself in another’s shoes, and it is important to 
regulate activities and dialogue. It is about people setting networks and linking 
current activities with future ones by setting a path of efficiency, meaning that 
they have to manage real people with real emotions that manage resources and 
real commitments while avoiding pain and isolation which can stem from the 
“ups” and “downs” mentioned. Therefore, this stream merits more research in 
innovation studies. 
 
7.2.3.- Exerting Autonomy  
Popular wisdom sees leaders as sources of inspiration and admiration (Kets de 
Vries, 2003; see also Mintzberg, 2002) that are needed in tough times. “We need 
leadership” people may say. To admire someone means having a favourable 
opinion of them based on approval, adoration and idealisation, all of which hide 
poor self-esteem by showing effusive respect to others; therefore, admiration is 
both a rationalisation and denial of the deadly passion of envy. The ones 
admiring choose an asymmetrical relationship with others (the objects of their 
admiration). This inevitably leads to evaluating one’s performance by comparing 
it to the admired person’s. The performance of the first will always be worse and 
lead to envy. One may argue that admiration is the surface of a deep structure 
grounded on envy. By exerting autonomy, orchestrators encourage testing one’s 
own powers and performance, and they actively engage in co-creative and 
productive commitments with others.  In this way, orchestrators work at deep 
structural level.  
 
7.2.4.- Resilience   
We argue that leadership is achieved through commitments. This starts at the 
individual level by committing to oneself: to be true to business or one’s own 
interests, and to hold conflict and open up a new future. It is about binding 
oneself to the mast.  
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We also argue that this self-commitment could be called resilience. It consists of 
exerting self-control as the capacity to manage emotions. This can vary, 
however, from over-control to moderate control and under control, with the 
optimum being somewhere in the middle. Over-control means too much 
constraint and inhibits responses and communication (under-playing); it also 
reduces expressions and results in the incapacity to process information (Bowlby, 
1980), finally, leading to brittleness. Under-control means dramatic behaviour 
(over-playing) and too few restrictions on information processing and 
communication (Bowlby, 1985). Resilience thus means modifying the level of 
self-control according to the circumstances, being resourceful and flexible to 
adapt to a changing situation, while possessing the ability to process competing, 
sometimes painful and conflicting, information.  
 
7.2.5.- Authenticity   
At the individual level of learning, generating trust and avoiding isolation can be 
synthesised into the first and foremost way of wheedling power: exerting power 
over oneself or committing to (or caring for) oneself. This is authenticity, which 
etymologically means exert power over and is directly connected to commitment 
with oneself and resilience. Authenticity is also related to assertiveness and the 
search for co-operative and co-creative formulas to solve conflicts.  
According to the findings related to leadership in this research, this natural 
capacity must be complemented by managerial capacities such as: (1) 
organisational skills, (2) achieving economic or performance results, and (3) 
conflict management.  
 
7.3.- Conflict Management     
 
Innovation is conflict since it challenges the existing rules of the game. We have 
argued that power is about holding conflict. Leaders may demonstrate autonomy 
and exert autonomy over their teams, boosting creativity as the vital force for 
innovating. Innovation may generate conflicts due to objective mismatches, 
strategy and resource misalignments, operations and above all, power dynamics. 
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Here, the focus is on orchestrators and examining their capacity to establish 
commitments to hold conflict (see Chapter 2). This is related to the idea that pre-
commitments are strongly associated with exerting power over visceral human 
passions, such as fear, envy, pain and hostility. These can worsen during periods 
of change and innovation due to the changes in political systems and the 
inherent loss that any innovation represents, which can lead to the misuse of 
resources.  
 
7.3.1.- Role and Relational Conflicts: Re-thinking Centrality 
 
As has always been the case, new ideas conflict with human interests at 
empowered and political levels. This is Machiavelli’s classic argument: leading 
change is hostilely received by those who are taking advantage of the existing 
order, and may even be exploiting current asymmetries which are repressed or 
hidden by coercion or arbitrary measures. As one Multiasistencia manager 
claimed,  
 
“Innovations are good for the organisation, but they can be bad for 
many people. By proposing changes in processes, products or ways 
of doing things, you are unintentionally questioning their work.”  
 
The notion that innovation is “good” for organisations and “bad” for people leads 
to the natural conclusion that, at best, innovation will obtain mild support from 
those who may obtain some benefit from the changes the innovation produces in 
the future. Not all leaders promote change, and there will always be other 
leaders to represent people that do not want a change to the status quo. In both 
cases, the leaders are transgressors, since they do not follow existing rules or 
commitments. Chapter 2 has argued that the orchestrator can be associated with 
the role of the entrepreneur who breaks the rules of the game and proposes a 
new rule. In Multiasistencia, new management played this role in 2000. The role 
of the critic, in opposition to the conservative one, was essentially played by the 
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company President's and COO’s 3
 
 former “right–hand man.” According to one 
Multiasistencia manager,  
“When we joined the firm, there were bets about how long [we] were 
going to survive in that context. Our predecessors lasted a few 
months. In our case, the founder took a step back, becoming 
President, and gave us full support to conduct the change needed.”   
By stepping back, the President adopted an institutional role to try to settle 
disputes. Through this research, we have also found mentor roles in major banks 
and among key trade professionals who, by agreeing to co-create a new venture, 
supported the process of innovation and also sponsored it by committing to this 
new business and risking financial resources to advocate and support 
Multiasistencia’s BNOS initiative. In the IBM Barcelona Lab, three roles were 
played within the focal firm, those of: (1) the champion (or advocate), (2) the 
business development manager who linked software production to different IBM 
units and customers, and (3) the architect who ensured software quality 
production. In Multiasistencia, the roles of architect and business developer were 
quite similar, as was the role of champion. This therefore, confirms the roles 
proposed by Hinterhuber (2002). In both cases, the focal firm generated new 
business (playing the role of nurturer as well) but also served as a reference for 
the owner of the technology, expanding the pie and acquiring a bigger slice (as 
suggested by Dhanaraj and Pharke, 2006). 
The argument here is that role conflict needs political mastery, i.e. knowing how 
to manage relationships, since different leaders have different approaches or 
priorities to determine the path to efficiency, and they may feel endangered due 
to their current status. If we are asked to form a network, we will normally place 
ourselves at the centre. Our relationships would be our set of choices (but also 
the choices others may have made concerning us). As such, we have considered 
the IBM Barcelona Lab as the “centre” of orchestration, comparing it to the 
Multiasistencia case. The main difference is that while Multiasistencia started 
from scratch, building a network and selecting the relationships to structure its 
                                                 
3 Chief Operations Officer (COO)  
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business, innovation at IBM (as in many other firms) came about with existing 
dependencies, structures and relationships. Multiasistencia is a metaphor for the 
evolution of deep structures compared to IBM, which can be considered an 
example of deep structural change within the global, formalised IBM structure.  
Having examined the results, we now take a different perspective, attempting to 
observe this Orchestration from the perspective of IBM headquarters (HQ), as 
depicted in Figure 7.1 below. The Lab does not have to be placed at the centre, 
according to one manager, “in a country - that is, Spain - in a corner of the world 
- that is, Barcelona. 
This perspective enables us to better examine how the Lab (and other similar 
initiatives) can be considered to have exhibited deviant behaviour or an act of 
defiance to formal HQ authority. In this situation, the HQ is challenged to 
regulate the appropriate level of autonomy to ensure cohesion and coherence for 
its strategies and structures. However, this process can also be seen as a natural 
way to express new ideas, a desired path, as in formally landscaped gardens 
where people tend to choose natural paths over the pre-designed ones. The IBM 
Barcelona Lab case shows that focal firms and innovation can happen anywhere, 
despite existing rules of the game and structures.  
As already argued, Orchestration has an antecedent in innovation dynamics 
within differentiated networks (Nhoria & Ghoshal, 1997). On the surface level, 
this organisational phenomena is called “local for global”, this can be seen in the 
Barcelona Lab case, since an initially local innovation came to prominence in the 
global market of the banking industry and was adopted by Corporate IBM, first 
as a set of products and then as a practice. In this and similar cases, local 
leadership may have to confront global leaders for the resources required (Barlett 
& Ghoshal, 2002; 1990), thus presenting a conflict between the role that local 
managers would like to play, HQ’s pre-defined role and structure, and personal 
subjectivity with regards to this conflict of roles. The literature emphasises that, 
in order to be successful, local innovations require a local critical mass, and fluid 
communication between the local subsidiary and HQ.    
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Yet how does Orchestration exert power through commitments? The obvious 
observation is that commitment is a two-way street and hierarchical superiors 
who are willing (and able) to assume these commitments are essential. 
Commitments require peer-to–peer relationships, yet HQ controls scarce and 
unique resources, such as career paths, promotions, salary policy, rewards and 
punishment.  
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                                                                            Figure 7.1: Orchestrating as re-thinking centrality 
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7.3.2.- Political Mastery            
 
In some firms, the role conflict associated with innovation is not managed 
through commitments. Arbitrary measures involving coercion are well-known 
power games found in divide et impera and/or tertius gaudens tactics (see Burt, 
1992; Álvarez & Svejenova, 2005). By tertius gaudens, we refer to the fact that 
HQ can play the “tertius” role as the institutional guarantor of the structure - 
while instigating conflict (or letting it continue) between innovators and 
innovation critics. This means taking opportunistic advantage of the normal 
conflict any innovation implies. Orchestrating activities can be targeted by 
applying simple divide et impera strategies taking advantage of any conflict 
arising by dealing with different members asymmetrically and applying arbitrary 
methods to create mobs or “inner circles” to isolate other groups. This may be 
the reason why some scholars argue that innovation must be initiated at the top 
of the hierarchy (Hamel, 2007), placing the responsibility for change firmly at the 
institutional level.  
 
In addition, innovation outcome, as well as the resulting team performance, has 
its cycles. It is easy to wait for decline in the absence of the level of investment 
which would have ensured long-term viability. It is worth pointing out here that 
while some new ventures may be aligned at a given moment in time, others may 
not be. For example, this could have been the case of the IBM Barcelona Lab if it 
had clashed with the US Lab responsible for the company’s IT infrastructure for 
the banking industry.  
 
We have seen that IBM allowed autonomy for innovation, giving space to IBM 
Barcelona Lab to take advantage of the new dynamics associated with the PC 
and internet developments. Moreover, at the strategic level the Lab wittingly 
developed: (1) important relationships with banks that counter-balanced internal 
competition; (2) a strategy of carefully feeding internal relationships to avoid the 
perception as “outsiders.” In this way, the Lab gained the support of the Spanish 
banking system, as well as the “internal” IBM sales division which saw the Lab as 
a strategic resource to better control customer behaviour, and then through the 
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installed base it acquired a better position for new business; and (3) ways of 
taking advantage of the revolutions represented by PCs and the internet in a new 
era where technology was no longer going “to be invented only by IBM,” as 
some IBM employees related.   
 
This leads us to emphasize the need for “political” skills, since different leaders 
consider different approaches or priorities to determine the path to efficiency, but 
all leaders need to know how to best position themselves to manage these 
differences. Relationships in global formalized firms are asymmetric and 
hierarchical. This approach leads to evident and implicit conflict between the 
various visions, objectives and resources thought to be needed to capitalise on 
innovation. The question here is how leaders in global firms can make 
commitments with innovators or, in contrast, why they disregard innovators, 
leaving them alone facing conflict with critics and product cycles. Administrative 
Theory pays special attention to opportunism, assuming that managers need to 
control subordinates. However, it is quite silent on opportunism concerning 
relationships among leaders. Opportunism - as opposed to commitment 
(regardless of where it comes from, as argued in Chapter 5) - is incompatible 
with innovation.  
 
Managerial opportunism normally incorporates arbitrary measures in the selection 
of managers, or in making them scapegoats out of people to cope with demands 
that cannot be fulfilled due constraints within organisations, product lifecycles, 
etc.), which may eventually justify their removal of management (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Since managerial performance and accountability are subject to 
discretionary assessment, this author’s reflection is that the innovation manager 
should address how innovation is going to be assessed upfront and agree on how 
accountability is going to be monitored from day one. In the cases studied we 
have seen that it is difficult to account for results in innovation, a look at how 
this can be done is an important issue that merits further research.  
 
Nevertheless, in the context of the cases studied, we have observed how 
management at the institutional level focused on the coherence of the firm to 
ensure the success of their innovations. This is why IBM Barcelona Lab searched 
Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation  |  154 
 
for active engagement and co-operation not only from banks (external firms in 
terms of legal boundaries), but also from the other Labs in the company, since 
“they did not want to substitute existing IT investments; they wanted to 
complement and protect IT assets,” as one manager noted. Moreover, the IBM 
Barcelona Lab pioneered a new business solution, leveraging software 
development that was highly aligned with IBM’s new strategy. According to our 
research, this new venture was culturally acceptable for the organisation, not 
only in terms of content, but also in terms of how it was driven. The IBM 
Barcelona Lab rapidly engaged in co-operative action with other parts of IBM: 
other IBM Labs, sales departments, consultancy units and other internal 
divisions. The issue they faced here was how to combine hierarchy and priorities 
with power distribution, something they achieved by establishing clear 
references, accountability mechanisms and rules of the game.  
 
7.3.3.- Managing Transitions: linking the old and the new            
 
In any change process there is organisational loss. This concept has been 
nicknamed as a “chasm” in managerial and academic literature. We prefer to call 
things by their real name, since imprecision as regards concept names, often 
leads to imprecision in terms of the concepts themselves. The IBM Barcelona Lab 
case is a good example of organisational loss: (1) in 1994, it lost its product and 
was forced to transfer it to the UK; and (2) the Lab’s staff was reduced from 70 
people in 1994 to approximately 15 in 1997. It was an important loss of 
community, as shown in the following figure on Lab staffing (see data for 1995-
1999).  
Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation  |  155 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
People
 
             Figure 7.2: Change in Number of IBM Barcelona Lab Staff  
 
This is how the Lab Director appointed in 1994 remembered this situation:  
 
“In 1994 IBM was restructured as a result of the crisis that had 
affected the company. So the company decided to consolidate all our 
small laboratory developments – when we say small, a laboratory 
with less than a hundred people was considered small – and to 
merge them into larger laboratories. In our case this meant Hursley 
in the UK. So in 1994 we were told we were moving. At the 
beginning, the reaction, the human reaction, was “why?” Everyone 
was trying to work out the macroeconomic reasons that might have 
led IBM to take the decision, thinking about their economic situation, 
their corporate strategic position, etc., people wanted to understand 
these reasons and to share and communicate them appropriately. IN 
the end, we had to transfer all our lab’s existing knowledge as 
professionally and appropriately as we could.  
 
You treat the product like one of your children, don’t you? There’s a 
series of almost personal and emotional bonds. In the beginning (and 
I’m not going to try to kid you on this) the reaction of some people in 
the beginning was to say: "Right, but why? What’s the reason for 
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this? And, who are going to be the product’s new parents and now 
what’s going to happen with the laboratory?"  
 
Left alone, with no clear support to cling onto and no hand-holding, a transition 
can be considered seen as a lack of commitment by the people who stand to lose 
the product or the activity. As discussed, the processes of disinvestment (or lock-
out) looks very different if we consider it from the HQ’s perspective and 
commitment is also required to proceed with lock-outs due to its irreversible 
nature. The Lab had the space it needed to understand the loss of the product, 
but it also had the capacity to re-invent itself with another type of activity.  
 
As mentioned previously, the same year that Multiasistencia started its 
transformation (2000), its COO and CIO (who had held the positions since 1989) 
left the company with a small group of followers to create a new company to 
compete directly against Multiasistencia. They not only took knowledge with 
them but also a “copy” of the software developed at Multiasistencia to start up 
their new venture and run its operations. Multiasistencia sued directors and the 
new firm, but, after several years, the courts were still unable to determine 
whether the software could be considered as having been stolen, since defining 
the intellectual property rights for this kind of intangible asset was very difficult 
according to the management interviewed. Nevertheless, Multiasistencia’s 
management soon realised that this painful situation had essentially only served 
to further drain the firm’s resources and energy while also constituting a major 
distraction.  
“Multiasistencia’s top management decided to focus on the firm’s core 
business and reinforce its relationships with customers and trade 
professionals. In short, they decided to put Multiasistencia’s business 
back on track and leave the litigation to the lawyers, not considering 
it a top priority,” according to one manager.    
As we have seen, other firms entered this newly created market, increasing 
competition. In of our both cases, management set a path and stuck to a 
commitment to confront feelings of loss and the associated potential conflict. 
One IBM Lab manager synthesised this situation as follows,  
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“After losing the product, we asked: What’s the next step? Or, where 
are we headed? What are we going to do? And then they suddenly 
hand you a blank piece of paper, freedom to think and freedom to 
design your own future”.  
From this short description of the situation we can identify the well-known 
natural phases of loss (see Bowlby, 1985), starting with denial, moving to anger 
(people leaving, some with products with which to form competition), through to 
negotiation and acceptance (explaining why a product is going to be transferred 
or why Multiasistencia should take advantage of the internet) and finally to the 
creative design of a new future.  
In this kind of situation being in the game is more costly than rewarding. From 
what we have observed, the design of a new future starts by engaging creativity, 
confirming existing theories (Kets de Vries, 2009) and opening spaces for 
communication and sharing, as well as letting people elaborate on this process. 
As one IBM Barcelona Lab employee recognised,  
“To be able to think as a team; to be able to tackle the situation and 
say: "OK, now we are masters of our own destiny and we can focus 
on where we think we can contribute most as a team."  
Innovation literature recognises the important psychological investments that 
people deploy. Here it is vital, as observed in the IBM and Multiasistencia cases, 
that management is successfully chooses to commit to a new path, re-designing 
boundaries or actions, and not (as can often be the case) responding hostilely, 
creating potentially negative relationships. As we have argued, commitment is 
established to ensure autonomy, not create a slave of visceral passions, which, 
as we have seen, are a part of business life. Finally, we would like to emphasize 
the importance of developing an integrative leadership role, that is, the capacity 
to link the old and the new, and to bring everyone to a new future.  
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7.4.- Organisational Capability for Co-Creation    
 
We have argued that leadership expresses its power through its capacity to 
attract and influence others (as a centripetal force) and to spread ideas, thus 
dynamically expanding boundaries. We have also shown how innovation is a 
source of conflict and how this conflict can lead to a great risk of isolation for 
leaders. We turn now to an examination of how to set commitments as the 
organisational capacity to set boundaries, focussing on: (1) communication skills; 
(2) managing strategic relationships; (3) managing mutual adaptations; (4) 
multi-disciplinary teams and (5) recognition.      
7.4.1. Communication     
 
Communication is the way in which solutions which can contain conflict are co-
created. Indeed, the good thing about conflict is that it revolves around existing 
asymmetries and gives the leader a chance to solve them. Power is needed to 
change the rules and set new boundaries. A classic argument is that authenticity, 
empathy and assertiveness are essential to deal with this conflict. These traits 
help us to understand others’ points of view, without necessarily sharing them. 
As one Multiasistencia manager indicated, 
 
“The communication policy of sharing our objectives with them 
(Stakeholders) was an absolutely key factor, since there was a 
relationship of sharing the objectives and of growing together.” 
 
Or, as indicated by one of the members of Multiasistencia’s professional network, 
“We learned to share information and work in a more transparent way.” 
Transparency engenders trust. This highlights the importance of monitoring, 
selecting sources of information and commitment. As one IBM Barcelona Lab 
manager reported,  
 
“I brought in a totally open laboratory layout, so there were no 
“boxes”, to encourage creativity. There were no offices. And why? 
Because I was extremely concerned about encouraging dialogue, 
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creating a challenge between people, forcing them to talk to each 
other.” 
 
Dialogue is the major tool for leading team and organisational learning. Dialogue 
is a free flowing conversation between people, allowing them to discover insights 
that they could not attain individually (Bohm, 1965). As one IBM Barcelona Lab 
manager commented,   
 
“Dialogue is a key part of our Mediterranean culture, but it was an 
intellectual discussion, where my solution did not necessarily have to 
be the best one. When my solution was presented to collaborators as 
a whole, the team members, discussed it to death, reviewed it and 
substantially improved it.”  
 
According to Bohm (1965), “Dialogue is a special kind of collaborative 
conversation, quite distinct from discussion, which is primarily competitive.” 
Regular meetings are good settings to use this technique because: (1) they serve 
as a source for group decision-making and turn debates into intellectual efforts, 
not personal confrontations; (2) they represent an exploratory activity, to 
discover insights which are not within the reach of the workers individually; (3) 
they are a public instrument by which to recognise contributions (asking 
somebody to prepare a presentation, for example), while also representing a 
powerful tool to encourage, influence and reward people; and (4) they allow us 
to understand people’s behaviour and interpersonal relationships.  
 
Above all, these meetings give the message that people are not alone during the 
turbulent times brought about by innovations. They allow the appropriate level of 
conflict and different perspectives to be attained, and avoid social processes such 
as conformity or “groupthink” which can lead to reality avoidance. Trying to 
establish unilateral control over situations hinders any attempt to, first, find out 
about conflicts and, second, to try to resolve them through the use of dialogue, 
since potential conflicts are kept hidden (Argyris 1986; 1990; 1994; Argyris & 
Schön, 1996). Instead of searching for the roots of discrepancies, wheedling of 
unilateral control may lead organisations to enter into latent conflict and 
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encourage the empowerment of leaders who have a tendency to confront and 
cause conflicts. Gaps, conflicts, and contradictions are living things, and conflict 
will not simply go away if we try to sweep it under the carpet.   
 
 
7.4.2. Managing Strategic Relationships     
 
Managing relational dynamics means knowing how to manage the relational 
lifecycle of co-creation. It implies knowing how to start relationships, how to 
manage them to ensure equity and peer-to-peer dynamics, and how to terminate 
them (or leave them in a latent state). It means that priorities are based on 
strategic relationships (not only arms-length ones), including: (1) realistic issues 
and realistic commitments; (2) focusing on projects aligned with a defined 
strategy (for example, as with the IBM Barcelona Lab and IBM as Corporation); 
(3) searching for complementarities, that is, where an exchange of knowledge 
and complementary resources might be; and (4) both parties engaging in real 
commitments on economic and legal levels. The IBM Barcelona Lab Director 
described what relationship management was about in the following way:  
 
 “You really are successful when you apply talent, technology and 
know-how to real problems. And, as our background and our 
‘baggage’ was in banking, we set ourselves a challenge: getting on 
borad the banks that were more in line with the strategy that we 
wanted to follow as IBM and as a team within IBM.  
We were also looking for a leitmotiv, a strategy that could attract 
talent and hold on to that talent. We had and attract talent from 
outside as well as talent from inside the company. To do that, you 
need to believe in what you’re doing: it’s necessary to have a passion 
for what you’re working on.  
The first initiative that we started up was to choose a series of key 
projects where we knew that the clients wanted to innovate; where 
we knew that there were innovation niches waiting for us to come up 
with a solution for; and where we could put key people from the 
laboratory team in those clients, with a marked leadership task: to 
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capture each of the clients’ existing innovation and turn it into 
reality.” 
 
This approach defines network behaviour, a style or a “leitmotiv.” It is like a 
piece of music that sets the rhythm, a pace which, paraphrasing White (2008), is 
a style that defines an identity and which leads to a hierarchy and a way to 
attract others.  
Another important aspect is the emphasis on emergent associations of 
autonomous actors from inside and outside (the boundaries here being the legal 
ones), in order to create increasing returns based on the management of 
relationships. The IBM Barcelona Lab and Multiasistencia developed these 
projects based on networked associations to engage in co-creative activities with 
their corporate clients. In the Multiasistencia case, the management forged trust 
by being transparent and not hiding the problems the company had in 2000. For 
example, Multiasistencia worked with a major European bank to define a new 
application to inform end customers in real time every time they called the bank 
with a claim. The project was developed in collaboration between the two 
companies during 2006 and was put into production at the end of that year. One 
executive from this bank declared, “We have to add transparency to our service. 
Information is the key to increased loyalty.”  
Finally, relationships end, and this has to be managed as a loss, as previously 
discussed. Reasons for ending a relationship may be that results do not meet the 
others’ expectations or that one or more of the agents in the relationship decides 
that the expected objectives will never be achieved.  Multiasistencia, for example, 
lost some customers during its change process from 2000 to 2003. For some, 
this “break-up” lasted two years, since the IT and process lock-in were extremely 
significant, and complete disconnection was required. In other cases, the 
relationship ended because the costs of maintaining it were greater than its 
benefits, or because the relationship was not successful. In many cases, 
relationships end simply because the project and its purpose end. As seen in the 
IBM Barcelona Lab case, if the relationship has been beneficial, it may be kept 
latent, making it very easy to restart again in the future. In fact, many of the 
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Lab’s competencies were knowledge-based and could be found in latent 
relationships with satisfied customers.    
 
7.4.3. Mutual Adaptation for Co-creation    
We have argued that networks, as loosely-coupled structures, are optimal 
configurations for innovation since they are formed by autonomous actors that 
can commit and adapt dynamically to each other to keep the structure alive, 
evolving and organising for the future. This is a different perspective from the so-
called Conversion Theory described in Chapter 3. The term “conversion” assumes 
that a conflict is solved by accepting a new idea. This may be true in some 
diffusion mechanisms. However, with co-creation, we propose that adoption is an 
active process of co-construction which, at the same time, is a process of 
diffusion embracing two types of adaptations: (1) technical adaptations in 
product features or the production process; and (2) mutual adaptations that bind 
companies together, often in a direct physical sense, reflecting a mutual 
commitment which, at the same, is limited in time and empowers the companies.  
In the IBM case we stress how management took care of its people and its 
installed base in order to connect the new technologies (and organisations) with 
future ones. As one manager justified:   
 
“We weren’t trying to do away with anybody’s job. Instead, we 
wanted to use and maximize all the existing technology: In other 
words, everything that would become the mainframe. And what we 
did was to take advantage of personal computers and hook them up 
to the best communication mechanisms that existed at that time, and 
which still exist in our clients’ applications to this day.”  
 
During projects, activities were focused to have a more complete vision of the 
interaction. This “bi-directional adaptation” - as several managers alluded to in 
both cases - respects cultural and market diversity and differences, and also 
respects the diverse business requirements that depend on different market 
conditions and customer needs. This recognises pluralism; in other words, power 
is distributed in networks. IBM Lab staff not only sub-contracted work with 
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Independent Software Vendors (ISVs), but also “hired” project directors from the 
banks to work in the Lab. One manager added that IBM top management was 
reluctant, "But how we are going to have people - clients - in our innovation and 
development centres?" And, without a doubt, that has been one of the wagers 
that have given the best results”.  
 
Multiasistencia staff was also rotating permanently with major banks, and 
developing strong relationships with top management, becoming a critical factor 
to support the development of the Business Network Operating System (BNOS), 
as well other co-creative ventures.  
 
Moreover, IBM Lab staff sub-contracted work with ISVs to manage network 
capacity, depending on the work load. Since orchestrators lead formal and 
informal relationships, including people “outside” the organisations’ legal 
boundaries, orchestrators normally command “external” and critical resources for 
their legally defined firms such as key relationships with key customers and key 
associations, thus leveraging power with the control over these resources.  
 
This emergent type of organising is based on co-creative relationships that are 
based on exerting autonomy. In the IBM case, management asked the 
employees to change roles and rotate positions to avoid them feeling too 
accommodated and to ensure their continued search for new opportunities, a 
process which empower people.  
 
One of the Lab members stated,  
 
“This results in plans being changed. People have to be dynamic, 
flexible, and know how to adapt to these changes. I would say that 
this is a little difficult at first; basically, professionals prefer to know 
very clearly what is expected of them, exactly when and how. And as 
soon as they get used to that dynamism, to that flexibility, they take 
it as a routine part of their work.” 
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By the same token, in the Multiasistencia case, Customer Service Representatives 
(CSRs) were asked to change their role from “information searchers” to “process 
owners”, to control processes proactively and interact with different actors in a 
learning process to manage exceptions. Key Account managers searched for 
more commercial opportunities by developing a better understanding of bank 
processes. Trade professionals were encouraged to become small businessmen, 
more autonomous and committed to Multiaisstencia. And IT staff members were 
engaged in co-creative software projects with banks. This is similar to the IBM 
Barcelona Lab case where staff changed from project management to system 
analysis and business consultancy positions. 
 
The capacity to rotate from software development to project management and to 
even business development was considered a part of the Lab’s tasks, thus 
“avoiding repetitive or routine activities,” according to one manager. Leadership, 
according to the Lab Director, was: 
 
“A matter of capturing the existing innovation needs in each of the 
clients, to turn this into reality and co-create a solution with them. As 
a result, we had key people in key projects.”  
 
Experimenting introduces a flow of ongoing ideas and inventions, a combination 
of accents and changing harmonic patterns that interweave the structure of 
relationships and networks. In all cases, problem-solving requires: the tacit 
accumulation of experience, “actionable knowledge,” the use of explicit 
knowledge, interaction with other people, information systems, and creativity 
which leads to performance. For the IBM Lab, their hybrid programming 
technique allowed them to produce software releases and reduce the time-to-
market to only 6 months. As one manager pointed out,  
“What we wanted was for the client to be involved in the whole 
development processes, from the beginning right through to the end. 
This approach requires trust and transparency since you can’t hide 
any mistakes, but the result is very beneficial since we are all in the 
same boat.”  
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IBM Barcelona Lab engaged in many formal and informal relationships with other 
IBM Labs as well, reaching commitments with “internal” units. As one Lab 
member related,  
“We had the experience to support multi-platform and operating 
systems. In 1992, three months before an IBM laboratory in the USA 
launched the new version of a new operating system, they discovered 
that it needed 15 or 20 more diskettes than planned to hold the 
entire operating system. This would have caused project costs to soar 
and delayed the launch of the new version that was to adapt 
production to the new conditions. During an informal conversation, 
one engineer at the Barcelona Lab offered his colleague in the US a 
compression algorithm he had been working on in his free time. A 
few days later, initial trials on the algorithm were successfully held. 
Until 2002, this solution remained IBM's standard software 
compression algorithm.” 
 
7.4.4.- Multi-disciplinary Teams     
An interesting finding is group identification beyond legal boundaries in processes 
of co-creation. One of the IBM managers commented, “As a final result, we have 
clients who consider themselves one of us.”  This suggests that trust among 
team members considers peers to be “equals” in terms of hierarchy, even 
reaching “members” beyond formal legal boundaries, something which 
represents an advantage, but also raises many questions in terms of co-creating 
products and services. For example, who owns the intellectual property rights? If 
a company can use technology to link or increase lock-in of network actors, could 
it, for example, also include better ideas for new service development? Is this a 
process that better fits strategies and resources and their transformation within 
all the network actors? This discussion underscores the importance of managing 
secrecy, non-disclosure agreements and incentives and their evolution in co-
creation efforts, and how they are different for each player in the network. These 
questions could be the subject of further lines of research.  
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7.4.5.- Recognition   
 
Recognition is the cornerstone of any leadership process (Anderson, 1983). And 
innovation, as seen, questions people’s previous achievements. Co-creation 
recognises actors in the network as creators, thus making recognition a 
cornerstone of network leadership abilities, allowing the leader to attract more 
talented people, more projects (business), and more actors, reinforcing the 
orchestrator’s centrality as a reference for innovation.  
 
Managerial recognition of others’ contributions is a sine qua non condition. We 
stress here that co-creative networks do not only rely on managerial recognition, 
but also on empowering people, based on the idea that giving autonomy allows 
them to develop, as well as to learn to work with a view to achieving one’s own 
as free individuals (Rand, 1967). Exerting autonomy confronts the risks of 
immature organisations in which its members are prone to identify managers as 
the only ones who exert power (Kets de Vries, 2003). In contrast, pluralist 
organisations distribute power in a similar way to democratic political regimes. 
The issue here is the successful combination hierarchy and priorities with power 
distribution: with clear references, accountability and rules of the game. As one 
top manager in the IBM Barcelona Lab added, “Being part of the Lab gave people 
a sense of pride and recognition.” This same sense of pride is observed among 
the trade professionals who work with Multiasistencia, “Being part of the 
Multiasistencia network is a way to express our quality,” as one trade 
professional commented.  
 
Formal managerial recognition must also be applied. For example in the IBM 
Barcelona Lab case, the engineer who developed the compression algorithm 
became a member of the IBM Academy, enjoying great prestige and recognition. 
Similarly, the President of Multiasistencia explained the company's key success 
factors as follows:  
“I believe that the success factor was basically the attitude of the 
management team; if we wanted to criticize something we would say 
that it was a little adventurous, a little daring, a little bold, a little 
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reflective. But if we wanted to praise it or speak highly of something, 
we would say that it was brave. We had an extremely determined 
attitude to confront this permanent challenge of growth, with a great 
spirit of service, a great vocation to do things well, a very enthusiastic 
team, with many hours of work.”  
We have argued that leaders express power through their capacity to attract and 
influence others (as a centripetal force) and to give autonomy on a peer-to–peer 
basis, encouraging other network actors to spread the new way of doing 
business. The idea is that instead of having been converted to a new doctrine, 
actors in the network feel proud to contribute and co-create in many ways: 
experimenters (system engineers and programmers), cross fertilisers (multi-
disciplinary knowledge from other areas), leaders in banks, for example, who 
promote new ideas, architects and designers, caregivers and storytellers. Co-
creation is not, therefore, a solely generative activity; it also works as a diffusion 
mechanism since co-creation expands the network beyond its legal boundaries, 
as shown in Figure 7.3. Orchestrated Networks are based on this sense of pride, 
respect for individuality and autonomy, and team playing, are generative because 
they produce novelty, and behave like structures of diffusion for this new 
doctrine based on caring for each other, co-creating activities and commitment.  
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Figure 7.3: Orchestrated Networks: Innovation Generation and 
Diffusion  
 
7.5. Economic Capacity   
 
According to the research presented, the performance of innovation can be 
described using the following findings:  
 
1. Reduction in time-to-market: for example, software is released every 6 
months at the IBM Barcelona Lab, instead of 2 years, or IBM’s taking 
advantage of the PC and internet as early detectors; similarly, 
Multiasistencia took 1 year to co-create the BNOS which was of greater 
quality and boasted more features, as opposed to the previous in-house 
version which took 2 years;  
2. Increased customer satisfaction and loyalty: for example, according to 
one IBM executive, “For us, the subject of customer satisfaction was 
absolutely crucial: customer satisfaction with the solutions that we started 
up. And I can tell you that we have improved exponentially”;  
3. An increased level of control over innovation through mutual adaptation 
and integration projects: (1) on a technological level, taking advantage of 
previous investments and the existing technological base, and (2) on an 
organisational level regarding inter-organisational processes of software 
production and service management (both IBM and Multiasistencia), thus 
reducing transactional costs;  
4. Reduction in IT transfer costs: a) initiating the innovation process through 
co-creation; b) identifying industry leaders who are willing to innovate 
(banks in both cases, in addition to trade professionals in the 
Multiasistencia case), and thus leverage the innovation diffusion of 
emergent leaders; and c) reducing co-ordination costs by giving 
autonomy and co-creative activities based on trust as argued in Chapter 
5; 
5. Increases in productivity: for example, a 50% productivity increase 
(2000-2003) in Multiasistencia and new software development in the IBM 
Lab: LAN-DP and WBCC.  
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We then argued that resilience is the innovation outcome in network changes. 
This is called resilience at the structural level, examining how much change the 
network has absorbed to reach a new equilibrium. Our research shows (1) 
members of the network co-creating with complementary equals; (2) some weak 
members trying to gain power in order to balance asymmetries, including the 
focal firm; (3) amicable (or otherwise) separations (or lock-outs) as seen in the 
cases considered. The degree of resilience can be synthesized by a phase, a 
motto, which in the case of the IBM Barcelona Lab was re-invention. 
 
7.6.- Proposition: Orchestration as Leading Leaders   
 
Proposition 7: Orchestrators lead leaders in the Network by making 
commitments and exerting peer-to-peer relationships.  
 
There is never a single leader in networks, as suggested by Merton’s notion of 
ego-centric networks. There are many egos, and it is obvious that, what one 
person sees as the centre in the network is not the same as that perceived by 
the other actors. Managing business generation and trust were critical to the 
management of increased growth in the cases studied.  
According to this researcher’s observations, perhaps the most salient 
characteristic of orchestrators is their capability to lead and to be led when 
circumstances require. Orchestrators lead leaders, propose actions and engage 
other leaders by using power (of a variety of types ranging from inspiration, 
influence, and formal authority – where the hierarchy is there to support this 
they may help others to make sense of situations and/or use coercion when 
needed). Leaders are implicitly elected by teams and serve as references for 
innovation, exerting this role of centrality.    
 
Leaders balance dependencies by giving autonomy, empowering people, 
improving work content and opening new sources of innovation. If we agree on 
the fact that people tend to do to others what management does to them 
(Milgram, 2005), then commitment will get commitment in return. The IBM 
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Barcelona Lab was based on autonomy, staffing “key people in key projects” 
these people (such as technical architects or sales people) were both from IBM 
and from banks, and dealt with bank and IBM leaders. In the Lab, it was quite 
the norm for a professional working in development to move on to the project 
group at the end of the development phase, later going to the client to 
implement the project based on the product that he or she was personally 
involved in the development of. Another interesting finding is group identification 
beyond organisational legal boundaries. In Multiasistencia, autonomy was clearly 
given to banks (providing them with information to keep track of claims) to trade 
professionals and to the CSRs that managed the entire process.  
 
As mentioned above, IBM Barcelona Lab orchestrated its staff in different 
projects where they changed roles and functions, Independent Software Vendors 
(ISVs) but also hired project directors from the banks. Similarly, Multiasistencia 
staff was permanently rotating through major banks and developing strong 
relationships with top management. Since orchestrators lead formal and informal 
relationships, including those “outside” their organisations’ legal boundaries, 
orchestrators normally command “external” and critical resources to their partner 
firms, such as key relationships with key customers and key associations, thus 
leveraging power with control over these resources.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusions: Perspectives on 
Innovation and Leadership    
 
This thesis proposes the concept of Orchestrating Network Behaviour for 
Innovation as a managerial function that stands as a proposition and a 
theoretical hypothesis. Methodologically, it is the fruit of abduction, that is: (1) a 
creative synthesis and, at the same time, (2) a tool to analyse objective reality. 
This managerial function generates a path between the current state of affairs 
and structures and future ones, through the management of network structural 
dynamics and digital platforms, understood as the infrastructure for innovation. 
We have also examined network structural dynamics in two longitudinal cases 
that have allowed this researcher to review 25 years of these companies’ 
evolution.  
 
Orchestrating is a managerial function to set a new path between the present 
and the future, managing a process of ongoing equilibrium between actors’ 
benefits and costs which can vary along the way. It is stressed here that setting 
a path is “changing the rules” while keeping the game alive - essentially, the 
principle of efficiency. This function is based on Strategic Leadership, which 
starts by creating a change in perspective, a new business venture that attracts 
people and resources. Leaders create networks naturally, but we argue that they 
require strategic management capacities in order to cope with strategic factors, 
dependencies and contextual variables. These capacities are required to manage 
real contextual variables. With this Orchestration function, we explore how 
management can open up new spaces for creativity to change the existing rules 
of the game, thus changing structures (not breaking them), as the function is an 
evolutionary process - a journey or a path - where efficiency is expressed by 
avoiding disruptions. As a managerial function, it is based on the power to: on 
the one hand, open new sources of innovation and, on the other, set 
commitments which shape network boundaries.  
 
Commitment is a principle of demarcation: orchestrators exert power through 
commitments to control network boundaries, thus affecting the roles and 
Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation  |  172 
 
relationship dynamics which determine resolving structural dynamics. A complex 
structure (based on autonomy and voluntary association) requires boundaries to 
survive. New opportunities come from “multi-connected” and “multi-disciplinary” 
networks. 
 
We have stressed this issue particularly in suboptimal regimes, therefore 
proposing resilience. In this respect, management is about dynamically 
regulating boundaries through centripetal and centrifugal forces in accordance 
with particular objectives and circumstances which can also shape roles and 
relationships. Therefore, Orchestrating Innovation is an ongoing process to 
change network structures in order to manage the players’ autonomy and peer-
to-peer relationships for co-creation, sharing investments and engendering trust, 
equity, holding  conflict, and organising forward .  
 
First, we emphasise that market creation is dependent on orchestrating, that is, 
autonomy, creatvity, commitments and trust. Second, we have already argued 
how complex structures need boundaries to survive and, by dynamically 
managing boundaries, they set paths for innovation. These structures lie 
between chaotic enviroments (with no autonomy), governed by an “invisible 
hand” or “too much of a vissible hands on approach”. Third, we suggest that 
orchestrating innovation, although perhaps considered a meso-level and 
transitional phenomenon, highlights the deeply rooted natural behaviour for 
innovation through the investment of resources to create something new in 
contact with the uncontrolled flows (“ups” and “downs”) of economic cycles. 
Moreover, we are not defending anything related to a strategic apex or “central 
planners” to control economic cycles. We stress, instead, how voluntatry 
associations of free people, orchestrated to build a new path, can serve as an 
integrative force capable of avoiding disruptions (during economic booms or 
depressions) by placing economic activity in real patterns, in other words, it is 
about knowing how to change the rules, not lead disruptions.    
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As shown in Figure 8.1, Orchestration is a managerial function with three 
proposed dimensions: Strategic Leadership, Structural Network Dynamics and the 
Management of Digital Platforms.  
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                                                       Figure 8.1: Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation  
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In this empirical research, we have found that digital platforms: (1) facilitate the 
development of new business models and affect markets through dominant 
designs or references; (2) enhance co-production architectures; and (3) use 
programmed behaviour naturally linked to boundary management. 
 
Leaders experience tension between authenticity and exploiting their own 
potential by stressing managerial effectiveness in terms of: (1) organisational 
capacities; (2) conflict management; and (3) financial results. The above 
discussion reflects the position held in his thesis. We turn now to a final 
discussion of the implications and contributions of this research, as well as the 
limitations and implications at different levels for future research.  
 
Orchestrating and Power  
 
By examining Structural Network Dynamics from the perspective of power, we 
have found the following characteristics in focal firms (or Orchestrators) 
regarding power in the following dimensions: centrality, control over resources, 
and dynamic capabilities. To date, the literature has focused on roles and, in 
part, on the management of resources.  
 
First, we put forward centrality as the Reference for Innovation, emphasising that 
the locus of innovation is the network itself. In other words, the focal firm’s role 
is that of reference to generate novelty by opening new sources of innovation 
and fomenting communication between actors to facilitate co-creative activities.  
 
Second, power is about controlling boundaries defined as sets of commitments. 
This control is exerted by managing autonomy and cohesion. This stresses two 
main variables: autonomy and the predominant relational model among network 
actors (whether hierarchical or peer-to-peer). Moreover, we have shown that 
innovation outcomes are maximised when the relational schema is peer-to-peer, 
thus leading to Generative Networks and processes of Market/Factor creation. 
We have stressed this issue particularly in suboptimal regimes, therefore 
proposing resilience as another key characteristic.  
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Finally, orchestrating is about dynamic capacities which we have analysed using 
the metaphor of centripetal and centrifugal forces. Orchestrating recognises that 
the focal firm dynamically regulates boundaries or constraints (or the rules of the 
game) through commitments in accordance with the objectives and 
circumstances which shape roles and relationships. Commitments can be 
understood as dynamic agreements on direction setting, network behaviour and 
a way of holding conflict in structural changes. Orchestrating through 
commitments emphasises managing autonomy and recognising the actors’ 
capacities to self-organise and control themselves, that is, making Orchestrating 
for Innovation a focal characteristic of the network.   
 
Generative Networks  
 
Generative networks are expressions of optimality as a result of Orchestrating 
Network Behaviour for Innovation, as has been shown by empirical research 
described in chapter 6. Orchestrating is based on commitments, balancing 
centripetal and centrifugal forces, engendering trust, a symmetric (peer to peer) 
model of relationships and co-creation. 
 
The orchestrator exerts power, as argued, with the following actions: (1) the 
focal firm carries out different roles, but that of serving as the reference for 
innovation is predominant; (2) power is exerted through dynamic boundary 
control and setting constraints, thus establishing commitments, exerting 
autonomy and avoiding the extremely costly option of one-to-one supervision; 
and (3) facilitating co-creation, the emergence of dominant designs and the 
creation of market factors through positive value returns and network 
externalities. 
 
The orchestrator exerts autonomy by opening spaces for new sources of 
innovation, boosting communication among actors, and through controlling 
digital platforms that provide an infrastructure for innovation, thereby giving 
more autonomy to actors by letting them build new applications, re-using and 
integrating them with existing applications and components to build more 
integrative solutions (in the IBM case) and new services (in Multiasistencia case). 
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Managing autonomy and commitments recognises that innovation can unfold 
anywhere and that orchestrating implies linking and communicating multi-
connected resources or, applying legal boundaries, “internal” and “external” 
resources (classically called boundary spanning).  
 
Autonomy is expressed through the proposal of new projects by composing 
software projects considered as the development of re-usable components, in 
other words, a re-combination of existing resources to expand the resource base, 
as dynamic capacities suggest. Additionally, this research has shown that project 
teams synthesise existing knowledge with new information, making it into 
interconnecting software modules which became the foundation for the modular 
architecture of digital platforms. Given the common problems and broad 
applicability of these processes, both focal firms quickly found (1) economies of 
scale and externalities that helped apply their digital platforms to other sectors of 
the economy with some additional modifications (for market creation), and (2) 
economies of scope as they became “innovation factories” for complex, process-
intensive information services, thus balancing greater scope or breadth with 
greater focus and specialisation.   
 
Orchestrating is a network capability, not only a question of the focal firm. With 
this approach, the network is the locus of innovation and Orchestrating is about 
opening and managing new sources: (1) network interactions among actors; (2) 
spaces for co-creation and generation of new modules/applications/services, and 
(3) the replication of existing models in new markets, industries and areas, as 
seen. The focal firms detected significant inefficiencies within the banking 
sector’s business processes due to their profound knowledge of the business and 
administrative processes in the industry.  
 
Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation finds its optimum configuration 
when the predominant relational model is peer-to-peer and co-creative. 
Managing autonomy and commitments recognises that innovation can come 
about anywhere and that orchestrating implies linking and communicating 
“internal” and “external” resources and boundary spanning or bridging activities.  
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We have presented evidence that centripetal forces can be ideological, but that 
they hide asymmetries in deep structures (such as opportunism and other human 
passions) which are normally dismissed in organisational studies, but are critical 
to organizing for innovation. Scientific management is about repression, not 
containing conflict or setting boundaries for action. Creative destruction, in turn, 
ignores autonomy, trust and commitments, and assumes a reactive attitude 
based only on competitive elements, thus dismissing cooperative and co-creative 
actions.  All these are based on denying autonomy, thus ignoring complexity and 
coming close to representing chaos.  
 
Orchestrating Innovation contributes to the notion of loosely-coupled structures 
that lie between both configurations of chaos: tight structures and unstructured 
configurations (sometimes, with all preventions: markets and hierarchies). Both 
extremes can be chaotic because they restrict freedom and autonomy. Markets 
are conceptualized as being only market driven and opportunistic; bureaucracies 
rely on “scientific management” that normally hides profound asymmetries (that 
sooner or later unfold), cultivates arbitrary ways of organising creativity and 
autonomy, and that has the capacity to set commitments, that is, force people to 
“anomic” states.  
 
By doing so, they condemn extremes to deterministic trajectories, almost 
reducing the levels of freedom to zero (in terms of the multi-connectivity and 
multi-disciplinary traits found in network behaviour), and drastically reducing the 
capacity to set paths of innovation. These chaotic extremes have a problem with 
the future (and, indeed, with innovation), since markets are unpredictable and 
bureaucracies are prone to repetitive behaviour, eventually producing outdated 
products and services for non-existing markets and jeopardising the firm’s 
performance and its very existence in the future.  
 
This notion is depicted in Figure 8.2. In short, networks are optimum 
configurations (although through processes using different steps; as discussed, 
this is not a “final” optimum, but a more modest process-based approach).Thus it 
is in between these two extremes that we find chaotic behaviour, notions 
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consistent with theories of complexity and psychodynamics (see Stacey, 2003), 
as the findings of this study have shown. We have seen how IBM almost faced 
extinction in the 90’s, but we can also look at this from a different perspective. A 
small Lab in Barcelona that pioneered hybrid programming and solution driven 
business, today represents 50% of IBM revenues. The same can be said of 
Multiasistencia, a focal firm who had to confront deep changes from 2000 to 
2003. In both cases, they pioneered what, in the end, became a very complex 
process of metamorphosis, changing the rules of the game and the resource 
base. Both focal firms brought networks to a new future.   
 
Thus, Orchestrating Network Behaviour is a network’s capacity to set a path, 
employing an inner capacity called innovativeness (connected creativities, and 
commitments) by managing dynamic equilibrium through (1) dynamically 
managing network boundaries and constraints, reinforcing the notion that no 
complex system can survive without boundaries; (2) unleashing the power of 
digital platforms as co-creative spaces, and (3) boosting multi-connectedness and 
multi-disciplinary teams. This thesis has shown how orchestrating stress (one of 
the roles of management) and providing illustrations of how to manage networks 
can be successful strategies for innovation at the edge of chaos.  
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Innovation and Digital Platforms: Market Factor Generation  
 
This thesis has proposed that orchestrating can generate new markets, although 
this is a first step to which more research must be devoted. This concept 
suggests that orchestrating is one way to command, and that it can generate 
optimal configurations or loosely-coupled structures based on commitments 
through establishing strategic relationships and multi-connectivity. This approach 
suggests that Orchestrating leads to: (1) the generation and diffusion of 
innovation, and (2) combining divergent and convergent behaviour (although 
there may be some predominant patterns depending on the phase). 
 
This approach also suggests that Orchestrating Networks for innovation is a 
meso-level phenomenon that is driven by management. This means that in the 
first steps when activities do not have enough scale, trust and commitments are 
essential to create communities. Once the super-additive games create a critical 
mass, the logic seems to be price driven and solely competitive, thus drastically 
reducing the degrees of autonomy needed and dismissing the role of 
management for market/factor creation. Market logic tends to dissolve existing 
communities and increase competition and opportunism, thus reducing autonomy 
or, in other words, adding more constraints, which can reduce the ability to 
innovate.  
 
In the Multiasistencia case, we explore the implementation of a specific Business 
Network Operating System (BNOS) which played a fundamental role in 
automatically regulating boundaries and ensuring expected behaviour. It 
achieved this through deterrent-based control systems to build trust, and 
increasing efficiency using information tangibility and transparency. In the IBM 
Barcelona Lab, digital platforms allowed the Lab to rapidly take advantage of the 
internet to develop multi-channel solutions for banks world-wide, building 
barriers to competition in this process of co-creation with banks.   
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In Figure 8.3 below, we present the three levels of commitment (1) digitally 
enabled; (2) co-creative and (3) irreversible lead by focal firm. Irreversible 
commitments (from point “B” to “C”) lead to dominant designs and dominant 
business logic, although the path is based on a set of experiments, a set of steps 
until the new business logic is right. This process may also attract other actors 
that can incorporate new complements to the network and to the digital platform 
due to increasing returns and externalities or super-positive sum games. 
Although initial centripetal forces are grounded on the business opportunity, once 
the business grows, the attraction of natural forces of leadership and 
commitments can hide asymmetries due to opportunism. 
 
In fact, digital platforms can be considered as a resource that can generate trust: 
(1) as a deterrent (for managing Service Level Agreements); (2) as a framing 
infrastructure for co-creating by standardize some processes; (3) as a knowledge 
synthesis of the inter-organisational learning process; and (4) as a network 
resource that can generate trust in the network. In this way, digital platforms 
may help to create new opportunities to collaborate and facilitate the 
recombination of this knowledge in novel ways. This can occur in the same or 
new relationships and co-ordination mechanisms, thereby fomenting business 
growth, change and further innovation. We have highlighted information systems 
and the digital platform, in particular, as proxies for commitments and also as a 
communications system and a creative space. Creativity in social settings may be 
part inspirational, but it also requires perception and communication in order to 
become a structural process.  
 
Orchestrating with digital platforms recognises automatic boundary setting for 
network behaviour (as the Multiasistencia case shows). In this case, the 
structural pattern or behaviour was driven by an information system setting a 
specific set of constraints to limit degrees of freedom. The second role 
information systems play is that of a standard and standardisation platform for 
the development of new software modules for the specific function of front-office 
and back-office integration in the banking system. Although business functions 
are different, the social and structural functions are similar: to set boundaries for 
human activities and set standards for behaviour. We represent this as a 
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horizontal line that limits the “levels of freedom” in our diagram of cycles, with 
the hypothesis that “ups” and “downs” can be held at this level; in other words, 
boundaries of action can be set.   
 
After analysing “up” dynamics, we now discuss “downs” and sub-optimal 
regimes. Once a new dominant design emerges, the competition (both external 
and internal) that aspires to this position will focus on prices to take advantage of 
the new design’s weaknesses and offer the same product at better prices, 
focusing on large-scale production. Orchestrators generally focus on the design 
and deployment of specialised assets, that is, the generation of new modules 
through co-creative activities and more specialised assets which are more difficult 
to copy. Examples of this can be clearly seen during the more mature phases 
within the IBM Barcelona Lab and Multiasistencia cases.   
 
The following figure highlights, in the ascending lines, centripetal forces 
predominate, extending limits and generating a positive sum game. Here the 
orchestrator generates value for the network actors through maintaining control 
over the technological strategic resource in order to absorb a greater part of the 
value created. It is here that the commitments are expressed in the form of 
exerting autonomy and co-creation.  
 
Once an optimum is achieved, the scale factor reveals a fact which requires 
further research. The way down starts with the product/services’ maturity, 
community dissolution and competition (external in markets and internal/external 
in global firms). It may be the case that everyone can (or knows how to) 
establish commitments at the individual level (Bowlby, 1980: 1985), and price 
and competition become the forces behind this co-ordination. With this set of 
constraints, factor generation strategies have to make way for the market by 
positioning strategies and investments in terms of differentiation in order to 
maintain the equilibrium (Wernerfelt, 1984). Managing from point “C” to “D” in 
the figure below requires controlling the risks associated with the dissolution of 
the co-creative community and competition. Obviously, each case will indicate 
how these variables are quantified.  
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As argued, if the scale becomes too large, it seems that dynamics are 
superseded by market rules, competition and opportunism, not commitments. 
Transaction Cost Economics can predict this fact, and, according to this research, 
this is true in the absence of commitments as boundary criteria. If the criteria to 
mobilise resources are driven by price, then Transaction Cost Economics can 
predict that valuable resources will tend to be in-sourced by firms. In the IBM 
Barcelona Lab case, once a dominant design was released, the major risk faced 
by the Lab was the dissolution of the technological community due to internal 
competition (as a hypothesis) and internal policies favouring off-shoring.  
 
However, we argue that networks and digital platforms can reach optimum 
states for innovation which engender the dynamics for market creation, through 
which actors can exchange ideas, and then projects and new services can shape 
the network’s structural dynamics. Nevertheless, even when a leading design is 
achieved and management becomes hierarchical with the rules set by 
product/market activities, the way down to a new transition is always hidden. 
This leads to the choice of starting a new orchestrating venture to manage 
commitments and constraints in order to avoid disruptions, and leading network 
behaviour for innovation to create new factors and new opportunities, thus 
emphasising value regimes based on equity or “growing together,” containing 
conflict and organising forward.  
 
Network Leadership   
 
Network Leadership is about changing the rules of the game, attracting people 
and emphasizing relational capacities and political mastery. Leaders are early 
detectors of innovation and conflict. Sources of conflict are similar to innovation: 
hidden asymmetries or new waves that require more than superficial changes, 
but changes in deep structures, shaping network behaviour.  
 
Leaders contain (instead of repress) the emergence of innovation (and conflict) 
and thus commit to teams and objectives (irreversible in some cases). This 
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achieved by Network Leaders leading other leaders, who generate and 
disseminate innovation. Network leadership is about dynamically managing 
boundaries, developing innovation sources, enhancing communication and 
dialogue, and focussing on team performance and business objectives. Network 
leaders emphasize commitments, that is, they set the direction and monitor it. As 
a result, they make the network the locus of innovation by promoting strategic 
relationships for co-creation. In contrast with the idea of leadership as a 
disruption, we argue that leaders should take care of the organisation by linking 
the organisational memory, the present state of affairs and possible future one, 
that is, by linking the old with the new. 
 
The first important factor in power is authenticity as an expression of full power 
over oneself. This is commitment or a commitment to oneself. Leaders also 
commit to their crews, referring back to the Ulysses myth. They naturally attract 
people, including people from inside and outside of formal organisations. Leaders 
naturally exert power by giving autonomy to invite people to work by themselves 
in order to engage in peer-to-peer relational dynamics that lead to co-creation. 
Orchestrating Innovation thus becomes a focal characteristic of Generative 
Networks which are based on opening new sources of innovation and combining 
them through structural communication processes. Orchestrating Generative 
Networks is about how to crystallize different ideas, knowledge and other 
resources to turn them into viable innovations.   
 
Not all managers are leaders, and not all leaders occupy managerial positions. In 
both cases, management and leadership are expressions of power that affect 
how innovation unfolds in organisations. We have argued how important it is for 
leaders to understand and exert managerial capacities. Due to their natural gift 
for attracting people, leaders have a natural attribute for giving autonomy. 
Commitment is the force that keeps the network united and allows it to renew 
the resource base of firms and re-organise economic factors and activities to 
engage in novelty and encourage innovations, that is, ensure its long-term 
survival. We have also briefly explored the complex relationships between 
leaders and how this variable shapes innovation.   
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Since organisations are made up of several leaders; the way they establish 
relationships with others inside and outside of their organisations is important, 
that is, how they establish networks of mutual influence. The question is how to 
determine a systematic method with which to understand how leaders interact, 
how they interact with followers, how they manage different types of 
relationships and different games at the same time, exchanging resources, and 
how they establish relationships between organisations. Orchestrating Network 
Behaviour for Innovation is a managerial function that explores this activity by 
placing “key people in key projects,” emphasizing the role of network leadership 
and its managerial effectiveness in terms of communication, financial outcomes 
and organisational capacities to manage relationships to produce novelty and 
innovation. 
 
In Table 8.1 below, the limits between perspectives are not clear-cut. Roles vary, 
but this table reflects the interpretation of this researcher. Network Leadership is 
about Governance and resilience, that is, the capacity to modify the level of 
control according to the circumstances. It also requires having the 
resourcefulness and flexibility to adapt to a changing situation and the ability to 
process painful and conflicting information. Moreover, we have argued how 
important it is to cultivate politics, alliances, networking and understanding of the 
games of others, looking at all these questions with distance and dealing with  
them in a positive frame of mind.  
 
In the cases studied, we have proposed some additional perspectives that will 
require more work and fine-tuning in further research.  
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 Commanding resources  Market Factor Creation  Building Identity and Purpose  Managing Conflict  Generative Networks for Co-
creation   
Leadership Roles 
or Different Ways to Attract 
(Pull) 
Commander  Entrepreneur 
Recognition (in all phases) 
Agitators  
Integrator/ Institutional  
Connecting the old with the new   
Mentors – Care: Holding and 
Expanding 
Communication 
Resilience  
Exert autonomy  
Reference 
Capacities: organisational, 
economic (tangible) results and 
recognition.  
Resilience and conflict 
management   
Structural Change: Roles, 
Relationships and 
Boundaries 
Boundary reminder  
Exert control over resources 
(formal and informal): 
recognition and sanctions; 
technology; relationships 
Boundary expansion 
(centripetal forces prevail)  
Positive returns  (risk of 
asymmetries)  
Network externalities  
Control over: (1) resources; 
(2) intellectual property; and 
(3 ) “complementors”  
 
Boundary reminders  
Dynamic adaptations: equilibrium 
between centripetal and centripetal 
forces  
Centrifugal forces may prevail: 
competition and community 
dissolution  
Focusing on symmetries and 
complementary factors among 
peers to co-create and make 
investments 
Boundaries controlled by peer-to-
peer negotiations 
Self-controlled autonomous actors 
Co-creation  
 
Digital Platforms Deterrent 
Standards   
 
Digital Platform as ideation  Strategic and structural resource  Deterrent  
SLA  
Component-based digital 
platforms  
Complementary digital assets  
Human Passions  Maintenance of trust  Personal trust in the leader / 
venture (expectations)  
Maintenance of trust   Focus on trust generation  Interactive trust among peers 
Trust in the network  
Trust in the digital platforms   
                                                                      Table 8.1: Leadership Perspectives 
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Limitations        
 
As with any research study, this project has some limitations that warrant 
attention. First, all research on networks suffers from the difficulty in delineating 
the unit of analysis, as many levels of analysis are intertwined in networks. If 
innovation is an expression of leadership and both appear everywhere in the 
organisation, how, then, does management deal with this phenomenon? How do 
leader-to-manager or leader-to-leader relationships influence the practical use of 
the innovation, avoid destructive conflicts and generate value for the 
organisation? A second limitation is that this research is based on two case 
studies, thus requiring validation with more empirical research. Achieving 
additional qualification and validation across larger samples is an obvious goal for 
a larger research agenda.   
 
Other limitations are related to further questions regarding factor and market 
creation. Can orchestrating be found in organisations facing market growth? And 
if so at what level? How are dependencies and market rules combined? How do 
we link market rules and new ubiquitous digital systems to Porter’s model? What 
are the key variables? Digital platforms reveal lock-in, clear boundaries, defined 
functions and clear connectivity protocols to ensure functionality. This approach 
contrasts with the argument of innovation networks, highlighting the capacity to 
exert autonomy in actors and thus generating lock-out. How do we address these 
issues? 
 
More research is required in terms of dynamic capacities and the process of co-
operative experimenting, exploring, and opening the network to new voices. This 
researcher sees several different issues here: What are the costs and limits of 
diversity and differentiation? We know that managing heterogeneous groups is 
difficult. Moreover, peer-to-peer networks are not exactly diverse. How can we 
combine both? How do we manage differences in absorptive capacities? How do 
these differences affect the recombination of resources for innovation? How can 
incentives dynamically affect the network’s evolution?   
 
Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation  |  190 
 
More research is needed on the “innovation manager” theme, accountability, 
since managerial performance and accountability are subject to discretionary 
assessment. How can you account for innovation results? In the cases studied, 
this was an important issue and merits further research.  
 
While we believe that this contribution breaks new ground, we also recognise 
that future research should consider the co-ordination mechanisms that govern 
network behaviour for innovation and their differences with other units of 
analysis.  
 
 
Final Remarks  
 
The construct Orchestrating Network Behaviour for Innovation highlights the 
governance of different voices and co-creative processes, which work through 
setting boundaries and changing rules of the game according to circumstances, 
rather than exerting power to “destroy” people’s creativity and natural capacities 
(or condemn people to anomic contexts). Therefore, networks are strategically 
orchestrated contexts where dynamic, inter-organisational relationships allow for 
collaborative action to innovate. Relationships are also complex phenomena that 
require different levels of analysis to understand their co-dependency 
mechanisms and how these affect deep structures and network behaviour. 
Finally, we have described the specificities in peer-to-peer production 
relationships as activities between peers or equals in a hierarchy, but 
heterogeneous in the recombination of complementary assets such as knowledge 
and technology. This combination generates trust for the orchestrator as a 
reference (or the interactive lighthouse of the network) and is interactive at the 
relationship level.  
 
Now the ship is reaching harbour and has to be docked. Network Leaders, as in 
Ulysses’ journey, steer ships across the seas of ideas and reality, navigating and 
bridging the past (and memories which are expressed through behaviour, a style 
and some routines at the social level), current reality and the future. The path for 
network behaviour for innovation is found precisely on this journey. It is the 
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capacity to build non pre-defined futures, thus requiring autonomy, creativity and 
dynamic setting of constraints to define behaviour. Network behaviour creates 
structures which shape further network behaviour. This is why complex systems 
cannot survive without constraints or with too many or too tight ones.   
 
Setting a path requires facing the unknown. Science and rationality are symbols 
of commitments (or binding rationality). Leaders must know their weaknesses 
and bind themselves to the mast. Like Ulysses, they are symbols of courage and 
power through the commitments they establish are symbols to themselves, to 
their crews (asking commitment in return) and to the ship. Leaders see the world 
through new perspectives, but require Strategic Management to steer ships 
through the murky waters of time and the changeable weather conditions of 
organising: what has been, what is, and what may be. 
 
Orchestrating is a managerial function that enables a network capacity, which is 
not a characteristic of one individual or a single focal firm. It is in this context 
where Network Leaders steer sets of commitments to build new paths. The 
critical variables are first: the capacity to build references, second: understanding 
that circumstances vary along the way, and third: managing dynamic constraints 
to balance autonomy and multi-connected networks with limits of action to 
optimize creativity and communication. Network Leaders exert power as a 
continuous process of dynamically controlling boundaries by reaching a series of 
optimums, opening new spaces by regulating boundaries, and taking advantage 
of the potential power of digital platforms. When boundaries expand, it is like 
opening a window - the air is colder but also fresher. Leaders are in command 
and give autonomy by putting rules of the game (boundaries) in place, mobilising 
resources, recognizing waves (unfolding mainsail when needed) and setting 
direction in co-creative ways, and managing key people in key projects (leading 
leaders). Leaders steer the ship by showing resilience, that is, by binding 
themselves to the mast, while at other times being unleashed in order to 
orchestrate network behaviour towards innovation.  
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